
COOPER'S TRACTS.

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V O L . I.



T R A C T S

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T H E O L O G I C A L

A N D

P O L I T I C A L:

By THOMAS COOPER, Esq.

K

V O L. I.

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ETHEL

THEOLOGICAL

AND

REPORT

THE



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1875

THE

1875

DEDICATION.
regions (if they were necessary)
might be assigned for the practice.
But I shall not take the trouble of
having them; for I shall myself
follow in the
TO THE

REV. J. BARWIS,

NITON, ISLE OF WIGHT.

DEAR SIR,

I PRESENT you with a Collection of Tracts, in defence of opinions, for the most part I dare say, in perfect opposition to your own.

This may not be very usual among dedicators, although good

A 2

reasons

reasons (if they were necessary) might be assigned for the practice. But I shall not take the trouble of stating them; for I hold myself at full liberty, to follow in this respect, the bent of my own inclination; and having written a volume for the sake of the public, I may fairly take a page to gratify myself.

Indeed, if conformity of opinion were necessary to a dedication, my book must remain ungraced with the name of any of my friends; with all of whom, at some time or other, I have had the good fortune to differ widely in

DEDICATION. v

in sentiment, on important points of literary controversy. A circumstance, I hope and believe has in many instances contributed to make me a wiser and a better man---if not, the fault has been my own.

But whatever disagreement of opinion there may be, between you and me on the subjects of the following Essays, I know you will give me credit for my intentions respecting them; and as you will think favourably of my motives, I am sure, you will not be offended at this public profession of esteem and regard. Some pleasure
fure

sure you will certainly receive, on seeing that the knowledge I derived from your instructions has not been entirely neglected; and that the many acts of kindness and attention you have formerly shewn me, have not been entirely forgotten, by

Your sincere Friend

and Servant,

MANCHESTER,

Dec. 1, 1787.

THOMAS COOPER.

P R E F A C E.

THE greater part of the present, as well as the succeeding volume, has originated from a desire of contributing to the entertainment of the *literary and philosophical Society of Manchester*; an institution, for which great credit is due to the Gentlemen who first suggested it. Many of the following disquisitions, however, are such, as from the nature of the subjects treated, could not be read at that Society; and as I have been in some degree under the necessity of publishing the Tract on Materialism, which makes a part of the present volume, I formed a resolution to present to the Manchester

Society such papers as I deemed best adapted to their Memoirs, and to print in a separate publication such other essays as I might venture to subject to the public eye,

With this view the present volume was printed off early in last winter : and I was proceeding to correct the Tracts which I meant for the second volume, when the subject of the *Slave Trade* began to be agitated ; and while my health permitted, the whole of my leisure during that winter, was employed in exciting the attention of the inhabitants of Manchester to that infamous and impolitic traffic ; and it will give me pleasure to the latest period of my life to reflect, that my leisure was not ineffectually employed. The rest of my time has been principally occupied by a renewal of professional studies which the ill state of my health compelled me formerly to relinquish.

Thus

Thus much of apology for not having performed what I heretofore promised; and for presenting to the public one volume only of Essays, more speculative and abstruse, and perhaps of less immediate application than those which I design for a second volume. This last (if health permit) shall certainly be published next winter; as I mean to compose nothing new,* but to dedicate those hours of leisure which more urgent avocations will allow me, to the correction of

* Since this volume was printed off, *Dr. Crawford* has published a second edition of his important work on Heat; as that Gentleman seems to countenance some chemical opinions on the subject, directly contrary to those which I have endeavoured to establish in my Tract on *Identity*, I shall certainly re-examine my own doctrine with attention. I omit for the present to state the objections which appear to me prominent against the Doctor's sentiments, because I think every opinion of *Dr. Crawford* (on this subject in particular) entitled to a careful and attentive examination; and I therefore defer my observations to the next volume.

such

x P R E F A C E.

such tracts as are already finished in other respects.

As to the subjects treated in the ensuing pages, although unimportant in the opinion of many readers, they are such as every serious thinking man, of literary education, wishes early to make up his mind about; so far at least as the present state of our knowledge will permit: the greatest and wisest and best among the literati of our own country, have so thought, and if I have erred in thinking so too, I have erred in good company.

In treating these subjects, I have endeavoured to be rather argumentative than declamatory; and I think it will be found, that I have shunned no considerable objection to my own opinion, nor stated unfairly the opinions of others. In general I have aimed at a brief history of the controversies, and a concise view of both sides, of the questions

questions discussed. The opinions which I myself have adopted, are far from being popular; and I am aware that some apology may be expected for the freedom with which I have advanced them: but I am not prepared to make any. I have sought carefully for truth, and I have endeavoured freely to communicate it to others: herein, I do not think I have done more, than what by right I might do, and by duty I was bound to do. If my opinions happen to be singular, the fault is not mine; no man can command his own judgement, or prevent the effect of such evidence as occurs.

Neither do I see why any opinions should be concealed, however singular or however *apparently* dangerous. They are either true or false: if true, they ought to be propagated as tending to the good of mankind; and as that is true to every man which appears to him

him to be so, every man is bound to propagate his own opinions whatever they may happen to be.*

Should they be false, they may either be urged so plausibly as to deserve confutation, or so weakly as to need none. In the former case, it is of importance to the public that they should be promulged and effectually confuted; and in the latter case, there can be no objection to their publication, because they can do no harm. Indeed, whether an opinion has a good or an evil tendency, cannot be told till it be published; so that the objection in question must always be premature.

This point however I have urged more at large in my Tract on Materialism; and what I have there said, would have been more amply stated,

* Et sapis, et mecum sentis, et Jove judicas equo.

HOR.

had

had I recollected at the time, *Collins's* discourse on free enquiry in defence of Mr. Whiston, prefixed to the "grounds and reasons of the Christian Religion," which I would recommend to the perusal of those who may not be satisfied with my reasoning on the subject.

Indeed, although it be of great importance to the moral character of an individual, that he should not attempt to propagate any opinions but such as appear to him to be true, it is in general of very little moment to the public whether they are presented with a defence of truth or error, in abstract and speculative disquisitions, provided the subject be so handled, as to deserve consideration. For an erroneous opinion urged so plausibly as to excite general attention, in all cases accelerates the adoption of truth, and in many, far more than when the latter is advanced absurdly, or defended weakly. Nor indeed can any well-founded

founded hypothesis be regarded as thoroughly established, till the opposite opinions with all the objections, have been urged as forcibly and as plausibly, as the nature of them will admit.

Truth, whenever it be thoroughly discussed will never fail to come like tried gold out of the fire: with Ajax, it requires nothing but day light and fair play;

Ποίησον δ' αἰθρην, δὸς δ' οφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδεῖσθαι.
 Ἐν δὲ φάει καὶ ὀλεσσον Il. xvii. 646.

Believing therefore as I do, that the opinions I have adopted, have a balance of evidence in their favour, I am not very solicitous whether they will ultimately be so found or not; and saving that degree of attachment which an author cannot but have to his own sentiments, I shall in other respects be equally satisfied, whether mine *be* the truth or *produce* the truth; in either case I have no doubt but good will be the result.

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T A B L E
O F
C O N T E N T S.

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* This was read at the Manchester Society September 29, 1784, which I mention chiefly because Dr. Paley's book on Morals which was published some time after, and which I never saw till lately, states the question somewhat in the same way as I do.

† Not read at the Manchester Society.

‡ Read at the Manchester Society January 17, 1787.

‖ The Chemical part read at the Manchester Society November 9, 1787.

§ Not read at the Manchester Society.

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I read at the Manchester Society January 17, 1787.	
§ The Chemical part read at the Manchester Society November 1787.	
§ Not read at the Manchester Society.	

The AUTHOR's distance from the press has made necessary the following

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA,

Which in some instances it will be important to the meaning, to attend to.

Page 3, note c, for *Infinites* read *Infinites*. P. 12, n. c, I have lost the reference to Suarez. P. 14, l. 6. f. why r. *why*. P. 18, l. 1. f. *ulmitate* read *ultimate*. P. 34, n. d, l. 2, after p. 4 add, *who* instances. P. 40, l. 11, add as a note, "Dr. Reid since this was written has published a Treatise on the Active Powers of the Mind, which I have not yet had an opportunity to peruse. P. 41, l. 11, It is but justice to Dr. Reid to add, that though Dr. Beattie be far the most elegant, the former is by far the most acute of the three. P. 49, l. 1, the parenthesis should end at *social*. P. 56, l. 18, after *perception* add *and by*. P. 67, l. 4, from the bottom, for *see immediately* r. *soon see*. P. 75, l. last, for *own account*, r. *own account*. P. 81, l. 11, after *Hume* add *perhaps*. P. 85, l. 4, add as a note, "I have gone too far in supposing a deist *must* make a doubt of the doctrine of a future state: on consideration, I think it proveable in a very probable degree independant of christianity; but on grounds very different from those adopted by the present Bishop of London (Porteus)." P. 86, add to the note "Bishop Clayton's Essay on Spirit, p. 14." P. 89, l. 7. f. *as far* r. *so far*. P. 134, l. 7, after *agent* add *be*. P. 145, l. 6, after *it is* add *as*. P. 164, l. 11, f. *possitive* r. *positive*. P. 177, l. 15, f. *one* r. *our*. P. 184, l. 19, f. *it is answered* r. *I answer*. P. 227, l. 10, f. *brobity*, r. *probity*; and in l. 15, add as a note to the word *late*, "he was alive when this was written." P. 238, l. 11, f. *eminent* r. *emanent*. P. 240, l. 14, add as a note, "I renounce this opinion on consideration, as I have before mentioned in a note, p. 85, l. 4. P. 241, l. 7, add as a note, "Dr. Smith has published in a late vol. of the Phil. Transf. a paper on the same subject. P. 251, note (1) l. 1, after *concerning the* add *mobility of the*. P. 330, l. 6, add "and in the beginning of his *Considerations sur les Corps Organizés*. P. 340, l. 11, f. *thence* r. *this admission*. P. 351, l. 11, f. *conception* r. *corruption*. P. 399, note k after i. e. add *with*. P. 400, l. 13, after *or* add *the*; l. 14, after *been* add *erroneously*; l. 20, after *place*, add *and is formed*. P. 401, l. 5, f. *second* r. *second*. P. 412, l. 4, f. *Magellon*, r. *De Magellan*. P. 427, l. 4, from the bottom, *dele the period*. P. 435, l. 1, after *of* add *personal*. P. 443, l. 3, add as a note, Archbishop Tillotson, v. 12. serm. 2, says, "I do not find that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is expressly delivered in scripture." P. 438, l. 15, add as a note, "Since writing this Tract, I find by an answer to a Socinian publication called the Naked Gospel, that the author of this latter, denied the resurrection of the same body." P. 444, l. 2, see the great use made of this hypothesis in Dr. Porteus's sermon on the Evidences of a Future State; l. last of the note, add "but how far the passages go to substantiate this doctrine I do not mean to say; I think it cannot certainly be concluded from them."

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ON MORAL OBLIGATION.

E S S A Y

MORAL OBLIGATION.

WHEN Socrates was told that the Oracle had pronounced him the wisest man, he disclaimed all title to superior wisdom except in this; that whereas others pretended to know every thing, he was conscious that he knew nothing.^a There was no affected modesty in this answer: considering how numerous, how discordant, and how dog-

^a Laert in Socrat.

2 ON MORAL OBLIGATION.

matic were the sects among the philosophers in his time; how apt were the heads of each sect to deliver as certainties the most improbable, and frequently absurd conjectures, and how ready were their followers *jurare in verba magistri*, with implicit faith to adopt and assert the tenets of their leaders, the observation of Socrates may be truly considered, as a mark of more wisdom, as well as more modesty, than any of his cotemporaries appear to have possessed.

But the *full* force of this observation, and the very high degree of knowledge it involves, can be perceived by those only, who have sought in vain for certainty in subjects, apparently the most simple and obvious. With such inquirers it must not a little detract from the opinion they might otherwise entertain of the extent of human intellect, to consider, that in many propositions of the utmost importance, no choice seems

seems remaining, but that of the least of two apparent absurdities ;^b that some of the clearest deductions of reason are contradictory to the clearest axioms ;^c and that of the strongest representations of our senses, some are demonstrably false,^d and others at best problematical.^e From such perplexing questions no science is free : they occur to the divine, to the metaphysician, the geometrician, the natural philosopher. What shall we say then ? Dogmatically assert with the contradictory Pyrrhonists that nothing is to be asserted ? or yield up the ground we can no longer dispute, and with Socrates fairly confess our incapacity ? The

^b To give an instance in each. Nothing exists without a cause : we found our proof of a first cause upon this ; but wherever we stop we contradict our axiom. I mean to say more on this.

^c Instances of this occur in the doctrine of infinities.

^d The sensible qualities for instance.

^e Is there such a thing as matter ?

4 ON MORAL OBLIGATION.

latter course seems the more eligible, but were it adopted, improvement would soon end.

The question concerning *the true source of moral obligation*, although it be not perhaps insoluble, yet one might be tempted to conjecture from the frequent discussion it has received, from the discordance of the opinions concerning it, from the difficulty of the subjects to which it is allied, and from the undecided state in which it remains, that it was entitled to rank with the topics above alluded to. We have been able to discern a great part of the superstructure of morality, but no one can yet say with certainty, that he has discovered the foundation; and notwithstanding the time cannot be pointed out, when mankind were not universally agreed that some things ought, and that others ought not to be done, no one has yet been able to assign the reason *why*, with respect to
the

the individual so clearly, as to produce a general acquiescence in his sentiments, or to render further discussion unnecessary.

I have been tempted in my turn, to throw together some observations on the subject, *not* from a presumption that I have been more fortunate than my predecessors, in discovering, what with talents and industry so far superior, they sought in vain; but from an opinion, that a question of such importance cannot be too frequently discussed while any obscurity remains on it; and that if I have failed a discovery of my errors may possibly induce others to turn their thoughts to the subject with greater ability and better success.

Some confusion has been introduced,* by intermixing the question concerning the *true source of moral obligation*, with

* Hutcheson, Kaimes, Hume, &c.

6 ON MORAL OBLIGATION.

the inquiry *how* we come by our moral ideas. Hence some writers seem to have thought it sufficient, to shew (according to their respective hypotheses) how the idea of moral obligation arises. But the task is not completed when that is performed. The latter question indeed is of easy solution, nor will there be two opinions on the subject, among those who have attended to the *association of ideas*, and are unwilling to admit more causes than are sufficient to explain the phenomena. Our moral ideas we obtain from our parents, our tutors, our companions, our books.^h Neither is it sufficient to shew what is the *immediate* motive which induces men to follow their duty: it is evident from association, as Mr. Gayⁱ has shewn, that men frequently act without stopping to ask why. In

^h Hartley, vol. I. 498.

ⁱ Preliminary Dissertation to King's Origin of Evil, p. 29.

general,

general, from numerous repetitions of similar circumstances the case and the conduct are associated intimately and immediately, which were so formerly remotely and mediately. The same phenomenon occurs in walking, in playing on an instrument, in dancing, as Hartley^k has shewn. Again, many persons have no other motive for acting agreeably to rectitude, than that it is the opinion of their parents, or of the world. Add too, that a *religious man* not metaphysically inclined would seek no farther in general than whether it were the command of God: in the same case the motives of a man *not* accustomed to religious impressions would be very different. It is not sufficient therefore to shew how or why men *usually* act; the question is, can a better reason be assigned for the action

^k This is evident in all the cases of the conversion of the voluntary into the imperfectly voluntary and automatic motions.

8 ON MORAL OBLIGATION.

than is usually the inducement to it;
and if so, what is it?

Of the definitions that are given of moral obligation, the greater part are framed with a view to the hypothesis of the definer, and thence include a *petitio principii*: the metaphorical nature of the term obligation has led to this and much other obscurity. I cannot help thinking, that if the subject had always been stated interrogatively, less would have been written, and more would have been known concerning it. Instead therefore of laying down an abstract definition of moral obligation, I shall state a question, and examine how far the answers are satisfactory, which the several hypotheses respectively suggest. It is universally allowed, that in certain cases, I ought (*morally* speaking) to act in a certain manner. But *why* ought I to do so? What is the *ultimate* reason or motive which on an attentive consideration of the

the

the subject should induce me to act in this, rather than in that manner? Because, say some,

I. It is agreeable to the will of God.¹

II. To the eternal and necessary fitness and congruity of things.^m

III. It is the dictate of the moral sense.ⁿ

IV. It is the dictate of common sense: of the *κοινὴ ἐννοία*.^o

V. You are conscious of a sensation that impels you so to do.^p

VI. Your understanding represents such an action to you as right, and of course that you ought to do so.^q

¹ Aquinas, Occam, Scotus, Suarez, Hobbes, Leibnitz, Barbeyrac, Warburton.

^m Grotius, Rust, Clarke, Balguy.

ⁿ Hutcheson.

^o Lord Herbert, Reid, Beattie and Oswald.

^p Ellis.

^q Cudworth, Butler, Adams, Price.

VII. It is agreeable to right reason.^r

VIII. It is agreeable to the truth of things.^s

IX. It is conducive to general utility.^t

X. It is conducive to the *bonè esse*, to your own greatest good upon the whole.^u

The above is the substance of the answers which the authors in the margin may be supposed to give to the question. It is very possible that

^r Burlamaqui.

^s Wollaston.

^t Hume.

^u Gaftrell, Cumberland, Puffendorf,* Norris,† Gay,‡ Turnbull,§ Rutherford,¶ Soame Jenyns,|| Dr. Johnson.*

* Law of N and N book I. ch. vi. § 5. and the note thereon of Barbeyrac. † Miscellanies, p. 214.

‡ Preliminary Dissertation, and note to King's Origin of Evil, p. 66, quarto edit. § Note to Heineccius, p. 16.

¶ Essay on Virtue, ch. vii.

|| Origin of Evil, Letter IV.

* Review of Soame Jenyn's Origin of Evil, in the Miscellanies published by Davies, 3 vols.

others

others may have adopted systems that would suggest answers different from these; but as I pretend not to offer a complete treatise on the subject, I hope to stand excused, if giving those opinions, and citing those authors only that have occurred to me, other maintainers of the same opinions, and other sentiments of equal importance may have passed unnoticed. What I *have* offered would have been less incorrect, if more time or more books had been at my command.

The first opinion, “ that the source
 “ of moral obligation is to be sought for
 “ in the will of the Deity,” seems to have arisen *chiefly* from the prevalence of the christian religion, which has a tendency to promote an habitual reference of every thing to God, far more than any other religious system, whether ancient or modern: though traces of this opinion may be inferred from the sentiments of many of the ancient philosophers

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Iosophers concerning the Deity, such as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and others.^x This opinion was maintained among the schoolmen by Thomas Aquinas,^y by Duns Scotus,^z by Occam,^a by Suarez,^b &c. of later authors Gale^c has advanced it, Hobbes,^d Leibnitz,^e

* See the quotations in the Chevalier Ramsey's Discourse of the Theology of the Pagans. I shall observe here once for all, that I have not had either opportunity or books to refer to *all* the *original* authors I quote. I might indeed have copied the references from the books I consulted without acknowledgment, but I chose rather to offer my *real* authorities, though they may not always be such as a man of *learning* would refer to.

^y Secunda Secundæ Questio 88.

^z Court of the Gentiles, part IV. book III. ch. i. § 2, parag. 2.

^a Cudworth on eternal and immutable morality, p. 10.

^b

^c See note ^z.

^d De cive, ch. xv. § 5, 7.

^e See Barbeyrac's note to Puff. L N and N. book I. ch. vi. § 5. and Burlamaqui's Nat. Law, Nugent's translation, p. 64.

Barbeyrac

Barbeyrac^f and Warburton,^g whose set of opinions on the subject of morals seems to have been adopted by the present Vinerian professor.^h These seem the chief among those who have deduced all moral obligation from the Deity *alone*. Others, such as Burlamaquiⁱ have indeed insisted upon the necessity of introducing the Deity in the case, but have not regarded him as the sole source. Among the abettors of this hypothesis Hobbes^k rests all upon the attribute of infinite power, the expressions of Barbeyrac look the same way, nor are those of M. Leibnitz very dissimilar. Warburton does not analyse our idea of the Deity for the purpose. Burlamaqui insists that is necessary to take in the idea of all his attributes; and that although the will of

^f Ibid. and his note on Grotius, L. I. ch. i. § 10.

^g Divine Leg. vol. I. p. 86.

^h Month. Rev. Mar. 1784.

ⁱ Burlamaqui, p. 89.

^k Ulli *supra*.

a being

a being of infinite goodness, wisdom and power be obligatory, no two of these attributes are sufficient without the other. But whether one or all the attributes be taken into the account, the question still recurs why ought I to act agreeably to the will of God? Is this the ultimate reason or motive that induces me to act thus? The terms of this question are not identical, and therefore it can be asked: but if it can be asked without an absurdity, the hypothesis is overturned. Again, let the case be supposed, that an action agreeable to the will of God is inconsistent with my happiness upon the whole: the terms of the supposition do not involve a contradiction, and therefore it may be made. What obligation then am I under, what inducement can I have to act in contradiction to my own happiness, or what recompense *can* be made me for so doing? Again, those actions which are agreeable to the will of God, are they en-
joined

joined without an end, upon no account whatever? Certainly not. For God is an intelligent agent: he is also a God of infinite benevolence, wisdom and power. His injunctions therefore cannot be nugatory, or for an evil end, but necessarily for a good end: from the attributes of God therefore, it appears that the good meant to be effected by that conduct which he has enjoined, was the reason of its being enjoined. A reason therefore may be assigned *beyond* the mere will of the Deity, *why* such a conduct ought to be pursued, namely, that which occasioned it to be the will of the Deity. *Causa causæ est causa causati.*

Again: All propositions that are intuitively true, are by the term obvious, and undeniable by every one. But the proposition, "The Deity is the only source of moral obligation," is far from being obvious, and it is denied by far more than those who assert it. But
if

if it be not intuitively true, it is either not true at all, or by the terms, a reason is to be given why it is true, which shall be more evident than the proposition itself. But this reason gives the death's wound to the hypothesis; for whatever that reason be, it will shew that the will of God is not the *ultimate* reason why we do this or that.

Again: It is evident that all arguments in favour of this hypothesis, must consist either of mere assertions, or be deduced from the insufficiency of other systems: for, as appears from what has been just urged, if any reason be assigned why we ought to obey the will of God, that very reason proves the source of moral obligation to lie deeper than this hypothesis supposes. As to the arguments from the insufficiency of others, they will occur respectively as the other systems come to be considered, and were they just, they

they would be collateral and presumptive only, not conclusive. The remaining class, that of mere assertions, are of use only as *illustrative* of a proposition which they necessarily suppose intuitively true. But beside what has been urged concerning the universal acquiescence claimed by every other intuitive proposition, I may fairly appeal to the same principle of perception, and ask if the truth of this proposition be at first sight so apparent, as to force conviction upon every mind?

The only observation¹ in favour of this system that I know of worth noticing is, "obligation implies an obliger, and it is absurd to talk of a man's obliging himself." If the objectors imply an obliger in their meaning of obligation, it amounts to no more than a *petitio principii*: but take the second way wherein I have stated the question,

¹ Warburton, and Barbeyrac.

what is the ultimate reason or motive which should induce me to act in this or that manner? In this case (which is the true state of the question) no obliger is necessary. I see not how it can be asserted, that if the command of God in any particular case were optional to a man, and more good than harm would upon the whole result from neglecting rather than obeying it, any ground of obligation could be shewn to induce a conformity. The reason why this state of the question was never considered by the abettors of this system as far as I can find, seems to be that it never occurred to them that the command of God could possibly in any case be inconsistent with the good upon the whole, of any individual, which certainly is true in *fact*. But as no one could possibly hesitate which side to take, were the commands of God evidently inconsistent with the *summum bonum*, no one, on attentive consideration can obey the commands of God *merely* because

because they are his commands. Again, if it be mere will only, that can oblige, if an obliger and a superior be necessary to obligation, then God neither is nor ever could be under any obligation. The contrary of which appears to me true. According to my opinion (the reasons of which may be given hereafter) it follows from our ideas of the first cause, and of his attributes, that he is a necessary agent as far as we have any conception of such, and that nothing that he hath ever done, or does, or will do, could have been otherwise, or have been omitted; and I am not capable of conceiving a *higher* degree of obligation; what more could an obliger effect? I conclude therefore, that there is some reason beyond the mere will of the Deity, for my acting in any particular manner, though that mode of action at the same time be acknowledged, agreeable to his will.

§ II. We come now to the second answer. You ought to do so, because such an action is conformable to the eternal and necessary fitness of things.

An *essentiæ rerum sunt eternæ*, is a common question in the schools, and by the schoolmen generally answered in the affirmative.^m Among the ancients there were some who denied it, and the controversy was renewed about the middle of the last century in consequence of the same opinion (the negative) being advanced by Des Cartes, and his followers,ⁿ whose sentiments were opposed among us by Rust bishop of Dromore,^o his annotator Glanville,^p Cudworth,^q Norris,^r Leibnitz, and

^m Vide Stahlîi regul. Philos. in hanc. quest.

ⁿ Vide Cudworth on Morality, p. 28.

^o Lux orientalis, and Rust's Discourse on the Immutability of Truth annexed.

^p Ibid.

^q Cudworth ubi sup.

^r A Metaphysical Essay toward the Demonstration of a God, from the steady and immutable Nature of Truth; in his Miscellanies.

those

those who maintain the hypothesis of obligation we are about to examine. The strict Cartesian hypothesis was soon exploded, as it evidently contradicted the axiom, it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time, and in the same respect: indeed the common instance by the writers on school metaphysics was a sufficient answer.^t *Essentia rerum sunt eternæ, quia Deus volens producere hominem, verbi gratiâ, non potest illi tribuere essentiam Lapidis, quia non faceret hominem sed Lapidem.* The principal argument^u of the Cartesians was that if the essences of things, and all verities and falsities depend not upon the arbitrary will of God, then something that was not God, would be independent of God.

But they would be no otherwise so than impossibles are, and prior to the

^t Vide Stahl. ubi. sup. from Mendoza.

^u Cudworth, p. 34.

actual existence of things, those *potential* essences, verities and falsities are synonymous with the wisdom of God, that is God himself. To the Cartesians succeeded the maintainers of the more modified opinion, that although the relations of things do necessarily belong to them while they exist, yet they depend upon God because the things themselves, the Relates and Correlates depend on him, and it was entirely arbitrary and optional to him, whether he constituted this system of things and relations, or another system of different things and different relations: also, that God chooses this or that, not from any previous view of a greater good that would thence result, but that every thing, and the necessary effects of every thing are previously indifferent, and good only in consequence of his election. This opinion is also controverted by the opposers of the Cartesians before-mentioned, by Clarke and his followers, and by the maintainers

tainers of the sixth hypothesis of his moral obligation before enumerated. The arguments in favour of it are stated by archbishop King,* and his translator Gay, and their opinion is adopted by lord Bolingbroke. As far as good and evil, right and wrong are separated from the pleasure and pain ultimately produced by them, I think the latter opinion incontrovertible. But 1st. previous to the actual formation of the present system, would any other of the systems *in posse*, have produced a greater sum of happiness than the present? 2. Was the greater sum of happiness resultable, the inducement to God to prefer this? 3. This motive or inducement did it operate *necessarily* or not; could God consistently with his attributes have produced any other?

These questions are extremely curious, and far from being settled; and as

* Page 185, quarto edit.

24 ON MORAL OBLIGATION.

they are very nearly connected with the subject of obligation, I shall state such arguments as occur to me on both sides in the Appendix.*

The terms fitness and unfitness, mean commonly the aptitude or inaptitude of a mean to an end; when applied to morals, if they mean any thing, they must be synonymous with virtue and vice, proper and improper. Not to enter at present into the dispute whether virtue and vice be founded upon the essential relations of things, or arbitrary, and consequent upon God's election of such things; I ask what motive or inducement have I to practise virtue rather than vice, to act conformably to this fitness, rather than opposite thereto? Is this question *evidently* absurd and identical? If it be not (as I think it is not) the hypo-

* I meant this: but I have given up the idea for the present.

thesis in question does not reach far enough : we must dig deeper for the foundation. Again, it is certain that a course of virtuous actions is not always its own reward in this life : a man, who looked no farther than the grave, might have reason to make the same exclamation that Brutus did, though his actions might have been even more uniformly and indisputably virtuous than those of Brutus. Hence the necessity of inferring a future state of retribution. But if virtue were of itself a sufficient and reasonable inducement to us to follow it, what need of any *reward* either here or hereafter ? It is certain that virtuous actions are frequently disadvantageous and disagreeable to us for the present ; it is equally certain, that vice is at first sight frequently more engaging : have we *no* reason for giving up the pleasurable and suffering the painful sensations ? Is it the beauty of virtue that induces us ? or is it not rather the well-grounded

grounded apprehension, that upon the whole of our existence we shall be gainers by such a conduct, and that the present pleasurable course of vice is inconsistent with our future felicity? Make the supposition, that vicious actions would, upon the whole of our existence, produce a greater sum of happiness than a constant adherence to the side of virtue: what motive^z could any reasonable man have to prefer this to the former? Or how can the Almighty possibly reward us, but by making us happy; or how punish, but by inflicting pain? In fact, whatever may become of morality, religion teaches us to fly from the *wrath* to come! And the only motives it holds out to us, are a prospect of a high degree of future pleasure as the reward of

^z The very maintainers of this opinion allow, that were virtue inconsistent without happiness, we should not be under any obligation to pursue it. See Balguy's Tracts, p. 89, 91, &c. Clarke's Boyle's Lect. 258.

virtue,

virtue, and a proportionate degree of future misery as the infallible consequence of vice. No *direct* argument can consistently be urged in favour of this or any other opinion concerning the true source of moral obligation, because if any reason could be given containing a medium of proof, that medium would be one step nearer the truth than the proposition it was meant to support. So that nothing can be stated *in favour* of the hypothesis we are examining, which will be other than illustrative, or amount to more than a repetition of the assertion in different language. It is highly necessary to bear in mind throughout this disquisition, that the true answer to the question must not admit of the interrogation why? In fact, the observations of the writers who maintain this system, consist of nothing but assertions that there is a real difference, in the nature of things, between vice and virtue antecedent to God's appointment, and independent of

of any happiness or misery that might result from the one or the other; a proposition that may well be denied, and if true, would not *prove* the obligatoriness of virtue.

The only thing I have met with like an argument is this.* “The same reason of things with regard to which, the will of God always, and necessarily *does* determine itself to choose to act only what is agreeable to justice, equity, goodness and truth, in order to the welfare of the whole universe; *ought* likewise constantly to determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings, to govern all their actions by the same rules, for the good of the public in their respective stations.” This amounts to no more than that the reasons of things are obligatory both to God and to us. It is indeed rather unluckily expressed,

* Clarke, p. 174.

for if one were inclined to cavil, one might say, if we *ought* to make the reason of things the guide of our actions because God does so, then they are not *of themselves* obligatory upon us. This may serve as an example of the impossibility of producing consistently a direct argument or medium of proof, in support of the answer we may think proper to make to the question in agitation.

§ III. Why *ought* I to act virtuously rather than viciously? Because it is the dictate of the moral sense, says a very ingenious writer. Dr. Hutcheson, in his Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, and in his Illustrations of the Moral Sense annexed to his Essay on the Passions,^b deduces all our moral ideas from a kind of instinctive approbation, an implanted sense whose peculiar objects are the moral relations, in like manner as odours, of the sense of

^b Sect. IV. and V.

smelling favours, of tasting, sounds of hearing, &c.

This is a step toward the doctrine of occult qualities. He examines some of the schemes of preceding writers for accounting for our moral ideas, and on weighing them in the balance of his own disquisition, he finds them all wanting. It was rather a hasty conclusion however, that because none of these schemes account for the motives that usually *do* influence men in their moral determinations, therefore none of them assign the motive that *ought* to influence them. In like manner I might argue, that because men do not always act upon the principles of the christian religion, that religion does not afford them right principles to act upon. The most proper and reasonable motive that *can* be assigned, for one mode of acting rather than another, is not always known, and if known, does not always occur, and
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when it occurs does not always actually influence the agent, among men; nor would there be the least difficulty in this, to any one who had been at the pains of considering the doctrine of the association of ideas; and yet, Hutcheson was not totally unacquainted with those phenomena. But to proceed to his system. Why ought I to act thus? It is one of those actions, he would say, which the moral sense incites you instinctively to approve, and therefore you ought to do it. But why ought I to follow the dictates of the moral sense? *Video meliora proboque*, but if the *deteriora* are the more pleasant, as they commonly are, what inducement have I to give them up? You follow the dictates of the moral sense? Yes. And why do you so? You may, if you please, as in fact you frequently do, act directly the contrary. If you had it not in your power to act contrary to those dictates, indeed it would be absurd in me to ask
 why

why you follow them? But it is evident the question may be asked, and if so, what becomes of this hypothesis?

Again; This opinion is extremely unphilosophical, because it recurs to an arbitrary, conjectural and unknown cause to account for that which may be accounted for from principles already well known and ascertained. With respect to the origin of our moral ideas in general, the question has been already answered: it would be egregious trifling to explain at length, as if it were necessary to be done, how those ideas originate with us, after what has been said by Hartley on the general subject of association. And with respect to the obligatoriness of actions in particular, this system explains nothing which mere Perception is not equivalent to. Accordingly it has never been very prevalent among persons of a philosophical turn: at the best it is very unnecessary. But farther, if
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our moral ideas arise from an implanted sense, they must partake of the properties of sensible qualities in general, and are not significative of any thing real in actions: so that we have as much authority for saying that heat is in the fire, as that any actions are right or wrong, whatever may be the ideas included in those terms. But I think it cannot be denied, without downright Cartesianism, that while the things themselves are in actual existence their relations are necessary to them, whether moral or any other. Again, according to this opinion, that which every man takes to be a part of morality is absolutely so to him, exactly as the sensation of heat to me, which is occasioned by a substance of a warmer temperature than my body, although the temperature of that substance being below yours would give the sensation of cold to you; for it is nothing real that you perceive independent of your own sensations. Hence

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what we now term an erroneous judgment in morals, would be full as true and as real, as what is termed a right one. Again, this being an *instinctive* approbation common to all men, there ought to be no difference of opinion on the subject of morals; but let not merely the *private* opinions of men,^c but the codes of laws ancient and modern be examined, and it will soon be discovered how little the theory and the fact correspond. The difference is so great as to be the sole foundation of *their* opinion,^d who with some plausibility assert that nothing is just or unjust, but what is determined so to be by the laws of each state.

In short, there is nothing that I know of to support this hypothesis,

^c Vide Locke's Essay, chap. iii.

^d See the quotations in Cudworth on Morality, p. 4. Protagoras, Polus, Callicles, Thrasymachus, Glauco in Plato's Theatætus, Gorgias in his Politics. Hobbes, Locke, chap. on moral relations.

but

but the *ipse dixit* of the maintainer of it; and as it is merely a feeling or emotion in him, I cannot assert that he has it not; I can only say that I have it not, that I know of no one who has it; that all the phenomena it is intended to solve can be explained without it; and even if it were common to all mankind, it gives no solution to the question we are discussing, because it admits of a farther one.

Lord Kaimes^e in his *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*, finds fault with Hutcheson's scheme "because it excludes justice "and every thing which may be strictly "called duty! and because it assigns^f no "distinct meaning to the terms right, "obligation, duty, ought, should!" It appears to me that Hutcheson, in his *Instinctive Approbation*, meant to include obligation, and indeed his second

^e Page 55. ^f Page 56.

definition of it^s is a summary of his opinions ; it means, he says, “ that every “ spectator, or the agent of the action “ upon reflection must *approve* it, or “ disapprove his omitting it according “ to the circumstances.” The term approbation indeed, is seldom used but with reference to the conduct of others, but when used respecting a mode of conduct which *we* are about to pursue, it *implies* that mode of conduct to be more eligible upon the whole than its opposite. As to the usual ideas annexed to obligation, they arise from the term being a metaphor, and if lord Kaimes have any other and farther meaning than Hutcheson, it can only be that of extraneous impulse, as if a man were pushed by something behind him. Whatever his meaning may be (for it is not easy to discover it) he has substituted an hypothesis in no respect, that I can discover, different from Hutcheson’s, except that his lordship

^s Illustrations of the Moral Sense, p. 232.

keeps

keeps to the old metaphors of right and obligation, whereas the other adopts the term approbation. With lord Kaimes, obligation is an instinctive feeling sensation or emotion respecting right or wrong, fit or unfit; and the terms duty, obligation, ought, should, denote those feelings, and have no meaning but upon the supposition of such. "The authority"^h (meaning "obligation") of conscience lies in this "circumstance, that we feel and perceive the action to be our duty, and what we are *indispensibly bound* to perform. It is in this manner that the "moral sense with regard to some actions (for by the way he not only has a direct chapter upon the moral sense, but explains it as Hutcheson explains it, compares its sensation to sensible qualities, and includes in it all that Hutcheson included except *his* own meaning of obligation which he makes a distinct feeling) "the moral

^h Page 63.

“sense with regard to some actions
 “plainly bears upon it the marks of
 “authority over all our appetites and
 “affections. It is the voice of God
 “within us which commands our
 “strictest obedience, just as much as
 “when his will is declared by express
 “revelation.” How differs this hypothesis from Hutcheson’s? Both imply that right and wrong signify only feelings or emotions in us, and both make the moral relations the peculiar objects of an implanted sense. There is nothing can urged against Hutcheson’s hypothesis which will not equally affect his lordship’s, and with respect to to the question what is the most reasonable motive that can be assigned why one should act thus rather than thus? both hypotheses are nothing to the purpose. Granting we have such feelings and emotions, it will not be denied that we have it in our power to disregard them, why should we not? There are multitudes of feelings or emotions

emotions equally strong, that men do actually disregard.

§ IV. Not very dissimilar to the preceding, is the next opinion we have to examine. It had long been an opinion that conscience consisted of a set of implanted moral sentiments, to which were conjoined the idea of obligation. Locke, in his chapters against innate principles, endeavoured to shew, that such principles, whether speculative or practical, were not innate or implanted,¹ among other reasons because it could be shewn how we came by them. Among the instances usually given of such implanted principles, he examines those of lord Herbert of Cherbury, who modestly insists upon five only, and moreover gives us half a dozen marks whereby they might be discovered.

¹ Innate: such as arise from our frame, or nature. Implanted; such as are superadded independently of human means: whether be meant, is not said, that I recollect.

Mr. Locke thinks even these are five too many, and accordingly he sets himself to reason against them. But what would Mr. Locke have said to the long catalogue of implanted propositions with which Dr. Reid^k has presented us, and which has received the *imprimatur* of the doctors Oswald and Beattie? Nor does this catalogue contain the whole of them, but at some future period Dr. Reid will condescend to point out some more. And yet, notwithstanding this, all the three Gentlemen have written large books for the sole purpose of informing us, that it was absurd to write any books upon the subject, because every man of common sense was sufficiently acquainted with the catalogue already; that all these untaught sentiments are as evident as our existence; that it is the height of folly to reason concerning them, and that the cause of religion and of

* Inquiry into the Human Mind.

morality has been materially injured by all argument produced in its favour: that in their opinion (as it should seem) Mr. Soame Jenyns, and the author of "Christianity not Founded upon Argument," are the only persons (themselves excepted) who treat the subject in an orthodox manner.

Their sentiments on the topic of morality are thus expressed by Dr. Beattie,¹ far the most elegant writer of the three. "Mankind believe a certain mode of conduct incumbent upon them in certain circumstances, because a notion of duty arises in their mind, when they contemplate that conduct in relation to those circumstances. I ought to be grateful for a favour received. Why? Because my conscience tells me so. How do you know you ought to do that of which your conscience

¹ Essay on Truth, p. 74. fifth edit. 1774.

" enjoins

“enjoins the performance? I can give
 “no farther reason, but I *feel* that such
 “is my duty. Here the investigation
 “must stop, or if it be carried a little
 “farther must return to this point.
 “I know that I ought to do what
 “my conscience enjoins, because God
 “is the author of my constitution,
 “and I obey his will when I act ac-
 “cording to the principles of my
 “constitution. Why do you obey the
 “will of God? Because it is my duty.
 “How know you that? My con-
 “science tells me so, &c.” Again,
 p. 421. “That the human soul is
 “a permanent substance, that God is
 “infinitely wise and good, that virtue
 “and vice are essentially different, that
 “there is such a thing as truth, and
 “that man in many cases is capable
 “of discerning it, are some of the
 “principles which this book is in-
 “tended to vindicate from the objec-
 “tions of scepticism.” And this he
 does by the single appeal to the inter-
 nal

nal feeling, or what he calls common sense. Wiseacres are ye all, ye Clarkes, and Kings, and Lockes, and Hartleys ! Ye write about the subject, and about it, without coming a whit the nearer, when all this while your maid-servants may know at the least, as much of these abstruse subjects as yourselves.

But are there such things, one might ask, as virtue and vice ? Yes. And they are essentially different ? Yes. And how know you this ? My conscience tells me so. Then what your conscience tells you is virtue, is virtue ; and what it informs you is vice, is vice ? It is the only, and a sufficient criterion, is it not ? Undoubtedly, no man of *common sense* would dispute it. But what shall we do with an erroneous conscience ? Felton stabbed the duke of Buckingham. Clarendon^m tells us, that when he was asked

^m Book IV.

who instigated him, he answered that no man living had credit or power enough to instigate him: that it proceeded only from himself and the impulse of his own conscience. But how do you know you ought to do what your conscience impels to? I can give no farther reason, says Felton, but I *feel* that such is my duty. Jacques Clementⁿ was asked why he stabbed Henry III. of France; it was the dictate of his conscience; he *felt* that it was his duty so to do: and many other people *felt* the same thing, and accordingly his action met with many defenders. Upon exactly the same ground can be supported the actions of Ravilliac, and the Seur Guiscard, the Irish massacre, the massacre of St. Bartholemew, the Sicilian vespers, the holy inquisition, the pious burnings of protestants by queen Mary, and of catholics by queen Elizabeth, the imprisonment of Bidle, and the

ⁿ See the quotations in Rutherforth's Essay on Virtue, p. 112.

pilloring

pilloring of Peter Annet. But enough of this "young gentlemen's and ladies' philosophy:" it deserved not the severe correction of so masterly a hand, as that of Priestley. Nor would the mode in which I have expressed myself on the subject be justifiable if it were not authorized by the arrogance of the authors themselves, and by their contemptuous manner of treating those who have *reasoned* upon the same subjects, and whose knowledge was so far superior. If Warburton's extreme learning and acuteness be no justification of his impertinence, what claim to indulgence have *such* writers?

§ V. The same objections that lie against the preceding hypothesis, and that of Mr. Hutcheson and lord Kaimes equally affect the "Dissertation on the Nature of Obligation prefixed to the Summary of the Roman Law," abridged from Taylor by the Rev. Mr. Ellis. In this Dissertation, he begins
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by examining whether *sensation*, or *reason*, be the immediate motive to action universally : and from an analysis of several of our actions he concludes, that in all cases we are impelled to act by a *sensation*. Hence as obligation is a motive to action, he argues, that obligation also is a *sensation*. This particular *sensation* he deduces from the operation of certain circumstances upon our implanted affections, selfish, social, and religious ; which are of such a nature, as necessarily to produce that *sensation*, feeling or emotion which we term obligation, whenever we are placed in the circumstances adapted to each. The general objections to this system are, that it introduces a three-fold gratuitous cause, to explain phenomena, which can be much better explained without it ; it makes obligation arise not from any thing real in the actions themselves, but a mere emotion in us, and of course a false conscience is equally true with
a true

a true one; it admits of the question why? What reasonable motive or inducement have I to act according to this emotion rather than opposite thereto? Is the answer, I *feel*, I ought to do so? So do the orthodox catholics when they roast heretics at an *auto de fè*. It solves not the capital difficulty to which it is liable, from its being unconnected with any statement of advantage, or disadvantage, namely, what if a great degree of misery upon the whole were the result of a regular adherence to the dictates of these emotions? Should I in that case be *bound* to such adherence? But this system is liable also to *particular* objections: 1. It uses the term sensation in a sense to which it has never before been applied that I know of.

By sensation is usually understood the perceived impressions of objects on our senses: of which, when the ideas occur either from reminiscence, or the force of imagination, Locke terms them

them ideas of sensation, and Hartley includes them under the general name of ideas. But in this acceptation, our sensations are notoriously not the only motives to action, nor are our moral ideas sensations, unless a sixth sense be supposed with Hutcheson, to justify the term. So that unless the author mean by sensation, something which is not its general signification, he fails in his ground-work. Suppose I am considering by myself in my closet whether I shall lend a sum of money to my friend, or pay my debts with it, and then proceed to the latter course: are my inducements in this case any thing but ideas? or does any sense, impressed by external objects, incite me to the action? Surely not.

Again; He supposes we have implanted affections, which being acted on by their peculiar objects, occasion the emotion or feeling which we term obligation. As an instance of one of these

these affections (the social, he adduces the parental *sophy* :) but this is evidently generated, nor has the father any affection for the child in the womb, nor for some time after, while the mother feels strongly toward it. Besides, how did this operate among the Lacedemonians? *They felt* it their duty to give up their children to inspectors, and if not apparently hearty, to be thrown into the common receptacle of infirm babes :° the case of the Chinese might also be urged, if it were not a fully sufficient answer that this parental *sophy* can be accounted for from association. His other instances, for the other affections serve his purpose no better. Again, this dissertation advances no hypothesis essentially different from the well-known system of Hutcheson ; both deduce our moral ideas from implanted instincts, both make them depend upon ourselves and not on the actions, and

° Plut. vit. Lycurg.

to both the terms feeling sensation or emotion are appropriate; and they are both abnoxious to the same capital objections. As the hypothesis of Ellis therefore is introduced with an air of novelty, some distinction more than is at first sight apparent should have been pointed out between it, and these which preceded, to which it seems essentially similar.

§ VI. We come now to a system that lies a little deeper. The ideas of duty and right, say the maintainers of it, so far as the opposite to the latter is wrong, *imply* obligation. Of the two opposite courses in your choice, your understanding plainly points out that the one is really and essentially wrong and the other right: there is no room therefore to hesitate.

This hypothesis supposes,

1. That right and wrong are essential qualities of actions themselves.
2. That

2. That these qualities are perceived intuitively without any medium of proof, by the understanding.

3. That when an action is perceived to be right, we perceive also, that we are *obliged* to perform it, and that all right actions are necessarily and essentially obligatory as such, without any prospect of advantage or reference to any other consideration.

The first supposition has already been noticed: if the right and the wrong of actions mean more than their tendency, to make us happy or unhappy upon the whole of our existence, it is so much more than I am disposed to allow. Of this, more hereafter. As to the second supposition. I think, Price after Cudworth,^p has unnecessarily limited his system, by confining the moral relations to the understanding as objects appro-

^p On Morality, p. 272.

priate thereto. In support of this, he examines Locke's opinion, that all our ideas are either ideas of sensation or reflection, or founded on those. And from the impossibility as he apprehends, of ranking among ideas of sensation, some that are usually so placed, such as solidity, causality, equality, &c. he insists that there must be some faculty of the mind which makes up for the deficiency of the senses, and perceives *intuitively* these relations. This faculty he thinks can be no other than the understanding.

It were devoutly to be wished we had done using words without ideas. No man has ever yet shewn precisely what he meant by the understanding, or any other among the bundle of faculties, which make up our idea of the soul. The only *allowable* use of the words, is, as significative of the unknown cause of known effects, like
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the terms attraction and gravity in natural philosophy. But, if these effects can be explained by the operation of known causes, the terms ought reasonably to be rejected. Now it cannot be denied but all our mental phenomena can be well explained and accounted for upon the doctrine of association, with the sole property of perception, or the *simplex apprehensio* of the logicians. And he who would reject that doctrine, (which no one ever did who had considered it) in the solution of the actual phenomena usually ascribed to the mind, is no more to be disputed with, than the objections of him are to be refuted, who having never read Euclid, was disposed to deny that the antecedents are to the consequents respectively, as the antecedents to the consequents conjointly, where the magnitudes are proportional.^a

^a Euc. V. 12.

Dr. Adams,^r indeed, although he frequently uses the term understanding, explains it by simple perception, nor is there occasion for introducing ought else for the explanation of the ideas which Dr. Price refers to the understanding. To instance in the idea of equality: when I see two sticks exactly similar in other respects, except that the one is longer than the other; are my senses sufficient to discern any difference between them? In fact, it is a contradiction in terms to say, that I see one is longer than the other, and yet that I cannot see any difference between them. To that difference we give the name of *inequality*. Suppose the excess in length of the one stick above the other be cut off, so that the one being applied to the other as they lie on a table, their ends shall be in the same vertical line: is not my eye-sight sufficient to see this sameness,

^r Sermon on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue, p. 6.

this

this correspondence? Certainly. To this correspondence we give the name of *equality*. How then can it be denied that equality is one of the ideas of sensation? In fact it is only reviving the old dispute between the Scotists and the Occamists, and he that asserts there is such a thing as solidity, separate from any thing solid, or equality separate from any thing equal, ought to point it out. Any one however, who will be at the pains of examining what his ideas are, when the words solidity and equality are mentioned, will instantly perceive, that the ideas of them are inseparably attached to those of some sensible objects from which he has derived them.* In like manner, no one can frame to himself the *abstract* idea of a horse, a house, whiteness, &c. there is always *some*, though not always a very

* The separate existence of abstract ideas, is unanswerably confuted by Berkeley, in the first part of his Principles of Human Knowledge.

distinct idea of a *particular*. Upon the system of association which these authors take no notice of, this is still more plain.

As to the third supposition included in this hypothesis. "Whatever is right is of course obligatory, as such, and for no other reason; so that the question why ought we to do what is right? is identical and absurd." Hence consistently enough with their hypothesis, the maintainers of it assert, that nothing is right for any reason, but it is so because it is so, and of course we cannot perceive that is so through any medium of proof, by any other criterion but the understanding or perception, *intuition* only. To this I object,

First, The understandings or perceptions of men being similar in kind, however various in degree, this cannot be an intuitive truth, because the generality

nerality of mankind, if not all of them, except the supporters of this theory, do not in fact perceive that any thing is right or obligatory *intuitively* and in *the first instance*, but *respectively* and *secondarily*, for a reason, viz. either because it is one of the ten commandments, or because it is in some other part of the Bible, or because it is enacted by law, or because it is generally agreed to be right, or because persons, whose opinions they reverence, inform them that it is right, or because it is one of those things which they have been taught to conceive of as right, and I and many more think any such action right, because it is conducive to general utility; and obligatory, because it is conducive to my happiness upon the whole. Every other proposition intuitively true is universally acknowledged, but by whom but themselves can the authors alluded to, shew that this self-evident and intuitive proposition is acknowledged? I object

Secondly,

Secondly, That as men's understandings are, and for ought we know, always were similar; and as, according to this hypothesis, it is the only and the sufficient criterion of right and wrong, there ought to have been no difference among mankind concerning the component parts of the system of morality. But the Lacedemonians thought it right to destroy their infirm children: Solon and the Athenians thought it right to forbid the elegant amusement of Pæderasty to their slaves, as only fit for gentlemen. Some nations (on Hobbes's principle I suppose) think it right to worship the Devil, and as to the fitness and congruity of polygamy to the nature of things, in an *eastern* country, who dares deny it? For the same reason the christian revelation was useless, for its greatest, if not its only use, is as an ascertained and sufficient sanction to morality; but if the understanding be sufficient to perceive these self-evident and eternal truths, and if
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when perceived they were of themselves obligatory, what need of any thing else? Dr. Adams aware of this, in the Appendix to his elegant sermon, insists that obligation is one thing, and the rewards and punishments connected with the conformity or otherwise to what is obligatory, is another; totally different and arbitrarily connected. This brings me to my

Third objection. Many actions that are *right*, are frequently extremely irksome and disagreeable; many that are wrong are wonderfully pleasant. Surely there ought to be some substantial recompense by way of inducing me to give up the pleasurable for the painful. If it be said it is evidently right to do so, this may be, but it is a mere name, or at any rate I can see nothing in *rightness* as such, which is to me, a sufficient inducement to make myself unhappy: nay, according to the opinion of these gentlemen, extreme misery may

may be arbitrarily connected with rightness as well as extreme happiness, and even in this case, according to them, I should be bound in conscience to make myself eternally miserable without the least recompense; for no one can be rewarded but by being made happy; nor can any one be punished but in making him miserable. All this is to me evidently absurd. And I state the following assertion as *intuitively* true; if doing what is right gives me uneasiness or pain, and doing what is wrong gives me pleasure, there is reason to ask why should I do what is right? And farther, if in such case, I *actually do*, what is right, I have, and every other man always has, some farther reason *for* so doing. If so, this hypothesis is false. No legislator whatever, whether human or divine, ever enacted any law but he proceeded on the necessity of conforming to my opinion, and annexed misery to the breach of

of his injunctions : none but God could uniformly reward.

Fourthly, There is the same objection against this as against the hypotheses of Hutcheson, Kaimes, Beattie and Ellis, substitute understanding for conscience, and all that has been said concerning theirs, will apply to this. Why did you stab the duke of Buckingham, Mr. Felton ? Because it was right so to do. How do you collect that such an action is *right* ? My understanding informs me it is so. Why *ought* you to do what your understanding informs you is right ? Because I ought ? but *why* ought you ? Because my understanding informs me so.

But *reason* (or our perception of truth and falsehood, through the means of self-evident axioms) could never have informed Felton, that taking the sword from the hand of Justice was conducive to general utility : the *true* criterion of
virtue

virtue as *I* think. But *the fact really was*, that he thought he did right in so doing. We may deny, that such an action was conducive to the general good, but we have no right to deny, that his understanding informed him he ought to do so: and if it did he was not guilty; and if he were not guilty, he ought not to have been punished; or if he ought to have been punished here, it would be no foundation for punishment hereafter.

This is an important argument; I beg permission to say a very few words more upon it. The maintainers of the opinions I oppose may retort upon me. Why did you stab the duke of Buckingham, Mr. Felton? Because it was for the general good to take a villain of such magnitude out of the world. How do you collect it was for the general good? My *reason* informed me that it was so. Here, say they, a man is punished for doing what his
reason

reason informs him was for the general good, and why not as justly because his understanding or his conscience fallaciously informed him it was right? Because you have precluded yourselves, I reply, from offering any reason *why* his understanding or his conscience was wrong; for that reason would overthrow your hypothesis, and understanding or conscience would no longer be the criterion of truth; and also because the proposition would no longer be *intuitively* true. If you tell Felton; therefore, that his understanding or his conscience deceived him, you can only advance the *ipse dixit*, that yours is right, and his wrong, for the criterion to determine which is right, and which wrong, will of course be the criterion of right and wrong itself, which overthrows the whole of your system. I, on the contrary, have not precluded myself from offering him a reason why he was mistaken, because the criterion of truth with me is not

Felton's

Felton's opinion, but that upon which his opinion ought to have been founded: and I have a right to say, before you committed a fact of such magnitude, you should have taken care to have examined the subject more thoroughly; and it was in your power, with proper attention, to discover, that if every one were to take the liberty you have taken, there would be an end of civil society.

These observations, I think, make the difference manifest between our opinions, and justify me in having turned their representations upon themselves.

§ VII. Burlamaqui, of whom we have already made some mention, in his well written Treatise on Natural and Politic Law, a summary of what has been said by Grotius and Puffendorf; argues (chap. v.) that man ought to square his conduct by some rule:
that

that as every thing we behold has its destination and end, which supposes a rule or means to that end, man also must have his ; from analogy, and from the inconvenience that would arise if he were not to conform his conduct to some rule adapted to his end. This rule, he says, the Creator has given us in the faculty of reason, which is therefore the primitive rule of man, and which his nature, frame or constitution argues he *ought* to comply with. Book II. chap. vii. he enumerates the moral sense, or a kind of instinct that shews us instantly but confusedly the most sensible and striking differences of good and evil. And farther, that as man is entirely the creature of, and dependent on, his Creator, he cannot but acknowledge an obligation to conform to the will of his Creator. These three rules or principles of obligation, he says, ought not to be disunited.

66 ON MORAL OBLIGATION.

Burlamaqui is an author of deserved reputation, and moreover an elementary author, or it would not have been worth while to have noticed this unphilosophical jumble of discordant systems, any more than the equally confused hypothesis of Warburton. Burlamaqui, however, in § 13. of this chapter, sums up his opinion thus. "The result of what I have been now saying is as follows:

1. "Reason being the first rule of
"man, it is also the first principle of
"morality, and the immediate cause of
"all primitive obligation.

2. "Man being by his nature and
"state in a necessary dependence on the
"Creator, who has formed him with
"design and wisdom, and proposed
"some particular views to himself in
"creating him: the will of God is
"another rule of human actions, ano-
"ther

“ther principle of morality, obligation, and duty.

3. “ We may therefore say, there are
“ in general two sorts of morality or
“ obligation, one antecedent to the law
“ and the work of reason, the other
“ subsequent to the law and properly
“ the effect thereof.”

Not to mention that he here leaves out the moral sense, his own words shall sufficiently shew the fallacy of his opinions. As to the latter obligation, if we did not perceive it reasonable on discovering that we were framed by a Being of infinite wisdom, goodness and power, to conform to the will of that Being, should we do so? Certainly not; else we should act contrary to our primitive and internal obligation; but we see immediately that such a conformity is reasonable, and therefore we adopt it. The distinction then of internal and external obligation, is nugatory; for if

the latter were not pointed out by the former it would not exist. But why ought we to obey the dictates of reason? Burlamaqui himself tells us why. "Now" (says he, B. I. c. v. § 4.) "let man reflect but ever so little on himself he will soon perceive that every thing he does is with a *view of happiness*, and this is *the ultimate end* he proposes in all his actions, or the *last term* to which he reduces them." Can a man more effectually refute himself? He goes on the same purpose, and § 6. "Indeed if it be natural to every intelligent and rational being to act always with a fixt and determinate end; it is no less evident that this view or end must be *ultimately* reduced to himself, and consequently to his own advantage and happiness. The desire therefore of happiness is as essential to a man, and as inseparable from his nature, as reason itself; for reason, as the very etymology of the word implies,

" is

“ is no more than a calculation and ac-
 “ count. To reason, is to calculate
 “ and to draw up an account, after
 “ balancing every thing, in order to
 “ see on which side the advantage lies;
 “ it would therefore imply a contra-
 “ diction to suppose a *rational* being
 “ that could absolutely forego its in-
 “ terest, or be indifferent with regard
 “ to his own felicity.” Accordingly
 in the three next sections, he goes on
 to shew, that man cannot attain to hap-
 piness but by the assistance of reason,
 and *therefore* he concludes, that reason
 is the primitive rule of man. How he
 could after this, talk of reason being
 of itself obligatory, of the will of God
 being of itself obligatory, and of our
 having a confused kind of instinct prior
 to reason, which he calls the moral
 sense, would be a matter of much sur-
 prize, if we knew not how weak, im-
 perfect and variable are human abilities.

§ VIII. Mr. Wollaston, in his Delineation of the Laws of Nature, deduces them all from a conformity to truth, insisting that we may tell a lie by deeds as well as by words.[†] A true proposition, he says, is that which expresses things as they are, or, truth is the conformity of those words or signs by which things are express'd to the things themselves. "And," prop. IV. "No act (whether word or deed of
 " any being to whom moral good and
 " evil are imputable that interferes
 " with any true proposition, or denies
 " any thing to be as it is can be right:" and every proposition that is false, is wrong, for *ορθον η αληθειαι αει* Soph. and every act implying that proposition, must be the opposite to right, and (prop. VIII.) moral good and evil are coincident with right and wrong. Not to dwell long upon an hypothesis that so evidently admits the question why, it will be sufficient that the very pro-

[†] Sect. I. prop. II. III. IV.

position

position upon which he builds his opinion, be read to confute that opinion it is meant to substantiate. He gives six reasons or media of proof to shew that such an action contradictory of truth would be wrong.

1. That proposition which is false, is wrong; the action implying it therefore cannot be right, that is, it is wrong.

2. Nothing can interfere with any true proposition, but it must also contradict the relation between the subject and attribute which is founded in the nature of things; and therefore such an interference must be unnatural and wrong in nature.

3. Such an action would be opposite to the will of the Supreme Being, who made things, and willed them to be as they are.

4. It would contradict axioms and eternal truths, such as every thing is

what it is, that which is done cannot be undone, &c.

5. It would be a great absurdity. It is to put bitter for sweet; darkness for light; crooked for straight, &c. (According to this Prop. and his whole hypothesis, moral good and evil being coincident with right and wrong, and the latter with truth and falsehood; a great fool is inevitably a great scoundrel, and Wollaston himself, if he be a bad reasoner, is of course a bad man.)

6. To deny things to be as they are, is a transgression of the great law of our nature, the law of reason. For truth cannot be opposed, but reason must be violated. To all which I reply, that if the proposition be true *for these reasons* it cannot be *of itself* and *intuitively* true, so that right and wrong depend upon the reasons he adduces, so far as they are just, and not upon the truth of his proposition itself. He seems to
have

have been possessed with the evil spirit of saying something new !

§ IX. A writer far more acute than the preceding, and whose disquisitions have not a little engaged the attention of the literary world, makes after Horace and lord Shaftesbury, utility the only Criterion of virtue. With much propriety, in my opinion: *quid utile quid non*, is a most important inquiry, the *cul bono* should be always in our mind. But why should I conform to this criterion ? What is, or reasonably should be, my ultimate inducement ? To this question the following quotation will suggest Hume's answer.^u

“ Self-love is a principle in human
 “ nature of such extensive energy, and
 “ the interest of each individual is so
 “ closely connected with that of the
 “ community, that those philosophers
 “ were excuseable, who fancied that
 “ all our concern for the public might

^u Why utility pleases, part, II.

“ perhaps

“ perhaps be resolved into a concern
 “ for our own happiness and preserva-
 “ tion. They saw every moment in-
 “ stances of approbation or blame, satis-
 “ faction or displeasure towards cha-
 “ racters and actions ; they denominated
 “ the objects of these sentiments *virtues*
 “ or *vices*. They observed that the
 “ former had a tendency to encrease
 “ the happiness, and the latter the
 “ misery of society ; they asked if it
 “ was possible we could have any *gene-*
 “ *ral* concern for society, or any *disin-*
 “ *terested* resentment of the welfare or
 “ injury of others. They found it
 “ simple to consider all these sentiments
 “ as modifications of self-love, and they
 “ discovered a pretext, at least for this
 “ unity of principle, in that close union
 “ of interest which is so observable
 “ betwixt the public and each indi-
 “ vidual.”

“ But, notwithstanding this frequent
 “ confusion of interests, it is easy to
 attain

“ attain what natural philosophers, after
 “ my lord Bacon, have affected to call
 “ the *experimentum crucis*, or that ex-
 “ periment which points out the way
 “ we should follow in any doubt or
 “ ambiguity. We have found instances
 “ wherein private interest was separate
 “ from public, wherein it was even
 “ contrary; and yet we observed the
 “ moral sentiment to continue, not-
 “ withstanding this disjunction of inte-
 “ rests. And wherever these distinct
 “ interests sensibly concurred, we
 “ always found a sensible increase of
 “ the sentiment, and a more warm
 “ affection to virtue, and detestation of
 “ vice, or what we properly call *grati-*
 “ *tude* and *revenge*. Compelled by
 “ these instance we must renounce the
 “ theory which accounts for every
 “ moral sentiment on the principle of
 “ self-love. We must adopt a more pub-
 “ lic affection, and allow, that the in-
 “ terests of society are not even on their
 “ own account altogether indifferent
 “ to

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“ to us. Usefulness is only a tendency
 “ to a certain end, and it is a con-
 “ tradiction in terms, that any thing
 “ pleases as a means to an end, where
 “ the end itself does no way affect us.
 “ If, therefore usefulness be a source
 “ of moral sentiment, and if this use-
 “ fulness be not always considered with
 “ a reference to self, it follows, that
 “ every thing which contributes to the
 “ happiness of society, recommends
 “ itself *directly* to our approbation and
 “ good will. Here is a principle which
 “ accounts in a great part for the origin
 “ of morality; and what need we seek
 “ for abstruse and remote systems, when
 “ there is one so obvious and natural?
 “ It is needless to push our researches
 “ so far as to ask why we have huma-
 “ nity, or a fellow-feeling with others.
 “ It is sufficient, that this is experi-
 “ enced to be a principle in human
 “ nature. We must stop some where
 “ in our examination of causes; and
 “ there are in every science some gene-
 “ ral

"ral principles, beyond which we
 "cannot hope to find any principle
 "more general. No man is absolutely
 "indifferent to the happiness and
 "misery of others. The first has a
 "natural tendency to give pleasure, and
 "the other pain. This every one may
 "find in himself. It is not probable,
 "that these principles can be resolved
 "into principles more simple and
 "universal, whatever attempts may
 "have been made for that purpose.
 "But if it were possible, it belongs
 "not to the present subject; and we
 "may here safely consider these prin-
 "ciples as original. Happy if we can
 "render all the consequences suffi-
 "ciently plain and perspicuous." In
 the Appendix concerning moral senti-
 ment, § 5. he says, "It appears evi-
 "dent, that the ultimate ends of hu-
 "man actions, can never, in any case,
 "be accounted for by reason, but
 "recommend themselves entirely to the
 "sentiments and affections of mankind,
 "without

“ without any dependence on the intel-
 “ lectual faculties. Ask any man, *why*
 “ *he uses exercise*; he will answer,
 “ because he desires to keep his health;
 “ if you then inquire, *why he desires*
 “ *health*, he will readily reply, because
 “ sickness is painful; if you push your
 “ inquiries farther, desire a reason, *why*
 “ *he bates pain*, 'tis impossible he can
 “ ever give any. This is an ultimate
 “ end, and is never referred to any
 “ other object.

“ Perhaps to your second question,
 “ *why he desires health*? He may also
 “ reply, because it is requisite for the
 “ exercise of his calling. If you ask,
 “ *why he is anxious on that head*? He
 “ will answer, because he desires to
 “ get money. If you demand *why*? It is
 “ the instrument of pleasure,” says he,
 “ and beyond this it is an absurdity to
 “ ask for a reason. 'Tis impossible there
 “ can be a progress in *infinitum*, and
 “ that one thing can always be the
 “ reason

“ reason why another is desired. Some-
 “ thing must be desired on its own ac-
 “ count, and because of its *immediate*
 “ accord or agreement with human sen-
 “ timent and affection.

“ Now as virtue is an end, and is
 “ desirable on its own account, with-
 “ out fee or reward, merely for the
 “ immediate satisfaction it conveys; 'tis
 “ requisite there should be some sen-
 “ timent which it touches, some inter-
 “ nal taste or feeling, or whatever you
 “ please to call it, which distinguishes
 “ moral good and evil, and which
 “ embraces the one, and rejects the
 “ other.” So far Hume. I make this
 long quotation, because I despair of
 saying any thing so well to my own
 purpose. It will save me much trouble.

In all that he has so forcibly urged,
 I agree with him perfectly except in
 this. Virtue is an end, desirable on
 its own account, without fee or reward,
 for

for the immediate satisfaction it conveys. His proof of this proposition is, "We have found instances wherein
 "private interest was separate from
 "public, wherein it was even contrary,
 "and yet we observed the moral sentiment to continue notwithstanding
 "this disjunction of interests." My objections are, 1. This is arguing from the *est* to the *debet*, from what *is*, to what *ought* to be the case. I have already observed in considering Hutcheson's theory, which is grounded upon the same fallacy, that the immediate motives upon which men act, are not always, nay, they are very seldom their ultimate motives, or the *last* reason which, if inquiry were pushed, would be assigned for acting. Why do you not commit adultery whenever you have an opportunity? The first answer a religious christian would make to this, and the immediate motive that would deter *him* from the commission, would be, "has not *God* said thou
 "shalt

“ shalt not covet thy neighbour’s wife;
 “ thou shalt not commit adultery?”
 But if he were put upon considering
 why he obeyed God’s will, “ because
 “ he will reward me if I do, and punish
 “ me if I do not.” “ Whore-mongers
 “ and adulterers God will judge.” It is
 evident, as Hume says, we cannot in-
 quire why we avoid punishment and
 seek reward. To this very question
 Hume would have given neither of the
 answers I have set down. So that the
 proximate and immediate motive to the
 action, is not always the ultimate that
 can be assigned. I set out to go through
 Oxford where I shall bait, to Birming-
 ham. What brings you this way?
 says an acquaintance meeting me on
 the road to Oxford. *I am going to*
Oxford, that is the proximate and
 immediate reason why I am found
 where he meets me: the ultimate rea-
 son is because Oxford is in my road
 to Birmingham.

2. The generation of the social from the selfish affections has been so evidently explained by Hartley, that the matter is not disputable. People should not write on the phenomena of the mind, without either adopting or confuting the doctrine of association. Hartley's book was published before the *Essays*. It is a point demonstrated that the social are founded originally on the selfish affections.

3. If virtue were intuitively, immediately, and of itself pleasurable, and that by an immediate appeal to some common and universal sentiment or principle of human nature, then people would not mistake so much concerning it, and perhaps the polygamous customs of the east could not exist. There would be still less dispute concerning the *utile* in the general principles of politics; and this is evident from his

own

own positions, for he grants that every man must seek the pleasurable and avoid the painful.

4. Hume has so elegantly and so judiciously, confirmed the opinion I adopt, and confuted himself in this very quotation, that it is almost inconceivable how he could have withstood the force of his own reasoning. "No man," says he, "is absolutely indifferent to the happiness or misery of others. The first has a natural tendency to give pleasure, the other pain. **** Ask any man *why* he uses exercise, he will answer, because he desires to keep his health; if you then inquire why he desires health, he will readily reply, because sickness is painful; if you push your inquiries farther, and desire a reason why he hates pain, 'tis impossible he can ever give any. *This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object.*

“ Perhaps to your second question
 “ why he desires health, he may also
 “ reply, because it is requisite to the
 “ exercise of his calling. If you ask,
 “ *why he is anxious on that head*; he
 “ will answer, because he desires to get
 “ money. If you demand *why?* it is
 “ the instrument of pleasure, says he;
 “ and beyond this ’tis an absurdity to
 “ ask for a reason.” All this is well
 said. And of course (Hume being the
 judge) every thing is to be referred
 to the obtaining of pleasure, and the
 avoiding of pain, which is the ultimate
 end, and beyond which there is no
 other object. If virtue therefore, or
 the *utile*, did not produce pleasure, and
 its opposite pain, it would not be desir-
 able, nor should we be obliged to pur-
 sue it. Whether virtue is, or is not,
 in *this* life its own reward, and whe-
 ther a future state be or be not necessary
 might if they would have owned it,
 have been a question with Hume or
 Shaftesbury;

Shaftesbury; it is none with me, nor with any one else who does not view facts through the false medium of a deistical hypothesis. Among the many instances, however, of inadvertence and contradiction, which men of the most consummate abilities have fallen into on this question, and from which therefore it is very pardonable, if I be not free, none is stronger than the words which Hume has pitched upon to express the very point in question. "Now as virtue is an end, and is
 "desirable on its own account, without
 "fee or reward, merely for the immediate satisfaction it conveys; 'tis requisite there should be some sentiment which it touches, &c." Now, how virtue can be at one and the same time desirable, merely on its own account, and merely for the immediate satisfaction it conveys, is to me inconceivable; if it be desirable for the satisfaction it conveys, it cannot be desirable

merely on its own account. Has he not destroyed his own hypothesis?

§ X. We proceed now to state the last of the theories before-mentioned; a theory adopted by writers^{*} equal in reputation, and more in number than the supporters of either of the opinions we have been examining. But it appears to me to stand upon a much firmer ground than either the numbers or the reputation of its supporters. Why do you act thus? is the question: the answer, because it is conducive to my

* *Gastrell*, *Puffendorf*, vide *Law of N. and N.* book I. chap. vi. § 5. and the note thereon of *Barbeyrac*. *Cumberland* *De Leg. Nat.* cap. v. § 27. *Norris*, *Miscellanies*, p. 214. *Gay*, *Preliminary Dissertation*, and *Note to King's Origin of Evil*, p. 66. quarto edit. *Turnbull*, *Note to Heineccius*, p. 16. *Rutherford*, *Essay on Virtue*, chap. vii. *Soame Jenyns' Origin of Evil*, letter IV. *Dr. Johnson*, *Review of Soame Jenyns' Origin of Evil*, in the *Miscellanies*, published by *Davies*, three volumes.

happiness

happiness upon the whole. It is evident we can go no farther. We cannot ask, why do you desire happiness, any more than why have you fingers and toes. It is apparent also, that no direct reason can be adduced in proof of this, because the question required the *ultimate* reason. The collateral and presumptive arguments that occur to me in favour of this hypothesis are,

1. It has the capital property of the true answer, whatever that may be: it is founded upon fact, no farther question can be put without an absurdity. This is not the case with any of the other theories.

2. It is impossible that any motive can be the most reasonable and ultimate motive, which, even by the possibility of supposition, admits of an inconsistency with our happiness; for what recompense can be made us for the loss of

any part of our happiness? God himself can do no more for us than take away pain and give pleasure.

3. It is intuitively true, that we do *above all things* desire and seek our own happiness, and that we never do suffer voluntarily any degree of pain, but as the least of an alternative, or in prospect of a greater degree of future happiness. And can any thing be the ultimate end of what we do, but that which we desire *above all things*? Surely not.

4. The ultimate end of the whole and of every part of the creation, as far as we can judge, is the production of happiness. This rests upon the same proofs as God's benevolence. It must of course be the ultimate end of man's creation, and of course also *his* ultimate and most habitual desire must be the same, otherwise it would be inconsistent with the design of his creation. But
if

if this be the point to which all his views ultimately tend, there can be no other, for there is only one ultimate: therefore the subject of this section is the true answer.

5. Revelation itself, as well as natural religion, as far as a future state is presumable upon the latter, assigns this as the ultimate reason of its requisitions. If you do not in this life, you must in a future, suffer physical evil in proportion to the number and strength of the evil habits you depart with out of the world, else they cannot be eradicated, and till they are, you cannot be happy.

6. Not only the social, but even the theopathic affections can be deduced from the selfish, as is evident from what Hartley has advanced on the subject, so that, whether we perceive the intermediate steps, or not, self-love is the foundation of all our other affections.

7. One

7. One might argue from the common consent of mankind. It is universally allowed, that self-preservation is the first law of nature. And I think it may be safely asserted, that no one ever counteracts this law for the present, but if he were asked the reason, it would appear, that it was to establish it more firmly in future. So among the ancients, none ever disputed whether the *summum bonum* were to be sought or not; the only question was how, and where?

8. From the nature of all voluntary actions, or those ascribed to the will. He, who asserts, that the phenomena of the mind, commonly ascribed to the will, are resolvable into any thing different from the last inclination or aversion, immediately preceding an action, or the omission of it; let him shew the fallacy of the representation of Hobbes, and Locke, and Hartley, and Priestley, which are consistent with this.

this. It appears to me a point indisputable. But, if so, all voluntary actions (the only actions we are speaking of) are the immediate consequences of inclinations and aversions, that is, of a sense of pleasure expectant on the performance of the action, which is attended with a sensation of uneasiness till it be performed (the foundation of Locke's reasoning) or a sense of pain on the performance of it; in the former case we perform it, in the latter we avoid it. But the pursuit of pleasure, and the avoidance of pain are the same thing, the latter being inconsistent with the former. *A priori*, therefore, no other hypothesis can be true than that here advanced. If it be objected, that we *will*, many things, and act accordingly, *contrary* to our inclinations and desires, and that the will, in this case, which we comply with, is a sensation of pain, though the act be positive, and not an omission: I reply, we choose that which is the best, or the least evil
upon

upon the whole. So to give Locke's^y instance of the distinction between will and desire. "A man whom I cannot
 " deny, obliges me to use persuasions
 " to another, which at the time I am
 " speaking, I wish may not prevail
 " over him:" here, says he, "the
 " will and the desire run counter."

But evidently in this case I choose the least of two evils. I had *rather* reluctantly use persuasion, than deny the man who requests it of me.

The objections to this theory are,

1. The desire of private happiness does not influence men, in cases that very frequently occur. In none of those, for instance, attributed to the social affections. What desire of happiness influences us, when we relieve an object in distress, which is very

^y Chapter on Power.

feldom or ever done, with any retrospect to the nature of virtue, the fitness of things, the will of the Deity, or any other system.

I reply 1. It has already been noticed, that the motives that *usually* do, and those that are the *most reasonable* to influence men are two different things; if men always acted according to the *best* of their judgment, and always asked themselves the reasons of their acting till they came to the ultimate one, the objection would be of some force, but that is not the case. 2. It has also been observed already, that the social are deduced from, and founded on, the selfish affections, as Hartley has demonstrated. 3. Locke has made it clear that the most pressing uneasiness always determines us to act; and this instance is a clear case in point. But the avoidance of pain, and the pursuit of pleasure, are the same thing. 4. The question to be resolved is not what is the

the *immediate*, but what is the *ultimate* motive to actions ; into which, on inquiry, all the immediate ones would be resolved. It is not disputable, that although *on consideration* we should refer all our actions to the *ultimate* end of them, yet being assured that certain means lead to that end, we commonly look no farther than one of the means, till we have passed it. Thus, I am going through Oxford and Birmingham to Manchester. I do not refer every step of my road to Oxford, to Manchester, but to Oxford. Knowing that Oxford is in my way to Birmingham, and Birmingham to Manchester, it is a sufficient motive to me to go this way, that it is the way to Oxford. So in the instance adduced. Why did you relieve the man ? He was in such distress, I could not find in my heart to give him nothing. Here was the *immediate* motive ; it was unpleasant (that is, painful) to pass by and spare nothing to the distress of a deserving object

object. But why do you cherish this habit of charity, and give way to your desire of relieving deserving objects in distress? Because such habits are praise-worthy; they are a part of benevolence, and are of public utility. But why do you pay attention to benevolence and utility? You might as well ask me why I pay attention to what is right and virtuous. Well, I *do* ask that question. Because it is the way to come off well in the other world, if not in this. Farther than this it would be absurd to inquire.

2. It is objected, that this scheme makes virtue and prudence synonymous, religion merely calculation, and that the motive of all others the most sordid and the most universally condemned, the spring of all evil, is assigned by this theory as the only one that ought uniformly and habitually to influence a rational creature.

I answer

I answer to the various parts of this objection; "it makes virtue and prudence synonymous:" granted: they are never separable if a future state be allowed. If they be separable, and a man may be virtuous, and at the same time imprudent, as he certainly would be if he were neglective of his ultimate happiness, it follows logically that a man would be a fool if he were virtuous in such a case. "But religion and virtue upon this scheme are no more than good calculation:" granted also. If it were otherwise then religion and virtue might be ill calculation, and a man that would act in conformity to the latter rather than the former, has no other term applicable to him but that already given. Dr. Price urges this objection, and yet one of the strongest *persuasive* arguments that I ever met with in favour of the christian religion is that which he has given us at the end of his Treatise on Morals, founded

founded entirely on the doctrine of chances.

If in reply to this, a distinction be made between coincidence and identity, and it be said that religion, and virtue, and prudence, and good calculation, though coincident, are not the same; it may be rejoined that the only mode of discovering which of them is the true source of obligation, or the ultimate motive for acting, is to put a case; suppose a course of virtue would make you finally miserable, and the opposite course finally happy, then prudence and virtue would be opposite: take your choice, and the question is determined: surely no man in his senses would make himself ultimately and eternally miserable, rather than act against what he terms virtue, be it a feeling or a perception of the understanding, a quality of actions, or what you will. Again, upon every theory that has yet been advanced on this

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contentious question, it will be granted that nothing can be perceived, or felt, or understood to be more wrong than that any being should make himself finally miserable, or more right than that he should endeavour to procure the greatest degree of happiness that he can; and I should be glad to know upon any theory, what else are religion, and virtue, and right, but *means* to that end? for if not to that, to what end? There is not a possibility even of supposing any other end, but what by the terms must either interfere with, or not relate to, our happiness. And what business we have with any course of action which would upon the whole interfere with our happiness, I cannot discover. As little have we to do with that which relates not to it.

“ But the most fordid and repro-
 “ bated motive, that which is the
 “ source of all evil cannot be the
 “ source of all good: nor can it be
 “ that which *ought* to influence men.”

I say

I say in reply *corruptio optimi fit pessima*: and we are not to argue from the abuse of a thing against the use of it. We reprobate the *improper*, not the *proper* application. As to its being the source of all evil, it proceeds from men being bad calculators, or if they calculate well, from not *acting* accordingly. If men will prefer three degrees of present pleasure, to three million of future, they cannot be said even on any system to act prudently, or for their own advantage: though were they to act otherwise, it is evident that the motive would be equally selfish.

The other objections to this theory are forcibly stated by Dr. Price in the following quotation, upon which I shall take the liberty of remarking as it proceeds. Hence, says he, ² it follows, *that virtue as such, has a real full obligatory power, antecedently to*

² Page 182.

all positive laws and sanctions, and independently of all will and power; for obligation we see is involved in the very nature of it. To affirm that the performance of that, which to omit would be wrong, is not obligatory unless conducive to private good, or enjoined by a superior power is a manifest contradiction. True, if there were *no reason* to be given why it was wrong, but that the understanding perceives that it is so; but I trust that has already been sufficiently answered. 'Tis to say, says the doctor, *that it is not true that a thing is what it is, what is just, just; or that we are obliged to do what we ought to do, unless it be the object of a command, or in some manner privately useful.* True again, on a *petitio principii* but this is the point in dispute; we say, a reason can be assigned *why* such or such an action is right or wrong, the contrary of which Dr. Price has by no means made clear. *If there are any things*
fit

fit to be done by an agent beside such as tend to his happiness, or independently of their influence on it, these things by the terms are likewise OBLIGATORY independently of their influence on his happiness. True again on a petitio principii, but I deny that any such things are fit to be done, or wrong to be omitted; give me an instance of any action obligatory upon man, which has no relation to his private happiness, and I give up the question. He goes on. Whatever action attended with certain consequences it is wrong to do, that action it is our duty not to do, whatever these consequences are, or whether enjoined or not by any positive law. That is, whatever action it is wrong to do, we ought not to do; but I deny that any action can be right or wrong independently of its consequences; this is the point in dispute. It appears therefore, says he, that those who maintain that all obligation is to be deduced from positive laws, the divine will, or

self-love assert what (if they mean any thing contrary to what is here said) evidently implies that the words RIGHT and JUST stand for no real, and distinct characters of actions, but signify merely what is WILLED and COMMANDED, or conducive to private happiness, whatever that be; so that any thing may be both right and wrong, morally good and evil at the same time, and in any circumstances, as it may be commanded, or forbidden by different laws or wills, and any the most pernicious and horrible effects will become just, if but the minuteſt degree of clear advantage or pleasure may result to him from them. This is drawing consequences with a witness; but Dr. Prices', so that, is not equivalent to the logical Ergo. His conclusion is a petitio principii: for those who make the essence of right and wrong to consist in the command or the tendency, of course, if the command or the tendency be different, conceive differently of the action termed right
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or wrong ; for the *abstract* ideas of right and wrong are non-entities. But *the most pernicious and horrible effects will become just, if but the minutest degree of clear advantage or pleasure result from them to the agent* : granted. But let God look to that.^a A future state of retribution, was formerly conjectured and has been since ascertained for the very purpose of obviating this objection ; and I apprehend it is sufficiently obviated.

Those, he proceeds, who say nothing can oblige but the will of God, generally resolve the power of this to oblige, to the annexed rewards and punishments. And thus in reality they subvert entirely the

^a This expression has been censured as extremely impious. I have examined, and re-examined it at different times and long intervals. (I have had this essay by me about four years.) I perceive not the impiety, and I have not so much respect for the understandings of the exclamants, as to alter the passage upon their *authority* only, without *conviction* of its impropriety.

distinct and independent natures of moral good and evil, and are forced to maintain that nothing can oblige but the prospect of pleasure to be obtained, or pain to be avoided. True; nothing else can oblige: as to good and evil, I know nothing such but pleasure and pain, and if what is called moral evil produced no pain in the end, I know not why it should be avoided. But if this is true, it follows that vice is properly no more than imprudence, that nothing is right or wrong, just or unjust, any farther than it affects self-interest, and that a being independently and completely happy cannot have any moral perceptions or any guide of his actions. The justness of these influences cannot easily be denied by one who will attend to the coincidence between obligation and virtue here insisted on, or who will consider that as far as a being is not OBLIGED to a thing, so far it is not INCUMBENT upon him; or that which is the only source of moral obligation must be also the only source of MORAL DUTY, or of moral right and wrong. Now to consider

sider his inferences : *vice is no more than imprudence*, granted : it is *no more*. *Nothing is right or wrong, just or unjust, than as it affects self-interest*. If he had said nothing is *obligatory* but as far as it affects self-interest, I should have allowed his inference and repeated it ; but right and wrong, just and unjust, as I understand them, refer entirely to the *criterion of virtue*. This criterion appears to me no other than *utility*, which it is *incumbent* or *obligatory* on the individuals to pursue no farther than their self-interest permits them. But his third inference is, *a being independently and completely happy cannot have any moral perceptions, or any guide to his actions* : none but the mere communication of happiness : what else is morality good for ? point me out any other end or use of it ? All these terrible inferences then I have allowed very nearly in their full force ; let others judge if they be *intuitively* so horrible as to induce us instantly to reject

ject the theory from which they are deduced.

But to pursue, says the doctor, this matter farther: let it be considered, would a person who either believes there is no God, or that he does not concern himself with human affairs, be under no moral obligations, and therefore not at all accountable? I answer that as physical is the necessary consequence of moral evil, that person would be under the necessity of suffering the degree of physical evil necessary to eradicate those habits which produced it: but those habits could not possibly be so inveterate as the same course of actions would produce in a person who had those motives for abstaining from evil, which the unbeliever had not. As to the sense of accountable, inclusive of free-will, I refer Dr. Price to Dr. Priestley. But to proceed: Would one who should happen not to be convinced that virtue tends to his happiness here or hereafter,
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be released from every BOND of duty and morality? If by *bond* the doctor means any more than a motive, I deny that duty or obligation includes more. Such a person would not have the same motives to virtue that a person would have who was thus convinced. *In foro conscientiae*, he would be released. Or *would he*, says Dr. Price, *if he believed no future state, and that in any instance virtue was against his present interest, be truly OBLIGED in these cases to be wicked?* I answer, yes, as much obliged to be wicked as any of us are to be good. Else he would come under the case of the imprudent man before spoken of: so that, what Dr. Price goes on to say, may be allowed, for ought I see. *These things must follow, if obligation depends entirely on the knowledge of the will of a superior, or on the connection between actions and private interest. But indeed the very expression, VIRTUE TENDS TO OUR HAPPINESS, and the supposition, that, in certain cases, it may*
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be inconsistent with our happiness, imply it to be somewhat that may exist independently of any connection with private happiness, and would have no sense if it signified only the relation of actions to this. Dr. Price, in his paragraph, says, that virtue may exist independently of any connection with private happiness; first, from an expression, and secondly, from a supposition. From the expression his conclusion is illogical. *Virtue tends to our happiness:* they differ according to this expression, as the means and the end; but is there no connection between the means and the end? Is not the tendency of one thing to another a connection between them? As to his supposition: it is a *petitio principii*: I deny that virtue can be inconsistent with our happiness, if there be a state of future retribution: but whether there be or be not, if virtue be inconsistent with our happiness upon the whole of any case, it may be virtue, but it is not obligatory. But
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he goes on : *For then, to suppose virtue to be inconsistent with our happiness, would be the same with supposing that what is ADVANTAGEOUS to us, may be DISADVANTAGEOUS to us: and saying that virtue tends to promote our happiness, would be saying, that actions which are conducive to our happiness, tend to make us happy.* All this is extremely just; and it is so far from being ridiculous as he seems to conceive it is, that every true proposition must as such be substantially identical: the subject and predicate ultimately, whatever words they may consist of must mean the same thing, so far as the predicate extends: this has been well illustrated by some one, I forget whom, by algebraical equations, but it seems to me to be intuitively evident.

'Tis strange, says Dr. Price, to find those who plead for self, as the only original and ground of moral obligation, asserting, that when virtue stands in the way of
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our temporal interest, or clashes with present enjoyments, all motives to it cease, supposing no future state. This may be strange (but leaving out the motives from associations and habits) it is perfectly true. *For upon their principles,* says he, *the truth is not that all motives to practice virtue would in these circumstances cease, but that virtue itself would cease, nay, would be changed into vice, and what would otherwise have been fit and just, become unlawful and wrong.* It is strange to find so good a reasoner as Dr. Price most certainly is, draw so many wrong conclusions: all that follows is, that on the supposition made that virtue tends to our happiness, the name ought to be applied to actions different from those which we now call virtuous: it is not that virtue would be changed into vice, but that those actions now termed virtuous would be vicious. Dr. Price might as well have said, that if the turner were to convert a die into a ball,

ball, squareness would become rotundity. He goes on, *For being under an obligation in these circumstances not to do what appeared to us fit, it could not in reality be fit; we could not do it without violating our duty, and therefore, certainly not without doing wrong. Thus all who find not their present account in virtue, would upon these principles, setting aside another world, be under an obligation to be wicked. Or to speak more properly, the subject matter of virtue and vice, that is, the relation of particular actions to private good would be altered; what was before wickedness would become virtue, and what was before virtue would become wickedness. It should be carefully minded, that as far as another world creates obligation, it creates virtue; for surely it is an absurdity too gross to be maintained, that a man may act contrary to his obligations, and yet act virtuously. This absurdity, I reply, cannot happen on my scheme, it is infallible on his. In all else, he has*
spoken

spoken more properly than before; the subject matter of vice and virtue, and not vice and virtue themselves, would be changed. Here is the strongest argument to me in support of the theory I adopt: an argument, which although I have not yet enumerated, I did not intend to omit: namely, 1. That no man can have any *reasonable* motives to virtue, but in proportion as he is convinced of a future state, where virtue would interfere with present happiness. 2. That as such a state is (as I think) *certainly* deduced from the christian religion only, no man can be so *absolutely* depended on, who is not a christian, as one who is. It is the christian religion only which *assures* us, that we shall be happy finally in proportion as we are virtuous, and miserable in proportion to our vicious habits; it is the christian religion therefore, and that alone, which holds out the reasonable incentive to
a course

a course of virtue, and which ascertains the genuine source of moral obligation.

Another observation, says Dr. Price, is, that rewards and punishments suppose in the very idea of them moral obligation, and are founded upon. All this I deny: they operate only as motives: the common idea of rewards and punishments is puerile and absurd; would God punish us if he could do us no good by it? Surely not: does even a human legislature punish with any motive but that of producing good either to the person punished or the society? Why do you beat your dog for dirtying the parlour? Is it because he was under an obligation a priori not to do it? is it not to associate the idea of pain to the action, so that when it is liable to recur, he may have a motive to abstain from it? And do we not treat children in the same manner? Precisely thus are we ourselves treated by the laws of our country. They do not make obligation,

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says

says he, *but enforce it, or furnish additional motives to comply with it.* This is an assertion; let it pass with a denial. *They are the sanctions of virtue, not its efficient.* We have already considered what virtue is. *A reward supposes something done to deserve it, or a conformity to obligations subsisting previous to it, and punishment is always inflicted on account of some breach of obligation.* This is a *petitio principii*; human legislators know, and God knows, that those actions termed virtuous are necessary to the conservice of individuals and of the species; also that if those actions were not made the road to happiness they would not be followed. Hence rewards and punishments: but to say that obligation is previous to, and independent of them, is only begging the question over again. *Occidit miseris crambe repetita.* Were we under no obligation antecedently to the proposal of rewards and punishments, and independently of them, it would be very absurd to propose

propose them, and a contradiction to suppose us subjects capable of them. A person without any light besides that of nature, and supposed ignorant of a future state of rewards and punishments, and the will of the Deity, might discover these by reasoning from his natural notions of right and wrong, morality and duty.

He might conjecture them, I reply, as the heathens did, before the advent of our Lord; but no more: as to *natural* notions of right and wrong I deny any but such as arose from experience, or from probable conjecture *a priori*. No man at present has any notions of right or wrong, but such as he has been taught or has read, or has observed universally to prevail, or such as he deduces from general rules which he *thus* knew before. He proceeds; *Were the latter dependent on the former (that is, were the notions of right and wrong dependent on the annexed rewards and punishments) and not vice versa this*

could not be said, nor should we have any medium or any principles left from which to gather what the Deity required, or what the conditions are of his favour to us. All this I deny. Temporal utility was sufficient to point out a great part of morality, and from the extreme necessity of begetting an adherence to those rules which it did point out, parents and legislators dwelt upon that necessity to those under their care, till something of the idea of obligation arose. Again, all the writers on natural law uniformly deduce all the precepts thereof, without at all recurring to revelation, or to a future state of retribution. In fact, no laws were ever made upon earth, nor any rules of morality deduced, but from a perception either *a priori* or *a posteriori* of the necessity of such to the preservation of society. And it seems rather strange to me how any one can talk about the *natural* notions of right and wrong without obviating the very prominent objection

objection of the diversity of those notions. A diversity no otherwise to be accounted for than from men's being bad reasoners, or reasoning from too little experience. And we find universally, that experience corrects the false notions, and introduces more just conceptions of what would be conducive to general utility. Hence new laws in every country.

These seem to me all the objections worth noticing, which militate against the theory here advanced. I have dwelt longer on those of Dr. Price, because his Treatise on difficult Questions in morals, is by far the most full and ingenious of any that have occurred to me. *Si Pergama dextra defendi potuit, etiam hac defensa fuisset.*

That private happiness is the only ultimate motive of action, where there is any apparent motive at all, appears to me a matter clear and ascertainable : but

so does their own system to each of the supporters of the various systems here examined : it is wondered on all hands, how so simple a question can have been so litigated ; and yet the chief opposers of that theory I advance are authors now living, or that were so no long time since. However clear therefore the matter may seem to myself, I should be cautious of asserting that the question itself was not obscure, or that my view of it had not occurred and been rejected by men whose talents are far above the comparison with mine. But as in the multitude of counsellors there is wisdom, so also in the multitude of writers there is truth, or at least a great chance of truth. It is not therefore useless or inopportune to treat of this question, seeing that it has been considered as a question of considerable importance by a multitude of writers of the first abilities, and it has been litigated with variety of sentiment by authors now living, whose works on
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this particular topic have not been hitherto examined, although they have been well received, and considerably disseminated. The preceding essay may be of use in this respect also, as containing a summary of the principal opinions, and a reference to the principal authors on the subject; a matter not unimportant to those who are desirous of considering it, and as to the arguments advanced throughout the preceding pages, I can only say, *Valeant quantum valere possunt.*

A P P E N D I X.

“LET no man say, I’ll write a duodecimo.” Expecting when I began this Essay, that it would scarcely be long enough to afford matter for the consideration of two evenings. I intended in an Appendix to have treated at large concerning the criterion of virtue, as well as those questions which I threatened in p. 21, to discuss in this place. In which discussion it was my intention to have advanced, first, That there is no such thing as moral good and evil independent of, and not resolvable into happiness or misery. Secondly, That the production of happiness was the motive to the creation; and Thirdly, That this motive operated necessarily, so that even from eternity

à parte

à parte ante nothing could have been otherwise than it hath been.^b

The sole subject however of moral obligation, has extended imperceptibly under my hands, to such a length, that it appears more like a treatise of growth sufficient to stand by itself, than an essay requiring the company of others. Such as it is, it is at the service of the society, but the nature of the subjects *as well* as the length of the Essay is a motive to me not to intrude disquisitions, which, notwithstanding their tendency to generate habits of exact reasoning, and acute discrimination, are much less attended to now than for-

^b The two latter questions I have since considered. The two former appear to me so clear, that farther consideration is needless. That utility is the criterion of virtue, *Hume* has gone near to demonstrate. That all moral good and evil are ultimately resolvable into the means of producing permanent, unmixed, pleasurable or painful sensations, will be as I think so obvious to every one on considering a little, that a formal discussion of this point is utterly needless.

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merly. I cannot avoid thinking we have run too much into the opposite extreme, and have conceived too slightly of the importance of metaphysical studies in every point of view. But however this may be, it is certain that many of those who may truly be stiled learned, whose time has been usefully as well as constantly employed, have little taste for abstract disquisition, or any studies with relation to which the *cui bono*, is not extremely evident. To the valuable members of this description in the society, my apology for what I *have* offered is drawn from example; their candour will accept it.

W H E T H E R

WHETHER THE

D E I T Y

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F R E E A G E N T.

IT hath been noticed in the preceding Essay, that among those who have treated on the subject of moral obligation, some derived the obligatoriness of obligatory actions, from their conformity to the eternal and necessary *fitness* of things. The maintainers of this hypothesis of obligation, moreover, in opposition to the Cartesians, advance, that the Divine Being was necessarily determined in the creation of the present system (and always is) by this antecedent fitness, inevitably attendant

attendant on the relations of the things or actions to each other. But this necessary determination, say they, is a *moral necessity* only, and perfectly consistent with liberty, or free agency.^a

This opinion notwithstanding the concession of its supposed consistency with free agency, has been opposed by names of considerable note in the ethical world,^b who insist on the contrary that the Deity doth not, nor ever did choose, from the inducement of antecedent bonity or fitness; but that the bonity or fitness of every thing chosen, depends entirely on the sole circumstance of God's choosing it.

The opinion I mean to maintain, is, 1. That the Supreme Being is the cause of every thing which depends

^a Clarke on the Attributes, Prop. IX. p. 100. and Prop. XII. p. 185. and the other references in King's Orig. of Evil, p. 186. quarto edit.

^b King. ubi Sup.

upon

upon him, from some *motive or inducement*, which occasioned him to become the cause of it: 2. That this motive or inducement operated *necessarily*, in the strict sense of the word, exclusive of the possibility of liberty, or free agency: and 3. That this motive was the *greatest sum of happiness* which would arise upon the whole from the existence of the effect, than from its none existence.

Herein I differ from *Clarke* and his followers, who maintain that the necessity they assert is consistent with liberty; and with whom the resulting happiness is not synonymous with the fitness of things.

But notwithstanding this apparent dissonance between the opinions of *Clarke* on the one side, and of *King* on the other, that absurdity of *Clarke's* that "God may be necessarily determined to do that which at the same
" time

“time he is at perfect liberty not to do,” brings them effectually together as to the main subject of the dispute, namely, whether God ever could have done, or have chosen, any thing but what he has done, and chosen: they, both say, yes; I should answer, no: with an intention therefore of bringing the controversy within a short statement, I shall first propose their arguments and then my own.^c

By those who assert the free agency of the Deity, it is advanced.^d

I. All the goodness of the creatures is owing to the Divine Will, and dependent on it, since antecedent to the

^c Mrs. Macaulay has published a Treatise against the opinions of Lord Bolingbrooke as I understand (which accord with Abp. King's on this subject) but having finished my search into the question before her book was published, I have never perused it.

^d I give very nearly the words of King and Clarke.

Divine

Divine Will they were nothing at all, so that God's will could not be determined by any antecedent goodness of the creatures.

Answer. It is fully sufficient if they existed as objects of God's knowledge, antecedently to their being brought into actual existence. In such case their aptitude to produce the end which he proposed was the inducement to their adoption. A course of conduct by which I am to arrive at my desired intention hath no actual existence until I really pursue it; but its aptitude to accomplish the design I am about, is beyond controversy the motive from which I prefer it. It is enough if some *motive quality* in the thing in *posse* can be shewn, without the necessity of its existence in *esse*. God is the cause of the actual existence of those combinations in the universe which are the effects of his power; but the properties, qualities, and relations of these

these, depend not upon him. If there never had existed such a thing as a triangle, yet a triangle being supposed, it must also be supposed with three sides and three angles; and that its three angles are equal to two right ones. Nor could any triangle have been brought into existence without having these properties: evidently because each of these properties is a part of the definition of, a *sine qua non* to the existence, of a triangle, whether in *posse* or in *esse*. The same will hold true of the moral relations, &c. Therefore, as the properties and relations of every thing are exactly the same while the things are in *potentiâ* only, as they would be, were they in actual existence; these potential properties and relations are sufficient inducements.

II. It is asserted, that if God be determined by the greater good which he perceives in objects, the world could never have been made. For God is
absolutely

absolutely and completely happy in himself, and therefore must be indifferent to all external objects; nor can any reason be assigned with regard to the things themselves, why he should prefer one to another, since he stands not in any need of these to his complete happiness.

Answer. Benevolence consists in an habitual tendency to communicate happiness. If God be a benevolent being,* he must also have that tendency. if

* It is sufficiently obvious, but not sufficiently noticed that we can only reason from what we know. If we say God has wisdom, we mean wisdom similar in kind to what we find among men, only infinite in degree. If we do not mean this, we have no meaning at all, for of any other kind of wisdom we have no conception; and it is evidently absurd to predicate of any being, a property of which we know nothing at all. So, if from the marks of design in the universe we deduce, that the Being which formed it is an intelligent Being, and that he formed it for some end, with some view, if we do not mean by these terms what we mean in common, they are terms without any meaning at all. In like

If therefore any system in *posse*, could be a means of increasing the general sum of happiness he has in his own nature, from his own attributes, a sufficient inducement to adopt that system; nor, indeed, do I know of any other assignable inducement. All the writers, however, who contend for the free agency of the Deity, even that class which deny that the things caused could possibly afford any inducement to their causation, allow, that it is a consequence from the attributes of God, that he must desire to communicate happiness: but how he can desire to

manner as to God's goodness or benevolence, if we do not understand it in some of the senses wherein it is used among mankind, we have no right to say that God is good at all, for our idea of goodness is drawn from our observation of the actions of men long before we come to apply it to the Deity. The same observations may be made, with respect to the other attributes of the Deity, his justice, his omnipresence, &c. Hence all the attributes of God are the same in kind with those which we find among men, only infinite in degree, otherwise he has no attributes at all, at least, we have no ground for asserting that he has any.

• communicate

communicate happiness without desiring the existence of the means of so doing, they have not explained. But whatever the means were, they must as such, contain a reason *why* their existence should be caused. If so, the argument under consideration must fall to the ground.

III. It is said, that if we suppose there was a reason, and that God was moved by it to produce external things, it is manifest that according to this, all things will proceed from him necessarily. For he that is determined *ab extra* by any thing, acts from necessity; he is passive, and must necessarily both do, and suffer, not what himself but what the determining cause has effected for him. But this goodness, which is supposed to be in things antecedent to the divine election, and to determine it, is something external with regard to the will of God; if therefore that be the cause which determines the election,

it follows that the act of election, and every thing which depends upon it, is necessary.

Answer 1. This argument is framed upon the supposed impossibility of admitting that the Divine Being is not a free agent; of course it is of no kind of avail against those who with me utterly deny the free agency of any, even of the Divine Being. 2. The Archbishop (King) whose words are here taken, is in this place, as in every other throughout his disquisition on the subject, totally unaware of what is universally true, that the motives which determine the voluntary actions of intelligent agents are *ideal*; that is, *perceived affections of the brain*. What external object is it that induces me to rise at a particular hour, because I have a journey to perform? The motive therefore is internal, although *in us* originally caused by external objects; a circumstance which there is no certain ground

ground for asserting with respect to the Deity.

But the possible existence of every thing which subsequently existed, together with every possible consequence and circumstance, must have existed as part of the knowledge of God, and he was determined by those views of them in which that knowledge consisted.³ In fact, there is not an intelligent creature in the universe, so far as we know, who acting deliberately, has not the ideas of what he is about to do, before he does it: this enters into our very

³ I mean here, and every where else throughout the book to take for granted the truth of the doctrine of *philosophical necessity*. I have so few observations to make in its favour which have not been made already, and it appears to me, that it stands so little in need of any such, at this time, that the attempt would be *actum agere*. For the same reason, it is proper to observe, that when I make use of the terms *agent* or *action*, I mean them in their popular sense, as when it is said that fire burns. Action in the sense of the defenders of free agency, does not exist even in the Deity.

notion of an intelligent agent, and if we assert that God is such, we must assert that it is so with him; or else produce some probable circumstance respecting his existence, which shall make him an exception; I know none such. Hence, as an intelligent agent not only *may have* (which is all the answer *King's* argument requires) but so far as we know certainly *has*, a determining motive to action which cannot be denominated external, the supposition in the argument is unfounded.

3. To those who are so afraid of the concession, that the Deity is inevitably determined in all his actions, it might be worth while to consider, that God exists necessarily, he cannot avoid it: he cannot alter his attributes or properties, whatever they be; these therefore are necessary: and if his actions proceed from his attributes, his actions also are necessary. In fact, we know of nothing in the universe that is not so, and with respect to the mental phenomena

phenomena of man, the point seems to me no longer disputable.

Hitherto I have considered *King's* arguments which go to prove that the Deity had no other inducement in the causation of whatever depends upon him, but his own gratification in the exertion of his will, there being no quality in the nature of external things, which could become such an inducement. One contradiction he has fallen into which I have before noticed, viz. his concession that God must incline to communicate happiness. For he must incline therefore to the means of communicating it; but external things (as the Archbishop terms them) are certainly the means to this end, so far as we know; and therefore there did and does exist in these, a motive to their causation.

But this is a trifling inaccuracy, when compared with the contradictory

sentiments of Dr. S. Clarke, whose arguments in favour of God's free agency I now proceed to examine: and whose metaphysical works (notwithstanding their high reputation) appear to me to contain in the same compass more ill-founded assertion, more inconclusive reasoning, and more arrogant expressions against authors, certainly his superiors, than the works of any other metaphysical writer *of repute* whose writings have occurred to me.

The ninth Prop. of his book on the Being and Attributes of God, is, "The
 " self-existent and original cause of all
 " things is not a necessary agent, but
 " a being endued with liberty and
 " choice." Not to mention that in this very proposition he runs directly into the same verbal mistake, which has furnished the chief topic of his quibbling answer to Collins's very excellent " Inquiry concerning Human Liberty," namely, combining the terms
necessary

necessary and *agent* ; * or his more than verbal inaccuracy in supposing, that necessity excludes liberty and choice ; it is hardly possible for a man to contradict himself more strongly than he does, a few pages after in his 12th Prop. where speaking of the Deity, he says, p. 185. “ ’Tis evident he *must* “ *of necessity* (meaning not a *necessity of* “ *fate*, but such a *moral necessity* as I “ before said, was consistent with the “ most perfect liberty) *do* always what “ he knows fittest to be done ; that is, “ he *must* act always according to the “ strictest rules of infinite goodness, “ justice and truth, and all the other “ moral perfections.”

Again, p. 190. “ From this account “ of the moral attributes of God, it “ follows, that though all the actions

* Collins moreover professedly made use of the terms of the free agents, and used them (not in their strict and philosophical sense, for they have none such) but in their usual and popular acceptation.

“ of God are entirely free, and con-
 “ sequently the exercise of his moral
 “ attributes cannot be said to be neces-
 “ sary in the same sense, as his exist-
 “ ence and eternity are necessary; yet
 “ these moral attributes *are really and*
 “ *truly* necessary, by such a necessity as
 “ though it be not at all inconsistent
 “ with liberty, yet is *equally certain,*
 “ *infallible, and to be depended on,* as
 “ even the existence itself, or the eter-
 “ nity of God. For though nothing
 “ is more certain than that God acts
 “ *not necessarily but voluntarily, &c.*”^h

That is, although this *white* paper is
 entirely *black*, it is not *black* in the
 same sense wherein this *ink* is said to be
black; yet is this *white* paper as really,
 as truly, as necessarily, as certainly,
 and as infallibly *black*, as the ink itself,
 though this *blackness* is nevertheless
 entirely consistent with perfect *whiteness*.

^h His opponents knew very well, and Clarke
 ought to have known, that *necessarily* and *voluntarily*
 are perfectly compatible.

Leaving

Leaving Clarke's *assertions* to themselves (*valeant quantum valere possunt*) I have only to remark on these quotations, that notwithstanding his arguments for God's free agency, which I am about to consider, he and I are already agreed: we come exactly to the same place, but by different roads; for if it be *evident* in Clarke's opinion that God *must of necessity* do always what is fittest to be done; if he *must* act always according to the strictest rules of infinite goodness, justice and truth; if his moral attributes are *really and truly necessary, equally certain, infallible, and to be depended on* as his existence, and his eternity, then are Clarke's opinion and mine coincident; he may call his necessity by what name he thinks proper, but if these be the effects of the necessity he contends for, they are the utmost that mine is capable of producing, and I shall lose nothing by the exchange.

I proceed

I proceed now to the arguments he adduces for that which he imagines to be his opinion.

IV. Godⁱ is an intelligent agent: but intelligence without liberty is really in respect of any power, excellence, or perfection, no intelligence at all. It is indeed a consciousness, but it is merely a passive one, a consciousness not of acting but purely of being acted on. Without liberty, nothing can in any tolerable propriety of speech be said to be an agent or cause of any thing. For to act necessarily is really and properly not to act at all,^k but to be acted on.

Answer. This first argument of Clarke's is in reality double, and ought to have been stated inversely thus,

ⁱ I use Clarke's words, only adding what is necessary to complete the sentence.

^k Therefore Clarke, who abuses Collins for verbal inaccuracy should not have blundered in this very page so much as to talk of a necessary agent.

1. God is an *agent*, but philosophically speaking, there can be no agency without liberty; therefore God has liberty, or is a free agent.¹

2. God is an *intelligent* agent; but intelligence without liberty is no intelligence at all; therefore God has liberty: i. e. he is a free agent.

As to the first part of it. I deny that God is an agent in any sense exclusive of necessity. To take for granted that he is such, is a *petitio principii*, it is taking the question itself for granted.

As to the second part of the argument; I deny that intelligence includes liberty. By intelligence nothing is

¹ Free agent is properly nonsense when applied as it is commonly, to voluntary actions: for freedom (as Locke remarks) is not applicable to the will. I use the adopted expression of my opponents to express their own sentiment.

usually meant that I know of, but knowledge or understanding. Moreover man is an intelligent being; this is universally allowed. But man is not a free agent, as the defenders of philosophical necessity have proved. Therefore intelligence doth not imply liberty or free agency. Again, Clarke (p. 81.) confesses that the intelligence of God cannot be proved *a priori*, *because we know not wherein intelligence consists*, and yet in the argument just stated, he says it consists in consciousness, and impliedly in active consciousness. The activity is clearly a *petitio principii*. Again, when Clarke, in a preceding part of the book, has to demonstrate that God is an intelligent being he implies activity in intelligence, but none of the media of proof he uses, avail at all as to this latter component part. As Clarke therefore is unable to establish the existence of such intelligence in the Deity as comprehends (strict) active power, he has no right to
make

make the assertion, that the latter is comprehended. If any one will be at the trouble of examining Clarke's proofs of God's being an intelligent being in the sense inclusive of activity or free agency, he will find that they equally tend to prove the very same of man: but as I hold it fully established that man at least hath no intelligence, or any other property necessarily inclusive of philosophical freedom; I state this reply to Clarke as a *reductio ad absurdum*: his arguments prove the truth of a falsehood, and therefore they prove nothing true.

V. If the supreme cause, says he, is not a being endued with liberty and choice, but a mere necessary agent, whose actions are all as absolutely and naturally necessary as his existence: then it will follow that nothing which is not, could *possibly* have been, and that nothing which is could *possibly* not have been; and that no mode or circumstance

circumstance of the existence of any thing could *possibly* have been in any respect otherwise than it now actually is. All which being evidently most false and absurd, it follows on the contrary, that the supreme cause is not a mere necessary agent, but a being indeed with liberty and choice.

Answer. Clarke must have known that all those who contend against the free agency of the Deity, do of course acknowledge that nothing could have happened, or does happen, or will happen, but what actually has happened, or doth, or will happen. Indeed he says, in express terms, that *Spinoza* owns this. It is therefore a shameless begging of the question to state an argument of which his adversaries make no scruple to admit his *conclusio ad absurdum*. Clarke says it is evidently most false and absurd, to assert that nothing which is not could possibly have been, and that nothing which is could possibly

fibly not have been, and that no mode or circumstance of the existence of any thing, could possibly have been in any respect otherwise than it now is. I together with those whose opinions on this subject are similar, say it is evidently most false and absurd to deny it. In fact, Clarke himself confutes himself in p. 101, where he asserts, "that by the perfection and rectitude of his will, God is *unalterably determined* to do always what is best upon the whole." Is there more than *one* best? If not, then nothing could ever be otherwise than it hath been, is, or shall be. How a man of common sense can attempt to demonstrate that Being to be free, who is always unalterably determined to act in a particular manner, I cannot conceive. The very attempt is a proof how easily a man of ingenuity may deceive himself.

. VI. If there be a final cause of any thing in the universe, then the supreme

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cause

cause is not a necessary, but a free agent.

Answer. If there be a final cause of any thing in the universe, then the supreme cause is not a free but a necessary agent. The final cause, that is the end or design with which, or for which, any thing is done by an intelligent agent, is always the reason or motive of his doing it: they are synonymous terms. If God had any intention or final cause, in producing the universe, then that was his motive to it. And that this operated necessarily, is demonstrable upon the hypothesis of philosophical necessity.

VII. If the supreme cause be a mere necessary agent, it is impossible any effect or product of that cause should be *finite*. For since that which acts necessarily, cannot govern or direct its own actions, but must necessarily produce whatever can be the effect or product

duct of its nature. It is plain every effect of such an infinite uniform nature, acting every where necessarily alike, must of necessity be immense, or infinite in extension, and so no creature in the universe could possibly be finite, which is infinitely absurd, and contrary to experience.

I answer. 1. The effect produced by any intelligent agent, must of course be, not as the nature of the agent simply, but as the nature of the agent, and the intensity of the motive conjointly. Hence Clarke's first consequence is illegitimate. 2. Granting that the effects produced by the supreme cause are properly infinite, every separate part of an infinite effect must be finite. Let the extent of the present mundane system be supposed infinite, the parts of which the system is composed are clearly finite. And it is to be considered, that the only rational foundation we have for the adscription of infinity to the

Deity, is the apparent infinite extent of the present mundane system.^m So that as far as we know, the case really is, that the sole effect of the Supreme Cause we are acquainted with is actually infinite, though its parts be finite. 3. Even supposing these replies were not as they appear to me to be, satisfactory, yet before Clarke's conclusion could be valid, we must perfectly comprehend the whole nature of the supreme cause; the nature of infinity: and how the general infinity of the supreme cause affects his operation.

VIII. If the supreme cause be not a free and voluntary agent, then in every effect (for instance in *motion*) there must have been a progression of causes *in infinitum* without any original cause at all. For if there be no liberty

^m We have no right in any case to ascribe a greater power to a cause, than its effect exhibits. For the same reason we have no right to ascribe greater power, &c. to God, than the universe exhibits.

any where, then there is no agent, no cause, mover, principle, or beginning of motion any where: every thing in the universe must be passive, and nothing active; every thing moved, and no mover; every thing effect, and nothing cause.

Ans. This implies that free agency is necessary to causation, which I deny. Every one who adopts the doctrine of philosophical necessity (which I all along take as a point established) contends that causation, from the nature of it, *excludes* free agency; agreeing with the maxim of long standing, *omnis causa agit necessariò*.

I come now to the arguments which induce one to suppose, that no effect whatever, which owes its origin to the *first cause*, remotely or immediately, could be otherwise than it is.

Some of these reasons have already been unavoidably hinted at, in considering the arguments for the contrary hypothesis. I have only to premise:

1. We can only reason from what we know: if we predicate any attributes concerning the Deity, they must be such as we are acquainted with, i. e. such as we find among men (the highest order of intelligent agents of which we know any thing.) The only difference we can make is in degree; and as we have no facts which will authorize us in the present case to set any bounds to the degree, within the compass of possibility, the term *infinite* is sufficiently allowable. If we say the attributes of God are different in *kind* from those of the same denomination in men, as it is impossible that we *can* have any data from whence to deduce the kind, we predicate a set of sounds without any meaning, and *Abracadabra* is full as applicable. 2. If we predicate any attributes concerning the
Deity,

Deity, we predicate all the consequences of those attributes. 3. *A posse ad esse non valet consequentia*. We cannot say, because a thing by bare possibility might have been thus or thus, we have a right to assume that it was so. 4. Those properties that are known to belong to every individual we are acquainted with in any class of beings, are to be presumed predicable of every individual of the class universally, until the contrary be shewn. The presumption is as the number of particulars of the induction.

I. God is an intelligent agent. Every being of this description, that we are acquainted with, is in all known voluntary cases necessarily determined by motives. The beings under this predicament, whose voluntary actions we have an opportunity of examining, are innumerable. The induction therefore is complete. Of course this predicament, of being necessarily influ-

enced by motives, is predicable of every intelligent agent universally; and therefore of the Deity. But the effects proceeding from a being necessarily influenced, whether *ab intra*, or *ab extra*, cannot be otherwise than they actually are, the previous circumstances being the same: therefore no effect of the first cause could be otherwise than it has been, is, or will be.

II. God is a being of infinite benevolence: that is, he is perpetually and above measure desirous of communicating happiness to his creatures. We collect the existence of this attribute in the Deity, only from those arguments that prove there is an excess of happiness above misery in the system, which excess is probably perpetually increasing. But we are not acquainted with any intelligent being (man for instance) who is not desirous of communicating happiness in proportion to the degree of his benevolence; and the
action

action (using the word popularly) results necessarily from the desire or volition. That is, benevolence (or that species of habitual tendency) is the cause of the desire, which is the cause of the action, and *causa causæ, est causa causati*. Now if God be a benevolent agent, his benevolence must operate in this way, or it is not any such thing as the benevolence we are acquainted with. God is a benevolent agent; therefore his benevolence necessarily produces his volition, and this his action; but there is no action of the Deity with which we are acquainted, but is in an instance of his benevolence; "all things work together for good." Therefore all the actions of the Deity are necessary.

III. A Power of doing either the action A or the action B, the previous circumstances being the same, cannot be predicated of any being whatever, because it involves a contradiction.

The

The voluntary generated power of doing the action A or the action B, according to the previous circumstances, cannot perhaps be predicated of God, because we have no sufficient ground for asserting that any power whatever has been gradually generated with him.

The freedom from compulsion *ab extra* may perhaps be granted. Than these three, no other idea of freedom that I know of, can be enumerated. The two last whether conceded or not in the present case, are *consistent* with necessity: and the other, which is the only philosophical idea of freedom, has been sufficiently refuted by the writers in defence of the doctrine of necessity. But if we have no other idea of freedom, we can predicate no other; and if the first of these cannot be predicated then is not the Deity a free agent.

The premises are the substance of what *Hartley* observes on Prop. IX. of the
the

the second part of his Observations on Man; which is, "God is a free being." After denying the existence of the only kind of freedom of which we have any idea, he ascribes to the Deity some kind of freedom, of which we have no idea; and the only reason in reality which he assigns, why the Deity is free, in contradiction to the preceding observations, is that we know nothing about the matter. It is very unusual with Hartley to reason thus. To assert that God has no freedom such as we have any idea of, but that he has some kind of freedom, such as we have no idea of, is using words without ideas. Such have passed current too long already. *A posse ad esse non valet consequentia.*

IV. Either this is the best of all possible systems, or a better ⁿ might

ⁿ I mean by *best*, that which will produce the greatest sum of happiness upon the whole. I have no other notion of any thing being good, than as it produces happiness, or permanent pleasure.

have

have been framed. A being of sufficient power to effect every thing within the compass of possibility, *could* have framed a better, if a better had been possible. A being of sufficient wisdom to discern the best of all possible system, *would* have discerned it: and a being of sufficient benevolence *would* have inclined to the best. But God is all this, therefore the system which owes its existence to him, must be the best of all possible systems. But by the terms, there *can* be but *one* best. And this is applicable to every part of the adopted system, as well as to the system itself. Therefore there was but one course of conduct which the Deity consistently with his attributes, *could* pursue, because there was and could be only *one best*. But if God *could not but* adopt that which he has adopted, then is he not a free agent, for necessity itself can effect nothing more.

To

To this it is answered,* that there is no system, so good but a better is possible, consequently there can be none absolutely best. For the distance between God and his creatures is infinite, and how perfect soever any system may be, still the distance remains infinite. Hence as every thing produced is infinitely short in goodness and perfection to what God might have produced, his understanding could put no limits to his power, or induce him to prefer one system to another. It is urged moreover, that infinite worlds can be conceived equally good and perfect as this, therefore this could have no antecedent merit as an inducement.

To the first objection I reply, that I do not understand what is meant by the distance between God and his creatures; if the meaning be, that the power which God hath actually dis-

* Law's Notes, p. 49. quarto.

played

played in his productions, is infinitely less being *finite*, than that, which in consequence of possessing *infinite* power, he might have displayed: I deny it: for although the separate parts of the system be finite, the system itself is either properly infinite, or we have no right to ascribe infinity to the Deity at all, for the system is the only exponent of his power that we are acquainted with.

Again, Even granting that the system is finite, yet it does not therefore follow, that another better is possible; for of finite things, each better than another, there must necessarily be only one best.

As to the second objection, it is notoriously untrue that we can conceive an infinite number of worlds better than the present, for we have not intellect enough to conceive any one, even this. If the meaning be (as perhaps

haps it is) that the proposition containing this assertion does not involve a contradiction; I grant it; but it does not therefore follow that the proposition is true merely because it does not involve a contradiction. And the argument requires that the possibility of a better system should be established, which cannot be done, without shewing how a better might have been framed. For until the contrary be shewn, there is reason, from the attributes of the Deity, for supposing this the best.

V. Every thing we know concerning the Deity may be reduced to his causality: his other attributes are modes of his causality. But necessity is included in the very idea of causality. *Omnis causa agit necessariò*. For let it be supposed *possible*, that a cause might not produce the effect of which by the supposition it is the cause; then that which is a cause by the supposition,

tion, might and might not be so at the same time and in the same respect, which is a direct contradiction in terms. Therefore it is *impossible* but that the cause *must* produce its effect. But the characteristic of necessity is, to exclude the possibility of the circumstance being otherwise than in the given case. Therefore every cause produces its appropriate effect necessarily. This also may be demonstrated from the property of cause and effect, as relate and correlate. Every thing therefore of which the Deity is the cause, could not possibly but have been caused by him: e. i. could not possibly but have been such it was, is, or will be.

If it be objected, that God might or might not have become the cause of the effects he has produced, previous to their existence, although they may flow necessarily subsequent to his election; or that he might have become the cause of different effects: I reply, that

that we know from his attributes he must have become the cause of some effects productive of happiness, we know that he has become the cause of the present system, but we have no data to conclude that he would, or could become the cause of any other: beside that this supposition is a plain *petitio principii* for the point I undertake to contend for, is, that he could not become the cause of any other. Moreover, from the nature of a cause it must produce all the effects which it is capable of producing in given circumstances, for the different parts of the effect, though termed effects, are parts of *one whole*: therefore all the effects which the first cause under the existing circumstances was capable of producing, could not but be, and actually were, produced by him; therefore the objection supposes what could not be the fact.

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VI. Every

VI. Every being we are acquainted with, of whom virtue or goodness is predicable, is deemed virtuous or good, in proportion to the strength of his virtuous and the weakness of his vicious habits: that is, in proportion to his approximation to an *impossibility* of not pursuing in every case what appears to him the *most* virtuous conduct. But all the attributes and tendencies of the Deity are acknowledged not only infinite in degree or strength, but they are in no case counteracted by any opposite tendency; therefore the approximation to an impossibility of not doing in every case what is right, is not predicable of the Deity, for his inability to do otherwise, amounts to a perfect impossibility; there being motives infinitely strong on one side, and no motive at all on the other. But an impossibility on the one side implies a necessity on the other; i. e. God is not a free agent.

From

From the preceding review of the subject, it appears to me, by far the more probable opinion, that every thing of which God is the cause, results from him necessarily. I know of no one^{*} however, who has publicly maintained the same opinion among us, because, until very lately, the doctrine of necessity has been cried down (not by those who understood it) as impious at least if not atheistical. I do not mean however to assert that the denial of God's free agency, and of man's, must go hand in hand, and stand or fall together. Whatever may become of the opinion I have here advanced, the doctrine of philosophical necessity, is, I trust, too firmly established now, to be controverted among those who possess the knowledge, and have given the attention necessary to decide upon that question.

^{*} Unless Mrs. Macaulay's opinion and mine agree; which, as I have never seen her book, I am ignorant of.

Far from derogating however from that great and good being on whom we all depend, I think no higher or more honourable conception can be framed of the Deity, than that he is in all cases, unalterably determined by a necessity of nature to communicate the *highest* possible degree of happiness. God is love: but the words have no meaning on any other hypothesis. Indeed no positive argument has ever been (that I know of) or ever can be, drawn in favour of his free agency, but what is ultimately resolvable into that from the idea which the maintainers of human free agency entertain of the will. An abstract idea, which they have clothed with an existence separate from its particulars, which is founded on metaphorical expressions, and on a mistake of the *popular feeling* of liberty (which is consistent with necessity) for the existence of the *technical supposition* of it.

As

As to the moral and practical influences of the notion of the necessary determination of God's actions, they are the same with those which flow from the hypothesis of the necessity of human actions. A perfect acquiescence in whatever happens, from a thorough conviction that it is *utterly impossible* but what it must be for the best, so far as a God of infinite wisdom, goodness and power can make it so. Not that this or any other speculative opinion *actually has* the influence, which if not counteracted by motives of an opposite tendency it would possess; but that the *tendency* of this opinion is obviously such as I have stated, I am thoroughly convinced of myself, and scruple not to advance it on appeal to my readers.

As to the material part of the
proof of the necessity of the
determination of God's actions, it is
not the same with those which flow
from the hypothesis of the necessity
of human actions. A person who
denies in whatever happens, from a
thorough conviction that it is necessary,
imagines that what is true for the
deity is true for a God of infinite wisdom,
goodness and power can make it so.
But that this or any other hypothesis
opinion is only an influence which
it not considered as motives of an
opposed tendency it would be false, but
that the tendency of this opinion is
obviously such as I have stated, I am
thoroughly convinced of myself, and
feel free not to advance for an appeal
to my readers. I am, Sir, your
obedient servant, J. H. [Signature]

ON MATERIALISM
A SKETCH OF THE
CONTROVERSY
ON THE SUBJECT OF
MATERIALISM.

I AM not certain I can say any thing absolutely new on this subject; but I am induced to write on it for the following reasons. 1. The phenomena termed mental are a frequent topic of discussion in this society, and as I have reason to believe I am hitherto singular in my sentiments concerning the explanation of those phenomena, and as very unfavourable ideas are usually annexed to the words used to express my general sentiments on this subject, I think it proper to relate at large *for myself,*

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myself, my own opinions, thereby to obviate, if possible, the consequences of misrepresentation. 2. Whether what I have to say, will be new or not, to the world at large, I am sure it will be new to the generality at least, of the members who usually attend our meetings. 3. The doctrine of materialism is deemed so evidently and notoriously unfounded, and so terrible in its consequences by those who know no more of it than its name, that I think it will be of use to shew the contrary in an essay to persons who would never be tempted to read a volume on the subject. 4. So much has been already written on the doctrines of materialism and immaterialism, that I think the arguments on both sides require a condensation.

But is it expedient to publish an opinion, which may possibly be misapprehended if true, and which, whether

ther true or false, may lead to consequences of an immoral tendency?

A materialist will deny that this question applies to his opinions; an immaterialist will assert the contrary. But whether it apply to the notions I defend, or those I oppose, it has been so repeatedly hinted at, on so many subjects in the writings of authors, and has been urged to me on the present occasion as a matter of so much moment, that I deem it necessary to say somewhat to this point, before I proceed to the main subject of the essay. And this the more willingly, because I think the common opinion a false one.

To the question then, I reply, certainly yes. It is in *all* cases whatever, expedient, that an opinion of supposed importance, and imagined to be true, should be published at large.

Such

Such an opinion must, upon the whole, be either true or false: if false, it must either be clearly and evidently so, or plausible, but fallacious reasons may be urged in its defence. Suppose it true: then,

1. It is always more expedient, that truth should be propagated than error; but if the truth be suppressed, the error is in fact propagated.

2. Although some inconvenience might perchance arise from the propagation of a truth, yet the same is the case with the most important and useful truths we are acquainted with: so that this argument would prove too much.

3. Whatever inconveniences result at first from the propagation of any important truth, like all other inconveniences they cure themselves in the common and natural course of things.

So

So that the *ultimate* result of any truth must be purely beneficial.

4. The making known a truth, is a certain good as such ; the inconvenience that may result from it, is problematical only. The circumstances should be very strong to induce the suppression of a certain good, through fear of a possible evil.

5. It is a settled point, that we are not to argue against the use of a thing, from the possibility of its being abused.

6. Among the innumerable experiments that have been made on the propagation of truth, not one can be produced as far as I recollect, wherein more good than harm has not arisen from the extension of truth.

7. The argument against the expediency of divulging an opinion, although it may be true, from the possibility
of

of its being perverted, has been so much hackneyed, and has served so often, as the last resort, to the confuted abettors of political and ecclesiastical tyranny in particular, that every man of literature, who has attended to the history of any important opinion, ethical, theological, or political, rejects it as the mark of a bad cause; as the last refuge of retreating error.

8. This has been so notoriously the case, that the legislature of every country in Europe (though in general well disposed toward every restriction on civil and religious liberty) has been under the necessity in the present advanced state of knowledge, of relaxing its former severity toward the propagators of new opinions. Finding in the first place, that the mind of every man of sense and spirit revolts at the restriction; and in the second place, that many opinions, formerly regarded as most dangerous and fallacious, have been
found

found by experience to be the truest and most beneficial.

Hitherto I have argued on the supposition that the opinion objected to is the true one. But you suppose it false. Then,

1. If it be clearly and evidently false so as to need no refutation, the reasons fail for objecting to its promulgation, for by the supposition it can do no harm.

2. But suppose plausible and ingenious arguments may be urged in its defence. Still every one of the preceding arguments hold with respect to the person who has adopted the opinion, because every man must ultimately think for himself, and judge for himself, and not another for him. And although he judge wrong, yet, as is universally allowed, an erroneous conscience is obligatory. So that if the preceding arguments be true, he is morally-

rally bound to publish the opinion he has adopted, if his other circumstances permit.

3. As truth will always bear discussion, there is no doubt of a fallacy being at length refuted if promulgated: more especially as it must be in all cases more easy to defend truth than error.

4. The more strictly a false opinion is concealed, the less likely is the true opinion to be known. Many an important truth is more extensively propagated by the discussion of its opposite, error. I think I may venture to assert, that if the writings of the English deists, for instance, had never been published, nine-tenths of the rational christians of the present day would have been deists.

5. Where from the supposed inexpediency, a plausible, but fallacious opinion is concealed, it is far more likely

likely to do harm than if it were known; because among those who incline to the *true* opinion, many will not embrace it *firmly*, on account of the opposing plausible arguments. While on the other hand, many will incline to, or adopt the *fallacy* on the strength of such arguments; which can hardly be refuted while withholden from public discussion.

6. There can be no discussion without a false opinion and a true one as the subject matter. Now it is a known fact from universal literary history, that the discussion of any opinion generally brings out many important truths collaterally, which would never have been known or attended to, if the discussed fallacy had not been advanced. From this source alone, I should have no doubt of proving that the promulgation of every false opinion on subjects of importance, has, upon the whole, been productive of much more good than

than harm. Thereformation, for instance, was principally owing to this cause.

Such are the chief arguments upon which I found the expediency of publishing every opinion on subjects of importance, whatever may be its real or supposed tendency. *Magna est veritas et prævalebit.* Indeed if I were asked what opinion, from the creation to the present day, has been productive of the most harm, I should answer without hesitation, “ the opinion of “ the inexpediency of publishing sentiments of supposed bad tendency.” It is this opinion principally that has filled Europe with blood-shed almost unremittingly for seventeen centuries ; for it is this opinion that has induced the infamous and tyrannical interference of the civil power in matters of mere controversy. The head servants of the people in almost every country upon earth, have, during this long period, repeated with indefatigable perseverance, the bloody experiment of dragooning their
their

their fellow-citizens into silence and uniformity; but with little effect. Thank heaven, repeated disappointments, and more extended knowledge, have considerably relaxed their efforts, especially in this country. And I hope the day is not far distant, when it will be considered as an axiom in politics, that *actions* alone, and not *opinions*, are the proper objects of a magistrate's interference.

Of Materialism; or that Opinion which makes the Phenomena termed MENTAL, depend on the Properties necessarily resulting from one Organization, without the Assistance of a distinct immaterial Principle.

I would premise, that wherever the existence of each of two things depends mutually upon the existence of the other, the non-existence of the one, implies the non-existence of the other. The maintainers of

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the

the doctrine of *immaterialism*, deny, that matter, or any modification of it, can alone produce the phenomena termed mental; they call in therefore the assistance of something that is not matter, or *immaterial*. Moreover, matter under every modification of it, with which we are acquainted, is discernible or destructible; but as the soul, or the immaterial substance has not the properties that matter hath; and as it is also supposed to exist when that modification of matter termed the body is dissolved and destroyed, the soul has been universally deemed by the advocates for its existence, necessarily *indiscernible* and *immortal* in consequence of its being *immaterial*. Hence, if either its indiscernibility, or its immortality, or its immateriality, be unfounded, the *existence* of a substance possessing these properties is unfounded. I proceed to the direct proof of the doctrine of materialism.

The

The only reason we have for asserting in any case, that one thing is a *property* of another; is the *certainty* or *universality* with which we always find them accompanying each other. Thus, we say, gold is ductile, because we have always found gold, when pure, to be so; we assert, that manure will nourish a plant, that muscular fibres are irritable, &c. for the same reason.

Moreover, finding by experience, that every thing we see has some *cause* of its existence, we are induced to ascribe the constant concomitance of a substance, and any of its properties to some *necessary connection* between them. Hence therefore, "Certainty or universality is the sole ground for asserting in any case a necessary connection between two phenomena." There is a necessary connection therefore, between such a structure as the *brain* and the property of *perceiving*, or *being conscious of* impressions made upon our senses; for there is precisely the

same reason for *this* assertion, as there can be for any other the most incontestible, namely, the certainty or universality wherewith we observe perception, and the brain accompany each other.^p I apprehend this argument is irrefragable

^p The reason why the assertion is limited to the *brain*, may be seen in anatomical and physiological authors, who seem at present to regard it as a settled point, that the brain is the origin of sensibility. All the objections that have been made to this limitation are discussed at large in Haller's Physiology, book X. from § 12, to § 36. The proof in brief is this. Every impression made on our senses, is made on the *nerves* appropriate to each, *before* it is perceived. From the extremity of the nerve the impression can be traced up to the brain, and no farther; for if any nerve be cut between the brain and the extremity of the nerve on which the impression is made, the part below the division totally loses all feeling. Thus when the sciatic nerve is cut, the limb below becomes paralytic. If the nerve instead of being cut is only tied, the same effect is produced while the ligature remains: the property of conveying impressions to the brain, or of causing them to be perceived, is restored on loosing the ligature. In like manner a palsy of the lower extremities is produced by a compression of the spinal marrow.

That *voluntary motion* depends on the brain, is proved thus. If a nerve be cut, or tied, all the
parts

irrefragable, unless it can be clearly shewn *how* perception results necessarily from something distinct from, and independent of the brain, or that whether

parts that are served by ramifications of the nerve above the ligature nearest the brain, may be moved as before, those which are served by that part of the nerve below the ligature are paralytic. Moreover in all cases of palsies and apoplexies the brain on dissection has been found affected. All medicines that act on the nervous system in general, and of course on the brain produce corresponding alterations in the phenomena of perception and voluntary motion. And lastly, all injuries done to the brain produce either a defect or a total want of these.

The amount of the objections in Haller and other authors are, that parts both of the *cortical* and the *medullary*, substance have been destroyed or hurt, without the loss of perception; that there has been suppuration of the *medullary* part extending even into the *ventricles*, and that there has even been a *schirrus* of the *cerebellum*, without the total loss of life. All these facts have usually been considered as anomalies, without sufficient weight to overturn the deduction from the innumerable opposing instances. I would observe in addition, that I have met with no account of a lésion of the *tubercles* whence the nerves arise, of the *crura*, of the *pons varolii*, or of the *medulla oblongata*,

ther this can be shewn or not; the assertion that perception does result from the brain, implies a contradiction, and is therefore at all events inadmissible. That, certainty, or universality of concomitance is the sole ground for asserting a necessary connection between two

oblongata, without a loss of life. Which I apprehend would also follow almost immediately from any considerable lésion of the *spinal marrow above the insertion of the recurrent nerve*. And in all the objected cases, some loss of perception, or voluntary motion, proportionate to the injury and the importance of the part, succeeded the lésion. But indeed whether there be facts enough to limit perception to the whole brain, or only to some part thereof, or to the nervous system in general, is of little consequence to the materialist, whose sole business is to prove that the phenomena of thinking are the necessary result of the impressions made by external objects on our corporeal system, without admitting the existence of a distinct immaterial being for the explication of those phenomena.

The assertion is limited to the property of perception, or of being conscious of the impressions made upon our senses, because I apprehend all the other phenomena of thinking result of course from these perceived impressions, as I shall notice hereafter.

phenomena,

phenomena, or that the one is the result of the other, is so true, that if this be false, no argument from induction can possibly be true; for all proofs from induction imply the truth of this. And as no direct contradiction has ever been attempted to be shewn in the assertion, that perception is the result of our organization; and as no immaterialist has ever yet pretended to account *how* perception results from an immaterial, rather than a material substance, there is, in reality, no more requisite to prove, that perception is the result of our organization. But however true the major proposition of this argument may actually be, I have met with some objections to it, which it will be proper to notice.

“Experience,” says Dr. Price,¹
 “teaches us, that the *exercise* of the
 “mental powers depends on the brain

¹ Controversy with Priestley, p. 89.

“ and nerves, not that the mind *is* the
 “ brain and nerves.*** Nor from the
 “ dependence of actual sensations, and
 “ thought on the brain, have we any
 “ more reason to conclude that the
 “ brain is the mind, than a savage who
 “ had never heard the music of a harp-
 “ ficord, and did not see the hand
 “ that played on it, would have to
 “ conclude, that it played on itself,
 “ and was the musician, because he
 “ could trace all the sounds to the
 “ instrument, and found, that when
 “ the strings were out of order, the
 “ music was disturbed or destroyed.”
 Dr. Price also observes, that on the
 supposition he is controverting, there
 can be no proof of a Deity. To this
 it is answered,

1. If on inquiry no extraneous cause
 of the sound could be discovered, it
 would be right to conclude, that the
 sound was the result of the mechanism
 of the instrument. 2. In many well
 known

known cases, Dr. Price himself would actually make the same conclusion: as in the common instances of tunes played by a clock. 3. It would in like manner be reasonable to infer, that the universe is the Deity, or that there is no other cause of the phenomena than the universe itself, if on inquiry no reason could be discovered for the existence of any other cause. 4. Dr. Price's opinion in this case would lead us to infer, that attraction was owing to some immaterial substance within the sun; magnetism to some immaterial substance within the loadstone, &c. for the rationale is as difficult in these cases as in the other.

Another objection more subtle, but full as fallacious, is this: certainty or universality of concomitance, is not a sufficient ground for asserting a necessary connection between two phenomena in cases of mathematical demonstration; thus, the three angles of a triangle, are certainly, and universally equal

equal to two right angles; but there is no connection between a triangle and a right angle; the one may well exist without the other. I answer, there *is* no connection between a triangle, and a right angle; neither are they found certainly, and universally concomitant: neither can they be so, if the one may exist without the other. Two right angles, are no other than different words, to express, by way of illustration, that the space occupied by the three angles of a triangle is equal in amount, to the space occupied by two right angles. When the three angles of a triangle are actually compared with two right angles; this equality of the spaces occupied is always found certainly and universally concomitant, and therefore it is asserted. The argument then, which proves that perception is the result of our organization when cleared of objections, stands thus:

Certainty and universality of concomitance

comitance between two or more phenomena, is the only direct reason we have for asserting a necessary connection between them.

The property of perception and a sound state of the brain are certainly, and universally concomitant: Therefore

This certain, and universal concomitance is the only direct reason we have for asserting a necessary connection between the property of perception, and a sound state of the brain.

But this reason is the same that we have for asserting a necessary connection between any other phenomena whatever: Therefore

We have the same reason for asserting a necessary connection between the property of perception, and a sound state of the brain, as for asserting the same thing of any other phenomena whatever.

In

In all cases where the necessary connection between two phenomena is such, that the one is denominated a *property*, and the other the *subject* of which the first is a property, the property is universally deemed to result necessarily from the nature or essence of the subject to which it belongs: but as perception must be a property of something, and as it is necessarily connected with a sound state of the brain, perception is a property of the brain, and therefore results necessarily from the nature or essence thereof. Such is the proper and direct proof of the doctrine of materialism; and which as far as I am acquainted with the controversy remains unanswered. But this doctrine will receive considerable additional evidence in its support, if the opposite doctrine of immaterialism can be shewn impossible or improbable; I shall endeavour to do both.

Of

*Of the Impossibility of the Existence of an
immaterial indiscerpible immortal Soul.*

I.

1. The soul, either hath *all* the properties of matter and no other: or it hath *some* properties in common

I think it was Kersey, who first invented the method of registering the steps in an algebraic process. It often happens in treating any subject (those of mathematics or natural philosophy perhaps excepted) that the propositions are expressed in so many words, are so frequently repeated, and a number of them are thrown together in one paragraph, in such a manner that it is not easy, when an author says, "from what has been said, it appears, &c." to tell whether from any or from what part of what has been said this appearance is deduced. Hence, it has occurred to me, that the registering the steps of an argument upon whatever subject, would frequently facilitate its discussion, and be attended with most of the conveniences, and few of the inconveniences of the old school-men; it would certainly tend to unveil a sophism, and introduce a habit of accurate expression. I have attempted a few instances by way of experiment, with what success, others are better able to judge.

with

with matter and *some* that matter *hath not*: or it hath *no* property in common with matter.

2. In the first case it is clearly material throughout: for we know nothing of matter in general, or of any species of matter in particular, but by means of its properties. If we see a substance have all the properties of gold, we say it is gold: if the soul have all the properties of matter and no other; then for the same reason, it is matter and nothing else.

3. But suppose it have some properties that matter hath, and some that matter hath not: then so far as it hath properties in common with matter, it is material, for the reason above given; and so far as its properties are *not* those of matter, the consideration of it belongs to the next of the alternatives.

4. Suppose

4. Suppose then, the soul to have no common property with matter ; then
5. Nothing can act upon any other, but by means of some common property. Of this, we have not only all the proof that induction of known and acknowledged cases can furnish, but that additional proof also which arises from the impossibility of conceiving how the opposite proposition *can* be true.
6. But by the supposition, the soul has no property in common with matter ;
7. And therefore the soul cannot act upon matter.
8. But by the supposition of every system of immaterialism (except those of Malbranche, Berkeley, and Leibnitz, which I am not now about

about to examine) it is deemed an essential property of the soul, that it acts upon the body, or upon matter :

9. Therefore the soul can, and cannot act upon matter at the same time, and in the same respect.
10. But this a contradiction in terms ;
11. And as two contradictions cannot both be true at the same time, the supposition of the existence of an immaterial soul cannot be true, that is,
12. The soul does not exist.

II.

1. Whatever we know, we know by means of its properties, nor do we in any case whatever certainly know any thing but these : and we infer in all cases the existence of any thing,

thing, which we suppose to exist, from the existence of its properties.

2. In short, our idea of any thing, is made up of a combination of our ideas of its properties. Gold is heavy, ductile, tenacious, opaque, yellow, soluble in aqua regia, &c.

Now let any one suppose for an instant, that gold is deprived of all these, and becomes neither heavy, ductile, tenacious, opaque, yellow, brilliant, soluble, &c. What remains, will it be gold? Certainly not. If it have other properties it is another substance. *Impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse.*

3. If it have no properties remaining, it is nothing. For nothing is that which hath no properties. Therefore,

4. If any thing lose all its properties, it becomes nothing: that is, it loses its existence.

O

5. Now,

5. Now, the existence of the soul is inferred, like the existence of every thing else, from its supposed properties, which are the phenomena of thinking, such as perception, recollection, judgment and volition.
6. But in all cases of *perfect* sleep, of the operation of a strong narcotic, of apoplexy, of swooning, of drowning where the vital powers are not extinguished, of the effects of a violent blow on the back part of the head, and all other leipothymic affections, there is neither perception, recollection, judgment, nor volition.
7. That is, all the properties of the soul are gone; are extinguished. Therefore,
8. The soul itself (by 1, 2, 3, 4.) loses its existence for the time.
9. But every immaterialist (except *Dodwell*, who can hardly indeed be called

called such) supposes the natural immortality of the soul a necessary consequence of its immateriality.

10. But as in all leipothymic cases, the soul ceases to exist in consequence of the non-existence of its properties, it is not immortal: therefore also,

11. It is a necessary consequence that it is not immaterial. So that

12. According to the hypothesis of the immaterialists, when joined with acknowledged matter of fact, a soul always and essentially immaterial, indiscerpible and immortal, is sometimes neither the one nor the other.

13. But this is a contradiction:

14. And as contradictions cannot exist, the soul cannot exist.

15. In like manner, previous to the existence of the body, and after the death of the body, the soul is con-

Ö 2 trascriptorily

tradictorily supposed to exist, although none of its known properties are then supposed to exist.

16. If any one shall say that these properties are only *suspended* for the time, I would desire him to examine what idea he annexes to this suspension; whether it be not, neither more nor less than that *they are made not to exist for the time*. Either no more is meant, or it is contradictory to matter of fact: and moreover, if more *be* meant, it may easily be proved to involve the archetypal existence of abstract ideas, and to contradict the axiom, *impossibile est idem esse et non esse*.

17. If any one shall say farther, “ These
 “ mental phenomena, are not consti-
 “ tuent parts, but acts of the soul
 “ and evidences of its existence; so
 “ that the soul may continue to
 “ exist when it no longer continues
 “ to

“ to act, or to act in this manner.

“ It does not follow that a man’s

“ power of working is annihilated

“ because he has lost, the tools or

“ instruments with which he has

“ usually worked.” I reply,

18. 1st. That whenever the evidences of the existence of any thing arise from the nature or structure of the thing itself, they are synonymous with its properties. Such are the phenomena of thinking with respect to the soul. 2dly. As these are *all* the evidences we have of the soul’s existence, when these are destroyed, or extinguished, so likewise is the conclusion drawn from them; when all the evidences of the existence of *life* fail, no one scruples to say, that life itself is gone. 3dly. The instruments with which a man usually works, are only *a small part of, not all* the evidences of the existence of his power of working: were he to lose his senses and his hands, and

his powers of muscular motion, which are also conjoint evidences of his power of working, every one would say he had lost that power; *i. e.* it did not exist. 4thly. It is equally legitimate to assert of *gold* for instance, that what are termed its properties, are not essential parts but acts and evidences of the existence of the substance gold, which *may* continue to exist, notwithstanding it no longer continues to exhibit any of those phenomena, which are falsely termed its properties, but are only temporary evidences of its existence. This is somewhat like the principle upon which some of the ancients and some modern Indians, buried a man's favourite spear, and shield, and sword, and harness. 5thly. If this conclusion, *à potentiâ ad actum*, from the remotest of all possibilities of existence to actual existence be allowed, I will give up the argument if any thing can be pointed out to me which
I cannot

I cannot prove, has never been destroyed, is existing is not existing, or any other absurdity whatever. Would not a physician regard him as a lunatic who were to say seriously of the putrid body before them, "to be sure none of the actions which are the evidences of life are exhibited at present, but life *may* exist notwithstanding?"

III.

1. All relative terms imply the existence of their correlates; a man cannot be a father without a child, a husband without a wife, &c.
2. Hence when either of two relatives cease to exist, the other does so likewise.
3. All those ideas which make up our idea of the soul, or in other words, all those properties from whence we infer its existence, are relatives; their correlates are ideas. Thus there can be no *perception* without

ideas to be perceived, no *recollection* without ideas to be remembered; no *judgment* without ideas to be compared; no *volition* without ideas of the object of volition.

4. Locke, has proved that all our ideas are either ideas of sensation or reflection, and that the ideas of reflection are no more than parts of, or combinations of our ideas of sensation: that is, all our ideas proceed from the impressions made on our senses. Dr. Price's gratuitous hypothesis, in opposition to this doctrine of Locke, I shall have another occasion to consider; not from any respect due to the hypothesis, which ranks entirely with that of the Scotch doctors, but from respect to the general literary character of the doctor who advances it.

5. But if all our ideas proceed from impressions made on our senses, as
these

these are entirely corporeal, we could have attained no ideas without the body.

6. And therefore (by 3.) there would have been none of the phenomena of perception, recollection, judgment, or volition without the body.
7. That is there would have been none of the properties of the soul, none of the phenomena of thinking, from whence we deduce its existence without the body: in other words,
8. There would have been no soul without the body. So that the commencement of the existence of the soul depends on the commencement of the existence of the body.
9. But the immaterialists say the soul is distinct from, and independent of the body as to its existence.
10. Hence it is both dependent and independent on the body
11. That

11. That is, it does not exist, for contradictions cannot exist.

The immortality *à parte ante*, of the soul being null, let us examine its immortality *à parte post*.

1. All impressions made on our senses can be traced up to the brain, and no farther.
2. But when once an impression is made by external objects on our senses, and by means of their nerves on the brain, we have the property of perceiving its effect thereon *after* the original impression has ceased. This is *recollection*.
3. So that although no ideas can be caused but by impressions on our senses originally, we may lose one or two of our senses, and yet remember the ideas which are the effect of the impressions formerly made upon them.

4. But

4. But ideas can no more be remembered without the brain, than they could have been caused originally without the senses. Facts are our chief proof, for either the one or the other assertion.
5. At death however, not only all our senses are destroyed, the only sources of original ideas, but the brain is destroyed, which is the *sine quâ non* to the existence of ideas already caused.
6. At death therefore, all our ideas of every kind are destroyed.
7. But there can be none of the properties of the soul without ideas, for these are relates and correlates.
8. And if all the properties of the soul are destroyed, the soul itself is destroyed.
9. Therefore whatever may be the case during the life of the body, the soul did not exist previous thereto,
and

and is destroyed when that is destroyed.

10. And when it is considered that many circumstances, during the life of the body, may totally destroy for a time all the properties of the soul; the little of existence that remains is hardly worth contending for.
11. But when it is farther considered that the natural immortality of the soul is supposed a necessary consequence of its immateriality,
12. It will be a necessary consequence, that this immaterial soul does not exist at all.

IV.

1. If the soul exist at all, it must exist some where, for it is impossible to frame to one's self an idea of any thing existing, which exists no where.

2. But

2. But if the soul exist some where, by the terms it occupies space, and therefore is extended ;
3. But whatever has extension, has figure in consequence thereof.
4. The soul, then, if it exist, hath the properties of extension and figure in common with matter.
5. Moreover by the supposition of every immaterial hypothesis (excepting those of Malbranche, Berkeley and Leibnitz) it acts upon the body ; *i. e.* upon matter.
6. That is, it attracts and repels, and is attracted and repelled, for there is no conceivable affection of matter, but what is founded on its properties of attraction and repulsion : and if it be attracted and repelled, its reaction must be attraction and repulsion.
7. The soul, then, has the properties
of

of extension, figure, attraction and repulsion, or solidity.

8. But these comprize every property which matter as such has ever been supposed to possess.
9. Therefore the soul is matter, or material.
10. But by supposition it is immaterial;
11. Therefore it does not exist.
12. For nothing can exist, whose existence implies a contradiction.

Such are the arguments on which I ground my opinion of the impossibility of the existence of an immaterial, indiscerpible, immortal soul. And it appears to me, from what has been said, that there is the same proof for the truth of the doctrine of *materialism*, as that gold is heavy, ink black, water fluid, or any other indubitable assertion. Also,

That there is the same proof that the opposite hypothesis *cannot* be true, as
that

that contradictions cannot be both true. I proceed to some other considerations that tend to make the hypothesis of *immaterialism* improbable.

1. I believe it is generally allowed by immaterialists, that however necessary the body may be, to cause the original existence of ideas, yet when the body is disunited from the soul, the ideas already acquired exist in the latter in some manner or other independent of the body. Indeed some immaterialists, as *Malbranche*, with his system of occasional causes, *Leibnitz*, with his pre-established harmony, the old Platonists, and the modern followers of Plato, Cudworth, Harris (and in part Dr. Price) do not allow that the body is at all necessary to originate ideas, but insist that these latter pre-existed in the soul, and were only synchronous when apparent, with their apparent corporeal causes. But as we *do* know how any thing that has parts, or is divisible, may exist in any other

other thing possessive of the same property, and *do not* know, nor are capable of conceiving, how any thing that is divisible can exist in any thing that is not divisible, there is all the proof that the nature of the case will admit, that as ideas are allowed to exist in the soul, if these ideas have parts or are divisible, the soul is so likewise. That is, an essential property of the soul, according to the immaterialists, namely, *indiscernibility*, is a non-entity. Now, that ideas have parts is, I think, so clear, that I know of no mode of proof that shall be more clear than the proposition itself. Is not our idea of a *book*, for instance, made up of our ideas of its external form, its written or printed contents, its leaves, &c? If so, then is our idea of a book divisible into these its parts. In like manner as the archetypes of most of our ideas have extension, and of course parts, their corresponding ideas must have parts also : and of course be divisible.

fible. But perception, says "Dr. Price,"
 "is a single and indivisible act; the ob-
 "ject perceived may be divisible, but
 "the perception of it by the mind can-
 "not be so."

Perception is a word to express one common circumstance attending the existence of a great many existences: it is no real entity. It is a relative term, implying something that perceives, and something that is perceived. Perception therefore is not an idea: it is only a circumstance belonging to every idea, though never found separately existing. But if an idea be, as it really is, something perceived, and if, as Dr. Price himself allows, this something may be divisible, then may an idea be divisible. And then too may that assertion be true, which Dr. Price says is so very absurd, that nothing more is required to confute it, than to state it. Moreover,

* Controversy, p. 94, 57.

whenever a definition is applicable to every known case of the thing defined, it is allowed to be the true one, and legitimately applicable to the unknown cases; and the more so in proportion to the greatness of the number of the known, and the fewness of the unknown cases. Now the known cases of ideas are innumerable, and the unknown ones are dubious as to their existence, and relate solely to the point in question. In all known cases, the following definition is applicable to an idea; *A motion in the brain, perceived.*

There is no known case of perception, without a brain, or some structure that is to answer the same end. This is a fact indisputable.

It is also indisputable that, every motion of the brain, when perceived, is attended with the existence of an idea, and as we are in *no* case acquainted with any intermediate process, by means of which
this

this perceived motion of the Brain occasions an idea, they are, as far as we know, identical.

There may be motions in the brain which are not perceived, or of which we are not conscious. This every physiologist will allow. Therefore

The definition above given, is the true definition of an IDEA. But it is clear from this definition.

1st. That an idea is divisible.

2dly. That it cannot exist without a brain or some corporeal structure analogous thereto; and therefore,

3dly. That the soul, supposing its existence, never had, and never can have any ideas without the brain.

It remains with the immaterialists to determine what use they will make of a soul without ideas.

2. It appears to me no more than reasonable, that if the doctrine of materialism be rejected, as inadequate to explain the phenomena, these latter should, at least, be explained in some manner or other, better upon the *substituted*, than the *rejected*, hypothesis. So that it is reasonable to require of an immaterialist that his supposition of a distinct soul should explain the rationale of the phenomena of thinking. But strange to say, so far from attempting to explain these phenomena on an immaterial hypothesis, it is acknowledged on all hands that even on this hypothesis the phenomena are inexplicable. It is a singular phenomenon in literary history, that one hypothesis should be rejected as inadequate to account for the appearances, and the hypothesis substituted should even by acknowledgement of its abettors be such, as not only to explain nothing, but from the nature of it, to preclude all hopes of explaining any thing by it, and to involve moreover in the supposition of its existence, such contradictions and impropa-

improbabilities, as would require very considerable ingenuity to annex artificially to any opinion whatever.

3. Supposing the existence of the soul, it is an unfortunate circumstance, that we cannot properly assert positively, any thing of it, at all. The soul, as far as it is immaterial, has no property in common with matter, otherwise it would be so far matter. But as all our ideas are through the media of our senses only, and as they are incapable of taking cognizance of any but material objects, we can really have no idea at all of any but *material* objects : and of course can have none of an *immaterial* object. Now, we cannot reason at all, or assert at all, but so far as our knowledge extends, nor can we properly make use of any terms to convey our meaning, but so far as we have ideas annexed to those terms. But it appears from what has been observed, that we have no ideas but of material objects, which are totally inapplicable to, and in-

commensurable with the soul, which being immaterial, is nothing that matter is. So that strictly and philosophically speaking, there is no word in any language, nor any idea in any human being, but what must be nugatory, inapplicable, and even false, when applied to the soul. Neither indeed can there be any proper proof even of its existence; and granting its existence, it may well be asked, of what use is an hypothesis of which no more can be asserted than its existence? And how can ideas exist in that to which they are totally inapplicable and incommensurable?

4. If the soul be, as the advocates for its existence suppose it is, simple, uncompounded, indiscerpible, it is inconsistent with this their notion of it, to suppose it liable to change. But all those faculties or properties which constitute our idea of the soul, and from which we infer its existence, are liable to

to change. We can trace the phenomena of perception, recollection, judgment and volition, from their commencement through their gradual progress toward their acmè, and thence through their decline to their total evanescence.

This consideration, so incompatible with the immaterial system, is even a strong proof of the opposite doctrine, which makes the supposed mental properties, the result of our corporeal frame. For let it be supposed that these mental phenomena are the mere result of our bodily organs: then, if this be true, it ought to follow that they will commence when these organs commence, they will improve as these organs improve, they will be in perfection when these latter are, they will be most acute where these organs are most sensible, they will decline as these decline, and they will disappear when these disappear. But all these consequences are undeniable matters of fact:

and every considerable variation will be explicable from the difference of the impressions made on the senses of different men, in kind, in number and in degree.

Nor will the immaterialist be aided against these facts by the supposition that the soul acquires ideas *by means of* the body; or that it makes its actions apparent by means of the body. For these phenomena either appertain to the body entirely, or to the soul entirely, or partly to one and partly to the other. Not to the body entirely on the immaterial hypothesis, for then the question is given up at once, since these are *mental* phenomena, the phenomena which induce us to recur to a soul for their explication. Nor to the soul entirely, for that is contradictory to matter of fact, as above stated; and matter of fact must be true whichever hypothesis be true. And yet if the last of the alternatives be taken, it will follow

follow that the soul is not independent of, or distinct from, the body, since none of its actions, none of the proofs of its existence, none of the mental phenomena, can be exerted but in concert with the body, and by means thereof. And if the soul be not independent of the body, when the latter dies, where is the former?

5. Moreover, how agrees the matter of fact as above stated with that notion, general among the strict immaterialists that the body is a burden, a clog, an oppression, a prison to the soul? A microcosm wherein notwithstanding, the soul

*Æstuat infelix angusto limite mundi
Ut brevibus clausus Gyris parvâque Seripho?*

How happens it that each amputation, each disorder of the body, should not increase the activity, the energy of the soul, in the direct proportion of the strength of the disease? And why
is

is it most unluckily the fact, that the very reverse of this is the truth; affording thereby an argument of the utmost probability to the doctrine of materialism?

6. Another unfortunate circumstance for those who are willing to believe the existence of the soul, is, that there can be no direct evidence in favour of it, such as is expected for all other matters of fact. Indeed, the direct evidence of our senses is all the other way. "I see," says Mr. Hallet, "a man move, and hear him speak for some years. From his speech I certainly infer that he *thinks* as I do. I see then that man is a being who thinks and acts. After some time the man falls down in my sight, grows cold and stiff. He speaks and acts no more. As the only reason I had to believe that he did think was his

* Priestley on Materialism, second edit. p. 49.

" motion

" motion and speech, so now that his
 " motion and speech cease, I have lost
 " the only way I had of proving that
 " he had a power of thought. Upon
 " this sudden death, the one visible
 " thing, the one man is greatly changed.
 " Whence could I infer that the same
 " *he* consists of two parts, and that the
 " inward part continues to live, and
 " think, and flies away from the body,
 " while the outward part ceases to live
 " and move? It looks as if the *whole*
 " *man* was gone, and that all his pow-
 " ers cease at the same time. His
 " motion and thought die together as
 " far as I can discern.

" The powers of thought, speech,
 " and motion, equally depend on the
 " body, and run the same fate in case
 " of men's declining in old age. When
 " a man dies through old age, I see his
 " powers of motion and thought decay
 " and die together, and by the same
 " degrees. The moment he ceases to
 " move

“ move and breathe, he appears to cease
 “ to *think* too.

“ When I am left to mere reason, it
 “ seems to me, that my power of
 “ thought as much depends on my
 “ body, as my power of sight or hear-
 “ ing. I could not think in infancy.
 “ My powers of thought, of sight, and
 “ of feeling, are equally liable to be
 “ obstructed by the body. A blow on
 “ the head has deprived a man of
 “ thought, who could yet see, and feel,
 “ and move. So that naturally the
 “ power of thinking seems as much to
 “ belong to the body, as any power of
 “ man whatsoever. Naturally there
 “ appears no more reason to suppose
 “ that a man can *think* out of the body,
 “ than that he can *bear sounds*, or *feel*
 “ *cold* out of the body.”

But if this be the case, as no man
 can possibly deny, if there neither is
 in fact, nor can from the nature of the
 thing,

thing, be any direct evidence for the existence of an immaterial, distinct, independent soul; still farther, if all the direct evidence that there can be of any thing whatever, all that the present case can in the nature of it admit, is *against* the existence of such a soul; how strong, how absolutely irrefragable, how evident ought that reasoning to be, by which its existence is inferred! How little it is entitled to any of these characters, we shall presently see. Even the possibility of its being disputed by any one, is a strong presumption against its conclusiveness.

7. To every protestant, it will surely afford no small presumption against the existence of a soul, that it was, and still is the only support of the popish doctrines of purgatory and indulgencies. And, indeed, unless with the modern deniers of an intermediate state, we render it totally useless and inactive unless in concert with the body, which
is

is advancing more than half way toward materialism, the doctrine of purgatory appears to me to flow necessarily from the supposition of its existence.

8. To many persons, I have no doubt but it will be a strong objection to the existence of a soul, that it is a very principal support of the vulgar notion of *apparitions*. Indeed one great use that the immaterial hypothesis is put to, is to account for these.

9. It is, no doubt, an argument against the probability of the hypothesis I am combating, that it is a spawn of the Oriental or Gnostic philosophy, imported into Greece, adopted from the Greek writers by the Gnostic and Platonic christians, and as their philosophy, with a little variation, became in the course of events the orthodox doctrine, it has been taken for granted by succeeding writers as a matter not to be inquired into, the more especially

especially as many notions of metaphysicians and theologians now justly exploded, were supported by this hypothesis. I forbear entering into particulars for obvious reasons.^u I think it sufficiently probable, that the chief reason why this hypothesis first obtained among the vulgar, was to account for the supposed phenomena of apparitions, which, in general, their own fears, or the cheats of designing persons converted into realities. The *general* inclination to believe any thing wonderful, invisible, and mysterious, assisted its propagation. Among the thinking and philosophising part of mankind, another reason was, the difficulty of ascertaining the rationale of thought and other mental phenomena, from the known facts concerning the human body. No little assistance to this be-

^u In the Manchester Society, all theological subjects are excluded. Besides, particulars in this case would have taken more time, and more room than I can spare.

lief was added by the figurative, fanciful, and poetical genius of primitive ages in every country; more especially in the east. By degrees, as I observed before, this subject, though merely a philosophical one, became artificially connected with theology, and then, an almost total stop was put to inquiry into the reality or the truth of the general opinion, and all controversies were confined to the rationale of it. But surely an opinion adopted and retained in times of comparative ignorance concerning physiological facts, and the rationale of mental phenomena ought not perpetually to be retained, when the greater part of the phenomena can be so well explained without this opinion. How they are to be explained Dr. Hartley has shewn at large, with a force of reasoning sufficient to bring perfect conviction to all those who either have not firmly made up their minds upon the subject, or who have not read his work, or who have slightly looked

looked his book over, or who are not able to understand it, or, as the case generally is, who take up opinions at third or fourth hand from some one, under one of these predicaments.

10. This opinion of a distinct, immaterial principle, is not only not connected in any degree with the fundamental parts of religion, but it is of no kind of use to morality. I should be glad to know what peculiar and important moral purpose the doctrine of an immaterial soul is calculated to answer among those who believe in a future state of retribution? Is not this latter opinion fully competent to every purpose to which the doctrine of an immaterial principle can be applied? Now, that the doctrine of materialism is perfectly consistent with the belief of a future state of retribution, and with the doctrines of christianity is notorious, and indeed all the known materialists, with whom I have the

Q happiness

happiness of being acquainted, are christians.

11. The question has now been discussed almost 2000 years: during which time, every thing that human ingenuity could suggest in defence of the separate existence of the soul, has been advanced. The opinion moreover has been supported, not only by the pecuniary emoluments, and the honours of establishments, but by the arm of the secular power. Every motive that men could have to adopt it, has been applied, and every motive of deterrence has been exhibited. Yet have some of the wisest and the best men of the present day among us, and not only so, but members of the established church, and of the highest rank therein, remained unconvinced, that this dogma of immaterialism is so uncontrovertibly evident as in general has been supposed. Not to mention the learned Mr. *Dodwell*, who denied the
natural

natural immortality of the soul, or bishop *Sherlock*, who denied that its existence could be made evident from the light of nature, or Dr. *Darwin*, the able ally of archdeacon *Blackburne*, who were of the establishment, or Mr. *Lindsay*, or Dr. *Disney*, or the first in rank of our honorary members, Dr. *Priestley*, who however great their reputation for probity, ability or learning, not being of the establishment, the argument from authority will not hold so forcibly as to them; I shall content myself with two quotations, one from the writings of the late venerable bishop of *Carlisle*, and the other from those of the excellent bishop of *Landaff*.

At the end of the third and subsequent editions of "the Theory of Religion," by the late bishop of *Carlisle* Dr. Law, is an appendix concerning the use of the word *soul* in holy scripture, and the state of *death*

therein described, in which he has proved convincingly (so far as I am capable of judging) that in scripture (to use his own expressions) “neither
“these words, nor any other, ever
“stand for a purely immaterial principle in man, or a substance (what-
“ever some may imagine they mean
“by that word) wholly separable from,
“and independent of the body.” And after examining the texts usually adduced to prove that the notion of a distinct, immaterial principle is founded on scripture, he subjoins the following remarks. “This may serve as a specimen of such texts as are usually
“alleged on the other side of the question, all which will I believe appear
“from these short remarks upon them,
“to be either quite foreign to the point,
“or purely figurative; or lastly, capable of a clear and easy solution on
“the principles just mentioned. Nor
“can such ever fairly be opposed to
“the constant obvious tenor of the
“sacred

“ sacred writings, and that number of
 “ plain express passages already cited.
 “ I shall only observe farther, that all
 “ philosophical arguments drawn from
 “ our notions of matter, and urged
 “ against the possibility of life, thought,
 “ and agency, being so connected with
 “ some portions of it as to constitute
 “ a *compound being* * or person, are
 “ merely grounded on our ignorance,
 “ and will prove equally against known
 “ fact, and daily observation in the pro-
 “ duction of various animals (oviparous
 “ ones in particular, and likewise vege-
 “ table substances) as well as against the
 “ *union* of two such heterogeneous prin-
 “ ciples, as those of our own soul and
 “ body are supposed to be.

“ Try any of these arguments (v. g.
 “ that from *extension*, *divisibility*, or the
 “ *vis inertiae*) and see whether such
 “ a parallel do not strictly hold : whe-

* See bishop Sherlock's Discourses. Disc. II.
 p. 86, and Disc. III. p. 114.

“ther these same qualities or powers
 “may not be in such manner united to
 “the vital ones, as to influence each
 “other full as well as the different
 “*substances* or *subjects* of them; whe-
 “ther the very same difficulties do
 “not lie against a communication in
 “each case, or whether the word *sub-*
 “*stance* helps any thing at all toward
 “a solution of them.”

I forbear to proceed with the rest
 of his remarks, or the concurring ones
 of Mr. Taylor of Norwich, in the
 extract of his Letter to the author.
 I have only one observation to make
 on this part, which is, that this Dis-
 course on the meaning of the word
 Soul in Scripture, and on the state
 of Death, was published in the year
 1755; from the archdeaconry of Car-
 lisle, which the author *then* possessed,
 he has been since deservedly raised to
 the *See*; so that even though the sub-
 ject were handled lightly, instead of
 learnedly

learnedly and cogently, as it is, the author's rank would entitle it to many replies, if it were ill founded. How happens it that *it has received none?*

The present bishop of Landaff, who as regius Professor of Divinity, and Moderator of the Disputations in the University of Cambridge, is professedly a judge of what ought, and what ought not to be deemed a point yet undecided, and fit to be discussed by *young students of divinity intended for the establishment*, has the following passage in the well written preface to his collection of theological tracts, expressly made for young divines.

“ But there are other subjects on
 “ which the *academicorum* *εποχῆ* may be
 “ admitted, I apprehend, without in-
 “ juring the foundations of religion.
 “ Such are the questions that relate to
 “ the power of evil spirits to suspend
 “ the laws of nature, or to actuate the
 “ minds

“ minds of men ; *to the materiality, or*
 “ *immateriality of the human soul*, the
 “ state of the dead before the general
 “ resurrection, the resurrection of the
 “ same body, the duration of future
 “ punishments, and many others of the
 “ same kind. Some one will think
 “ that I here speak too freely, and ac-
 “ cuse me probably as an encourager
 “ of sceptical and latitudinarian prin-
 “ ciples. What ! shall the church of
 “ Christ never be freed from the nar-
 “ row minded contentions of bigots ;
 “ from the insults of men who know
 “ not what spirit they are of : when
 “ they would stint the Omnipotent in
 “ in the exercise of his mercy, and bar
 “ the doors of heaven against every
 “ sect but their own ?”

Little can be added to the argument
 from authority, when I have en-
 listed such names as Sherlock, Dawson,
 Priestley, Law and Watson.

12. It is notorious that brutes have all the phenomena termed mental; that is, they possess perception, recollection, judgment and volition. A dog is frequently lost, and finds his way home. His *perception*, is exerted on every object around him; his *memory*, or *recollection* is shewn, by his perceiving that he is not at home, and endeavouring to go there; his *judgment*, or *ratiocination* by his discovering his way home, and chusing this street rather than that; and his *volition* by going home rather than not going home. These, and similar facts are so strong, that some writers as Locke, have been reduced to place the *differentia* of a *man*, and a *brute*, in this, that the former is, and the latter is not capable of framing *general* or *abstract* ideas.

Dogs, generally come when they are called, whoever calls them. I presume it will not be denied, that when a dog is called, he attributes the voice,
if

if it be not his owner's voice, to some other man; now, suppose a stranger calls a dog by name, in a voice different from his owner's voice, and that the dog runs to the place whence the sound proceeds. Will any one assert that the dog has not the idea of some *man*, in this case, who calls him, when by the very terms of the supposition he cannot have an idea of any *particular* man, since the voice is a stranger's? If so, then are dogs capable of framing *general* or *abstract* ideas.

All the phenomena then, which the maintainers of the doctrine of a separate, immaterial principle have universally thought utterly inexplicable, except upon that doctrine, appertain to brutes. If therefore there be foundation for any conclusion whatever, it is, that upon their own principles *brutes have souls*. But have all brutes souls; a mouse, a red-breast, a herring, a mite
or

or a flea? It is not the business of a materialist to answer this perplexing question, but upon his own hypothesis. But it is certainly incumbent on the immaterialist to solve this difficulty, and surmount the apparent absurdity of conceding immaterial, indiscerpible, immortal souls to the minuteest and most inconsiderable of brute animals. They have the wide range of animated nature to consider, from the man and the elephant, to the oyster, the coral, and the sea anemony. Moreover, they have not only this difficulty to surmount, but the still greater of shewing wherein the souls of men are different from those of brutes, which has always been taken for granted; for certainly there is no apparent difference between men and brutes, but what the difference of their bodily organs is fully competent to account for. Again; if man were material, he would be subject to the laws of matter; he would be a machine; there would be no ground for

for the predication of free agency; he is a free agent in consequence of his immaterial part, his soul. By like consequence then, are brutes free agents, accountable, rewardable, and punishable; an opinion, which, as far as I know, immaterialists have hitherto been afraid of adopting.

In proportion therefore to the improbability of an oyster's having an immaterial, in discernible, immortal soul, existing as a free agent, a fit subject of praise and blame, reward and punishment, and accountable for his actions, is the hypothesis of immaterialism improbable.

In fact, this has long been, and still continues to be, a great stumbling-block to the abettors of this hypothesis.

The ancients,^y who believed in a soul of the world, from whence all other

^y I have taken this account chiefly from Priestley, and Bayle Art. Rotarius.

souls were emanations, had little difficulty with those of brutes. Neither had those of the ancients who believed in the doctrine of transmigration. The Platonic christians, from the manner in which the scriptures spake of the resurrection, were induced to place the *differentia* of the souls of men, and those of brutes, in the latter not being immortal; the general opinion of the schoolmen I am not acquainted with. *Acquinas* had two particulars of *differentia*, the one that the souls of men were, and the souls of brutes were not immortal, and the other, that the one were, and the other were not *per se subsistentes et operationis capaces*.² *Pereira*, Sir Kenelm Digby, Lord Bacon, and Dr. Willis, supposed their souls were *material*. Des Cartes said both their souls and bodies were *automata*. Leibnitz said they had souls, but totally unconnected with their bodies, though the impressions on the one, and the

² I. 2^{dæ}. 75 of the Summa Theologiæ.

affections

affections of the other, were coincident, like two pendula, that described the same arch in the same time. Malbranche, like Des Cartes, supposed them *automata*. Cudworth, aware that brutes are conscious and cogitative, and allowing that "either all conscious and cogitative beings are incorporeal, or nothing can be proved incorporeal," revives the old notion of a soul of the world, the source of eminent souls, by way "of suggesting something toward easing the minds of those who are so much burdened with this difficulty." How far it is *orthodox* to revive the mystic notions of the Gnostic school, he hath not discussed. Cæsalpinus had said before him that the souls of brutes were *part of the substance of God*. Locke does not well know how to determine, but inclines to think them *material*. Dr. Price^b indeed inclines to think

^a Intell. Syst. vol. I. p. 44, quart. edit.

^b Contr. with Priestley, p. 53 ad fin.

them

them immortal, but in general those who allow them to be immaterial, deny them nevertheless to be immortal. But if there be any rule of reasoning that is certain, it is that the same premises lead to the same conclusion :

Immateriality,
Indivisibility,
Indiscernibility,
Immortality,

is the universal chain of reasoning with all the immaterialists that I have seen, except Dodwell; so that the souls of brutes ought to be regarded by the abettors of the doctrine I controvert, as immaterial and immortal.

On the hypothesis of materialism, this case has no difficulty. The phenomena of thinking are the result of our organical structure, and the impressions of external objects thereon. If this be true, then, as that structure is more exquisite, perfect, and complex, the properties of it ought to be proportionably

proportionably so. It is no slight proof of the doctrine of materialism that the fact is actually thus; and the mental powers of brutes are, as far as we can see, proportional to the perfection of their organization. Of the *immortality* of brutes, which so puzzles those who assert the immortality of the human soul, for reasons *independent* of the scriptures, the christian materialist pretends to know nothing, because no information is to be derived from them on this subject, and his only ground for believing his *own* immortality is the promises therein contained.

13. Still farther; Dr. Hartley has shewn, with a force of argument which no one as yet hath attempted to refute; that with the property of perception all the mental phenomena result of course from our corporeal structure. Hence it follows, that the property of perception is the only one of the mental phenomena from whence the existence

ence of a distinct immaterial principle can be inferred.

The present bishop of Landaff,^c the late Dr. Bell,^d and our present excellent president, Dr. Percival,^e have made it extremely probable, that *vegetables* are endued with *perception*. Therefore it is proportionally probable that all vegetables possess an immaterial soul, with its train of consequences, immortality, free agency, accountableness, &c. and in proportion to this absurdity is the hypothesis of immaterialism on which it is founded, improbable.

14. One may very safely defy an immaterialist to shew, that most of the arguments whereon the existence of a separate soul, is generally founded, will not apply, to prove that the *involuntary*, or vital motions of the human body,

^c Essay on the Usefulness of Chemistry.

^d Manchester Transactions. ^e Ibid.

the effects of the application of *stimuli* to the nervous system, and muscular *irritability*; especially when to these is joined the indubitable fact of the *vis medicatrix naturæ*, are owing to the actions of separate, immaterial, indivisible, indiscernible, naturally immortal principles. Indeed this has been so obvious, that the distinction between the *anima intellectualis*, the *anima vitalis*, and the *anima sensitiva*, is very old; even Thomas Aquinas clearly distinguishes between the *anima vitalis*, and the *anima rationalis*; nor are the modern doctrines of the *vital principle* very different from the supposition of a soul distinct from the common one. Upon the supposed fallacy of this, was the doctrine of the Stahlians erected, and whoever considers the modern doctrines of a vital principle as holden by Mr. Hunter, and Dr. Monro, will hardly indeed distinguish between the *general* idea of this, and that of the common or Stahlian soul.

But

But if the phenomena in the cases, being similar, lead to similar conclusions, as can hardly be denied, then have we three or four other souls than the common one; and the evidences being similar in all the cases, it will follow that each of these is immaterial, indiscernible, and immortal; and from thence, that the *body* is so also. Absurd as this appears, and unwilling as an immaterialist might be to admit these conclusions, a materialist might safely rest the issue of the controversy on proving them legitimate.

15. If the doctrine of a separate immaterial principle were a point so clear and indisputable, as the abettors of it seem in general to suppose, from the high tone in which their sentiments are uttered; or even if it were clear at all, it should seem wonderful after the point has been laboured for these two thousand years, that their opinions on the general subject should be so

R 2 discordant,

discordant, that it will be hard to find two who think thereon *exactly* alike.

The Orientals,^f supposed our souls, emanations from one general fire. Among the Greeks, many held that we had two souls, a celestial, and a material one: conceiving, in general, that our souls were not properly created, but emanations from the Divine Being. Aristoxenes said the soul was harmony. Zenocrates that it was number. Plato allowed us three souls, a rational one in the head, another the subject of anger in the breast, a third from whence proceeded desire, inhabited the middle regions of the microcosm. Socrates (who was not single in this opinion) believed the souls of the wicked only were material, while those of the good, were free from matter, light, and at death rose up to the regions above: those who have been

^f This enumeration of opinions is almost entirely from Priestley. Disq. VI. p. 232 and 289, et seq.

guilty of the more venial offences, fall not so low as the others. Aristotle, was in doubt, whether the souls of men were material or not; he inclines to the former opinion. Cicero held, at different times, both opinions. The Stoics held, in general, that the souls of men were part of the Divine Being. The opinions of Marcus Antonius, was sometimes the latter, and sometimes that of the materiality and mortality of the soul. Galen pretended to know nothing about it, but thought it corporeal. Justin who was a platonist, held that souls were emanations from the Deity. Tertullian was a materialist. Irenæus held the doctrine of transmigration. So did Origen. The other fathers were equally discordant. Of the opinions of the school-men I can say little. That of Thomas Aquinas was frequently discordant, as may easily be seen by looking at the article anima, in the index of his Summa. His good

sense, however, led him^s to see that the existence of the soul could never be evinced by the knowledge of material objects. Des Cartes seems to have been the first strict immaterialist, and yet, contrary to his own principles, he made the soul have some relation to space, by lodging it in the pineal gland. In his strict immaterialism, and his exclusion of extension he is followed by Stillingfleet, Cudworth, Watts, Baxter, Doddridge, and the annotator on bishop King's Origin of Evil.

Watts at large refutes the notion of spirits bearing any relation to space; while Gassendi, Newton, Dr. H. More, Clarke, Price, Tucker, Palmer, Berington and De Luc say that it has a relation to space. Price in particular asserts, that an immaterial soul that has no relation to space, is an absurdity unworthy of notice. But both he^h and Dr. Clarke are extremely on their guard

^s I. 2da. Quæst. 88.

^h Controv. with Priestley, p. 94, 106.

against

against being induced to shew what they mean by spirit having a relation to space. Wollaston thought the soul was immaterial, but had a kind of material vehicle of much finer texture than our bodies, by means of which it was united thereto. Clarke¹ does not deny the same opinion. Locke was clearly in great doubt; he thought the soul was immaterial, but allowed the possibility of the mental phenomena resulting from organized matter, had God so pleased. It were tedious to enter into an enumeration of the discordant opinions concerning the state of the soul after death; writers are as little agreed about that as about its existence.

But to give more weight to this argument against the immaterial hypothesis drawn from the discordance of opinion among its abettors, I shall pro-

¹ Controversy with Collins on the subject of the Letter to Dodwell. I have lost my note on the passage, but it is so.

ceed to examine, the notion of the soul which the last writer on the subject has advanced. This writer is our worthy Secretary, Dr. BARNES ; who, having given the latest definition of the soul, and being aware that his opinion will not be universally admitted, and having expressed this opinion in the concise form of a definition ; and as this gentleman is a professor of *Logic*, *Ontology*, and *Pneumatology*, Secretary to the first provincial society in the kingdom, and a person of acknowledged abilities, should any fallacy or contradiction be discoverable in the definition he has presented us, it will amount to a strong probability that it must solely arise from the difficulty of supporting an opinion in itself insupportable.

As I dwell much on this part of the argument, from the reputation this gentleman has acquired, I shall endeavour to examine his definition more scrupulously than I should that of any other

other person of inferior note; convinced that as Dr. Barnes does not defend an opinion for the sake of defending it, he will not take amiss any strictness I may use in the examination of his sentiments, since it is reasonable to imagine that I must be incited to peculiar exactness, from his credit as a writer, and from my having so able an advocate to oppose. But whatever Dr. Barnes may think of my sentiments, or of their real or supposed tendency, or of me in consequence of these, I am glad of this opportunity of expressing my conviction, that although in my *own* opinion, the tendency of Dr. Barnes's sentiments is not such as I can approve, he is totally unchargeable with maintaining that tendency, and I am sure the Society at large will join me in saying, that his character and conduct is free from any immoral imputation of sentiment or practice.

Dr. Barnes's words are these; * “ I
“ beg leave to hazard a description of

* Manchester Transactions, vol. I. p. 377.

“ the

“ the human mind, which some may
 “ not very readily admit. In judging
 “ of the mental powers, it does not ap-
 “ pear to me philosophically just, to
 “ describe the soul as consisting of se-
 “ veral distinct and discordant faculties,
 “ of which some are commissioned per-
 “ petually to oppose and contradict the
 “ others. The proper idea of human
 “ nature seems to be, that it is ONE UN-
 “ COMPOUNDED essence continually in
 “ motion; and receiving different de-
 “ nominations according to the diffe-
 “ rent modes and circumstances of its
 “ movement.” As the opinions which
 have been commonly entertained on this
 subject, by those who have preceded
 Dr. Barnes, appear to him not *philoso-*
phically just, we may of course expect
 this philosophical justness in the pre-
 ceding definition.

Omitting the notice of some slighter
 verbal inaccuracies, the observations I
 would

would make on the preceding quotation are these.

1. That if the novel¹ part of this description which Dr. Barnes professes to hazard, be, that the soul is one being, and that what are usually called its *faculties* are no more than general terms expressing the classification of the different phenomena, which we ascribe to its operation, and not really parts of the soul

¹ Dr. Barnes's notion concerning the soul, so far from being novel, is expressed by Titus Boetrensis, an old ecclesiastical writer who lived at the time of the Emperor Julian, and by the Abbot Serenus in a tract *de anima mobilitate*, &c. a century or two after Titus Boetrensis.

“ Nō igitur, id est mens, αἰ κινητός καὶ πολυκινητός,
 “ id est semper mobilis et multum mobilis definitur.
 “ XXX. hæc igitur (anima) pro conditione naturæ
 “ nunquam potest otiosa consistere; sed necesse est
 “ eam nisi provisum habuerit ubi suos exercere mo-
 “ tus, &c.”

Abbatis Sereni de animæ. Mobilitate, &c.

Bibl. Mag. Vet. Pat. VII. 140.

Chapter 7th, is intitled, Interrogatio de Animæ Mobilitate. “ Germanus: posset forsitan hæc volubilitas animæ coerceri, &c.” Ibid.

So

soul itself, this opinion is no other than that which every writer of repute within this century has maintained, so far as I am acquainted with them. I may safely venture to appeal to Locke, Clarke, Stillingfleet, Baxter, Doddridge, Price, Tucker, and Palmer. Indeed this must necessarily be the opinion of all those who hold that the soul is uncompounded, and I know of no writer whatever, whom the present times would deem of repute, who does not.

So much for the “ continual motion” of the soul.

“ Est igitur anima expers Corporis, quæ nullo pacto compositionem secundum Substantiam, præsertim contrariorum, recipit. Qui enim visi sunt eam componere; non Substantiam variam et à se differentem introduxerunt; sed operationis ejus ex iis quæ videntur descripserunt, cum non possint extruere unam simplicem definitionem quâ comprehendetur.”

Tit. Bostr. contra. Manichæos. Ibid. IV. 449. G.

Others therefore have supposed the soul, “ uncompounded” also beside Dr. Barnes. But I confess however, that the Doctor must be acquitted from the charge of obtaining his ideas on the subject from these sources.

2dly. All

2. All those who maintain the existence of a soul, distinct from the body, allow, nevertheless, that *human nature* is a compound of *soul and body*. For *human nature* is that nature which is the characteristic of a human creature; and I must own, I never heard of a human creature who possessed not a *body*. In the preceding quotation the human mind, the soul, and human nature, are used as synonymous, and it is in consequence asserted, that the proper idea of *human nature* "is, that it is one un-
 "compounded essence continually in
 "motion." Whether the writers, who have preceded Dr. Barnes, have described the soul with philosophical justice or not, it does not appear to me philosophically just to assert that human nature, *composed of soul and body*, is either, *one*, or *uncompounded*, or an *essence*, or *continually in motion*. On the contrary, it must be obvious to every one (Dr. Barnes perhaps excepted), that the proper idea of human nature on the principles of
 immate-

immaterialism, is neither the one nor the other ; so that, according to the common and acknowledged use of language, two things are confounded in this quotation, as being exactly the same, which in one particular at least, are *exactly opposite*.

3. This description of the mind or soul, involves some difficulties which I am at a loss to solve. Thus, if the soul (as this quotation asserts) be continually in motion, it must move either *within* or *without* the body. But for any thing we are able to conceive, any soul *out* of the body, has no more to do with it, than any other soul out of the body. So that on this latter supposition, for any thing we know, Dr. Barnes's soul might produce the phenomena of king George's or any other body, or *vice versa*. This hypothesis therefore I presume will be deemed untenable. But suppose the soul move *within* the body; of course it cannot
occupy

occupy the *whole extent* of the body, otherwise it could not move therein; therefore it must be in extent *less* than the body; and as it moves therein, it must be sometimes in *one* and sometimes in *another* part thereof: ^m hence, for ought we know, a man's leg, or any other member may be taken off, just at the time when the soul has journeyed into that part. Perhaps indeed Dr. Barnes may adopt the Stahlian notion of the presentiment the soul has when any thing is about to attack the body, in which case no doubt there may be time to escape the impending danger.

Again; If the soul be continually in motion within the body, it cannot take cognizance of impressions made upon one part, while itself is in another.

^m Dr. Whytt supposes the irritability of a separated muscle to be owing to the remaining action of the soul, and yet he will not allow that the soul is discernible. The opinion of Dr. Barnes is not perhaps much different from that of Scheibler, who asserts *anima tota est in pede*. Metaph. L. II. c. iii. § 410.

For if the *presence* of the soul be requisite to the perception of impressions, it is a contradiction to suppose that impressions can be perceived in the *absence* of the soul. So that if a man call and we do not hear him, the definition in question will lead us to conclude, that the soul is at the time in the finger, or the foot, or some other distant region; or like the idol of the priests of Baal, he is talking, or he is pursuing, or he is on a journey, or, peradventure he sleepeth. As this is a conclusion however which the schoolmen rejected for the sake of their *Tota in toto, et tota in quâlibet parte*, it may need some proof.

4. I think no other *data* are required to prove that the *soul is material* than Dr. Barnes's definition (or description) of it. "One uncompound-
ed essence, continually in motion."

All motion must necessarily as such,
be a motion *from* some place *to* some
other

other place. If the soul therefore move, it must, during its motion, be in some place: but the soul is "continually in motion;" therefore the soul is continually or always in some place, though not in one and the same place; that is, it occupies some part of space, but nothing can occupy space which is not extended, therefore the soul has extension or magnitude, and of course figure or shape: hence according to this definition the soul has that property which many writers on natural philosophy, conceive to be the only essential and demonstrable property of matter, for impenetrability is far from being universally conceded. So far therefore as we have *certainty* to proceed upon, the soul is material.

Again; Whatever has extension, has parts; and whatever has parts is divisible and compounded; but according to fair inference from this definition, the soul *hath* extension; so that (exactly contrary to the assertion in the definition)

tion) the soul is *plural, divisible, and compounded*.

Again ; The soul, according to Dr. Barnes's idea, has extension or magnitude, and he himself in this definition informs us, that it hath motion, and even continual motion. But if the phenomena of thinking depend upon the soul, then are the phenomena of thinking resolvable into magnitude and motion.

But according to every writer on the side of immaterialism, it is the constant reproach cast upon the materialists, that they resolve all the phenomena of thinking into magnitude and motion. This is perpetually objected by the two most strenuous defenders of immaterialism, Dr. Clarke and Dr. Price. Dr. Barnes therefore, notwithstanding his definition, is even like one of us, a determined materialist.

But it will follow moreover from the definition in question, not only that the
soul

soul hath magnitude and motion in common with matter, but that it hath also all the other properties of matter. Thus as it is an opinion too absurd to suppose that the soul moves *out* of the body, let it be supposed that it moves *in* the body. Then, if the soul be continually within the body, whenever the body is moved, the soul is moved: as when a man fainting or apoplectic, is carried up to bed. But, as this soul is moved by means of the body within which it is, and by actual impulse of some other body, within which it is not, then hath the soul *solidity*, or the property of *repulsion*; otherwise the body by means of which it is moved, would pass through it and leave it behind. But by the terms of the supposition it is not left behind, for it is *continually within* the body: therefore it hath the property of repulsion.

Again; One mode of the soul's movement (to use Dr. Barnes's lan-

guage) is *action upon* the body. But all action upon the body, of what nature or kind soever it be, implies either attraction or repulsion, for into these can all the affections of body be resolved. But as it is hardly conceivable that the soul constantly repels, it must of course sometimes attract, therefore the soul hath the property of *attraction* as well as *repulsion*. So that according to the legitimate inferences from Dr. Barnes's definition, the soul has the properties of extension or magnitude, attraction and repulsion; that is, it hath all the properties of matter; or in other words, is material.

I could indeed notice an apparent contradiction to matter of fact in this definition, deduced from the absence of the phenomena of thinking, in cases of *deep* sleep, swooning, drunkenness, apoplexy, &c. wherein, if the soul's motion be thought, as thought is absent there can be no motion, so that
the

the perpetual continuance of the soul's motion requires some consideration before it can be admitted; but as Dr. Barnes and I are perfectly agreed upon the principal points in dispute, I am too happy in possessing so able a coadjutor to think of noticing a fault so trivial. I would observe, however, that if the doctrine of materialism *be* attended with bad consequences, they may be deduced full as well from Dr. Barnes's opinion as from mine.

There is one obvious and important inference to be drawn from these remarks. If they be well founded, Dr. Barnes's definition involves contradictions and absurdities. Let it for a moment be granted that it does so. Just for the same reason that a man is abused as a bad man, because from his speculative opinions inferences may be fairly (or unfairly) drawn of an apparent immoral tendency, may very incongruous and unbecoming epithets be

applied to Dr. Barnes, because some of his opinions are reducible to contradictions. In like manner, I firmly believe, and would undertake to shew, that many of Dr. Barnes's opinions, upon subjects nearly connected with the present, are utterly subversive of the very foundations of religion and morality. Yet no one, acquainted by person or by character with Dr. Barnes, will dispute his abilities, his morality, or his piety. *The inference then from opinions to character is unfair.* Yet because the doctrine of materialism, and others connected therewith have hitherto been inorthodox and unfashionable, the writings of those who oppose these doctrines, have abounded too much with charges of atheism, impiety, infidelity, and with implied conclusions from opinions to character. To me, these imputations seem obviously wrong: and I hope there is no need in the present society to prove at large, that

that such conduct is utterly unbecoming a man, a gentleman, and a christian.

Such and so numerous are the impossibilities, and improbabilities attending the hypothesis of a distinct, immaterial soul. I proceed now to examine all the arguments, which in the course of my reading, have occurred in *favour* of that hypothesis.

I. All the modes of an *extended*, or *corporeal* substance have length and breadth. Thought has neither the one nor the other, nor is in the least related thereto, and therefore cannot be a mode of any extended, or corporeal substance. Hence, as it is clearly a mode of some existing substance, this latter can be no other than an *incorporeal* one.

Answer. Neither motion, attraction, repulsion, magnetism, electricity, vegetation, muscular irritability, nor in-

numerable other modes of extended, and corporeal substances, have length or breadth. So that this is no criterion.

2. In fact these, as well as thought, are mere names to express certain phenomena appertaining to some substance or other. But whether in the case of thought, that substance have length and breadth, is the matter at present in dispute; neither have I a right as yet to assert it, or an opponent of my opinion to deny it.

II. I think: therefore I exist. Thought then, is alone sufficient to prove our existence, without the aid of any of the properties of matter: therefore the properties of matter are not essential to our existence: but thought is essential to our existence, otherwise we could not evince this latter. Therefore, thought is independent of matter, and of course, different and distinct therefrom. So that the substance of
which

which thought is a mode, is neither matter, nor necessarily connected with, but different and distinct from it.

Ans. The two preceding arguments, I frame upon the known principles of *Des Cartes*; I have to answer this latter.

1. It is generally, and I think properly replied to *Des Cartes*, in answer to this mode of proving his existence, that he takes it for granted unwittingly, before he makes his assertion. "I think," says *Des Cartes*: *who* thinks? Who is *I*?

2. I might prove my existence in the same manner, from the existence of my body: thus: I move; therefore I exist. I see, hear, taste, smell, feel, therefore I exist.

III. It is the characteristic, the essential property of matter, that it is passive,

five, sluggish, and inert; incapable of originating motion from itself. All those general expressions of the phenomena, termed *laws of motion*, and which are demonstrated by Sir Isaac Newton, and other philosophers, proceed upon this *vis inertiae* of matter, as their foundation. Thought, on the contrary, has activity unbounded, and motion which originates from its subject the soul alone. It is impossible, therefore, that thought can be the mere result of matter.

Ans. 1. We have a right to assert positively, what we *certainly know*; we have no right to assert, unless hypothetically, what we *do not* certainly know. Of matter, we know nothing certainly,^a but its properties: these are resolveable into attraction and repulsion. We certainly know, that in every case where it is possible for

^a I reason on the *common*, not the Berkeleian hypothesis.

us to ascertain, whether the fact be thus or not, this attraction and repulsion takes place *at a distance* from the attracting or repelling particles. We know certainly, that actual impulse or contact, has never yet been shewn in any phenomenon that mankind is hitherto acquainted with. The contrary is proved, in magnetical and electrical cases; in all cases wherein gravitation is concerned; in all cases of the passage of light, through a diaphonous body of a different medium, and of its reflection from an opake one. The same is evident in all cases wherein a body contracts by cold, and dilates by heat; and visibly in the case of the suspended links of an electrified chain. Whatever therefore may be the consequence, these innumerable facts can never be overthrown. But every one of these facts are proofs that matter is neither sluggish, nor inert, nor devoid of activity, for in every one of them, the action of the particles commences
previous

previous to, and without contact. The supposed inactivity of matter therefore, relates not to the integrant particles of any given mass.

2. The *laws of motion*, neither proceed upon, nor suppose such a *vis inertiae* as is inconsistent with the active properties of attraction and repulsion. For as these operate *sensibly* to a small distance only, the laws of motion, and the facts whereon they are built, will be precisely the same, without that sphere of action, as if this latter did not exist. And whatever his followers may have supposed for him, Sir Isaac Newton never conceived that the active properties of attraction and repulsion, militated with the laws of motion, which he deduced from phenomena: for he himself ascertained one of the strongest instances of attraction and repulsion which can be produced, namely, the reflection and refraction of the particles of light, without contact
with

with the reflecting, or refracting medium.

3. The laws of motion, commonly so termed, do not imply that there can be no motion whatever, but what is subject thereto: if they do, they are not true, for no chemical fact whatever, no phenomenon of vegetation or animalization, can be explained by their means. The reaction of an irritated muscle, is much greater than proportional to the stimulus, if the latter be calculated according to the laws of motion.

4. There is full as much ground for asserting that motion originates in a particle of matter, as in the subject of thought; for the known facts go to prove, that each of the phenomena of thought was the result of some preceding phenomenon. But I deny that, properly speaking, there is any origin of motion but one. And until we
trace

trace it up to that first source, there is no instance wherein it is not probable, if not demonstrable, that the motion in question was the necessary effect of some precedent motion.

To this it is replied, that the properties of attraction and repulsion, cannot possibly belong to the particles of matter as such, for as these attract and repel without actual contact, and as nothing can be true, if so evident a proposition be false, as that "nothing can act where it is not;" they must either be the result of some foreign power, or subsequently superadded to the particles that possess them, and in either case not essential to those particles.

Ans. To this I rejoin 1. That if these properties do not appertain to matter as such, we have no evidence at all of the existence of matter, for we only assert its existence in consequence of
our

our observation of these its supposed properties. We have the same evidence therefore, that these are essential properties of matter, as of the existence of this latter.

2. It is unphilosophical to introduce a foreign power to account for that which may more simply be accounted for without that introduction. As the assertion, therefore, that these properties are *essential* to matter, implies no contradiction, and as the argument against this assertion from the *vis inertiae* of matter has proved inconclusive, we must adopt the opinion in question as the true one.

3. This self-evident proposition that "nothing can act where it is not," appears to me demonstrably false, at least so far as an universal deduction of facts approximate to demonstration. For every thing acts, not where it is, but where it is not, in that sense of the word

word action, which is applicable to any phenomenon at all. I instance all the cases of attraction and repulsion, the planetary motions, &c. This inertness, or sluggishness of matter, therefore, is a non-entity.

IV. Body and its affections consist of nothing but magnitude and motion. Combine these in reality, or in idea, how you please, the consequence will be the same. From magnitude and motion, however divided or compounded, nothing can possibly result but magnitude and motion. *Thought* however, is so totally different from magnitude and motion, that they cannot be the same thing.

Anf. I would have it understood, that no materialist ever undertook to say *how* perception resulted from our organization; yet will any materialist undertake this, whenever an immaterialist will undertake to say *how* an immaterial principle

principle is connected with, acts upon, and is acted upon by a human body. What a materialist undertakes to assert is, that perception *whatever* it be, or *however* it results from, does actually result from our organization. I reply then,

1. All the phenomena of thought may be comprized under perception, recollection, judgment and volition. Of these, the three latter are demonstrably modes of motion. Hartley has proved it: and I again repeat what I have observed on a former occasion, that it is inexcusable in the present day to attempt the discussion of the phenomena termed mental, without adopting or confuting his system.

2. I grant, the particles that compose our frame, and the motion of these particles may properly be termed magnitude and motion. But whatever perception be, or however it arise, it is actually

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tually the result, the consequence, the effect of the magnitude and motion of the particles of our corporeal system. This is the *fact*, whatever the *rationale* may be ; some future time, I doubt not, will furnish us with facts to attempt an explanation. I assert therefore, that in all cases, thought is though not the same with, yet the result of magnitude and motion ; and moreover in three cases out of four, it hath clearly been shewn *how* and *why* it is. Now, as the assertion I am opposing hath always (as far as I know) been hazarded as self-evident, or upon grounds which I have elsewhere refuted, I apprehend, the probabilities in favour of *my* assertion, are to the contrary as three to one.

To this answer it will be replied, that the result of magnitude and motion, can be nothing but magnitude and motion ; so that either perception is the same with these, or it is a non-entity, or it is an affection or an action of some
imma-

immaterial principle. As this objection is founded on the truth of the next argument for the immateriality of the soul, my reply will of course be contained in the answer thereto.

V. Every system, is the sum or aggregate of the parts which compose that system, therefore the properties of every system are the sum or aggregate of the properties of the parts of that system, and of course must necessarily be the same *in kind* with the properties of the parts, and differ only in degree. Hence, no system or compound can have properties as such, different from those which the *parts* of the system or compound separately possessed. Dr. Clarke states this argument (Controv. with Collins, p. 183) thus “no *real quality* can “result from the composition of *different qualities*, so as to be a new quality “in the same subject of *a different kind* “or *species* from all and every one of the “component qualities.” ***** “This

“ must of necessity hold universally true
 “ of all powers and qualities whatsoever,
 “ whether known or unknown. Be-
 “ cause otherwise as hath been said be-
 “ fore, there would in the compound,
 “ be something created out of nothing.”

He elsewhere says upon the like occasion, that this would be

“ For an universal to exist without
 “ particulars.

“ For an effect to exist without an
 “ adequate cause.

“ For a cause to give that which it
 “ doth not possess.”

Anf. In all *mechanical* compounds
 where the aggregate is formed, not by
 the combination, but the juxta position
 of its component parts, this remark *may*
 be true, but I am far from asserting that
 it *is* true. These however do not com-
 prehend one case out of a thousand of
 the phenomena of nature.

2. In all chemical cases, and in all cases of vegetation and animalization, which are not purely chemical, the very contrary holds universally true. To instance from books of modern chemistry. There is a note of Mr. Keir's to his translation of Macquer's Dictionary, at the article *affinity*, expressly to illustrate this point; wherein he asserts, "that it may be considered as a
 " general rule that a change of properties, and a production of *new* properties may be considered as criterions by
 " which compound bodies, chemically
 " combined, may be distinguished from
 " bodies formed merely by mixture or
 " apposition of integrant parts, in which
 " latter kind of bodies, the properties
 " are intermediate between the properties of the several component parts,
 " and no *new* properties are produced."

The eighth law of the affinity of composition in *Fourcroy*, is as follows,
 " Two or more bodies which have

T 3

" united

“ united by the affinity of composition,
 “ form a substance whose properties are
 “ *new* and *very different* from those
 “ which any of the substances had be-
 “ fore their union.”

3. So far is the supposed axiom, *nil dat quod non habet*, from being true, that I think it implies a contradiction. Thus it is a contradiction in terms to assert that a cause and its effect are the same; for by the terms they are different: but an effect is that which is the result the consequence of, produced or occasioned by the cause: but the effect is different from the cause; therefore a cause as such must necessarily produce something different from itself, *i. e.* having properties which *it* hath not, *i. e.* having *new and different* properties.

4. Hence, all the other supposed data, namely, that if Clarke's assertion be not true, something is created out of nothing; an universal, exists without
 parti-

particulars, an effect is produced without an adequate cause, are either false or apply not.

5. I have instanced the falsity of this supposed truth in chemical cases. Let us trace one case of the progress of vegetation and animalization. All the earths are known, all the salts that enter into the aggregate termed *mould*, are known. The products of vegetable fermentation we are acquainted with. The gazes are in a great measure ascertained, by the important labours of Dr. Priestley. We know at least enough of all these to assert positively, that none of them are either vegetables or animals. Yet do these earths, salts, gazes, and their compounds from the very substance of the vegetables which grow therein. But these vegetables moreover, are capable solely in consequence of the organs that act upon them in the given case, of becoming parts of animals, of forming the compound fluid,

termed blood. All animal secretions moreover, are known to be made from the blood by means of certain organs termed *glands*; this blood when acted on by the glands, termed *feminal*, acquires the property of impregnating another secretion in another animal of somewhat different organization, so that the product shall be a new animal with properties totally new and almost innumerable. Here, merely by means of a series of different organs, are the earths, salts, and gazes, absolutely converted into the substance of an animal. Which, whether it hath a soul or not, most indubitably hath life in consequence of its organization; a result, which though an incontestable fact, is full as difficult of solution, as any of the *mental* phenomena.

6. The general rationale of the acquirement of new properties by a compound, is so well expressed by Collins in his answer to Clarke, that I think
it

it will be well to transcribe the passage. (Clarke and Collins, p. 116.) “ I will
 “ allow that matter is every where un-
 “ der the same circumstances, endowed
 “ with the same powers ; and that
 “ taking the whole material world to-
 “ gether, every particle thereof is capa-
 “ ble of contributing to all the actual
 “ powers of matter, equally with any
 “ other particle whatever. But then,
 “ if these actual powers exist but un-
 “ der such and such regulations, and
 “ that a disposition of parts by motion,
 “ be necessary to the exertion of every
 “ power, it will equally follow that the
 “ power of every system will not be the
 “ sum of powers of different kinds,
 “ because, by the different situation of
 “ parts in a system, a different power
 “ is exerted in every particle, though
 “ each of them would exert the same
 “ power under the same circumstance
 “ or position. And I much rather
 “ take this to be the case, than to
 “ suppose really different powers,
 “ founded

“founded on different capacities in the
 “different parts of matter. For by
 “experience we see, that every thing
 “by change of form becomes every
 “thing. Thus the same parts of
 “matter become parts of dung, earth,
 “grass, corn, sheep, horses, men, &c.”
 I cannot forbear observing, that Collins,
 whom I regard as one of the first heads
 that England, or any other country ever
 produced, was a deist: and that, for
 the same reason, as most of the deists of
 his time were, who were far from
 being deficient in sense, learning, in-
 tegrity or piety: namely, that in con-
 sequence of the false and injudicious
 representations, which the churchmen
 made of certain doctrines as being
 absolutely essential to christianity,
 which were in fact far from being so,
 they rejected the whole, because they
 could not embrace a part. Thus, if a
 man regard the doctrine of a distinct,
 immaterial principle as an absurdity,
 devoid of foundation in sense and rea-
 son,

son, and is taught and believes that no man can be a christian without adopting it, *he cannot be a christian*. Such was Collins's, and such would be my case. I apprehend, therefore, that every man, who shews that neither materialism nor immaterialism, are necessary to christianity, renders service to the latter, and to the world at large. This hath been done irrefragably by the present bishop of Carlisle, and by Dr. Priestley. Nor is this the only obligation, which christianity has to the latter.

Again; Mr. M^c. Neven, who on every subject hath something to advance worth attention, objected (in a conversation) to materialism, that the properties of a compound being only the aggregate of the properties of the parts thereof, the former must be similar in kind to the latter. I replied the fact, of new and different properties arising in every compound, from those
of

of its parts. To this he rejoined, that though they were *apparently* different, they might not be *really* different; for the same properties *might* inhere in each part, but so faintly, and so approximating to evanescence as to be discoverable only in a condensed state in the aggregate. I think this opinion extremely ingenious. It was adopted by Hobbes (though without Mr. M^c. Neven's knowledge) and ridiculed by Clarke. But, 1. We are not to infer actual existence from the possibility of existence. 2. It certainly proves against immaterialism, for perception, according to this theory *may*, for aught we know, be the aggregate of the perceptions of the parts of the compound. A property which has been denied the parts, solely on account of its being so faint and evanescent, as to be separately inascertainable.

I have dwelt the longer on this argument, because I consider it as the
sheet

sheet-anchor of the immaterialists, and because by its means I can answer almost every other argument which an immaterialist can bring against me. Thus "all the modes of an extended substance must have length and breadth;" I reply, a compound may have properties which its parts have not. "Thought is essential to our existence, because we can prove this by it." I reply, it is not essential, because a compound of previously existent, unthinking matter may think. "Matter is passive, sluggish and inert." I reply, a compound of matter may have different properties. "Matter is merely magnitude and motion:" I reply, a compound of matter may have properties which are not magnitude and motion.

VI. An *individual* power or property cannot result from a compound. But thought, consciousness, or perception
is

is an individual power. The brain is confessedly a compound.

Ans. A compound may have a property which none of its parts have : and every property as such, is an individual property. 2. Every compound is in fact an individual, though consisting of parts. Nor is there any existence in nature without parts, as far as we know. A brain is one brain, not two brains. A clock is one clock : a rose one rose : a muscle one muscle : but each of these have individual properties.

VII. " The spirits and parts of the
 " brain being loose, and in a perpetual
 " flux, cannot therefore be the seat of
 " that consciousness, by which a man
 " not only remembers things done
 " many years since, but also is conscious
 " that he himself, the same individual
 " conscious being was the doer of
 " them." (Clarke and Collins, p. 185.)
 As

As an objection of Dr. Price's, is the same, though stated differently, I add it.

“ The soul, that is, the being who
 “ thinks and acts must if an organized
 “ system of matter, be either the mate-
 “ rial substances themselves which com-
 “ pose that system, or it must be their
 “ organization, motion or arrangement.
 “ If the latter be true, it will follow,

1. “ That man is not a substance or
 “ *being*, but a *mode*. For motion, tex-
 “ ture and arrangement of parts, are not
 “ substances, but modes of substances.

2. “ It must follow, that any number
 “ of men having the same organization,
 “ must have the same soul, or are the
 “ same man. Just as points having
 “ the same arrangement round a center,
 “ make one figure.

3. “ That the same systems of matter
 “ organized differently, will make
 “ different

“ different souls, or new men : just as
“ the same points arranged differently
“ round a center, will make different
“ figures. But if the soul be the ma-
“ terial substances themselves, and not
“ their organization, then it will
“ follow,

1. “ That the man will always remain
“ while the matter which constitutes
“ him remains, however different its
“ organization, or arrangement may
“ be.

2. “ Since death does not destroy
“ the matter that constitutes the man,
“ it does not destroy the man. Con-
“ sequently he goes on to exist after
“ death, or is naturally immortal.”

Ans. 1. It is supposed, but it is not
proved, that the brain is so flux, or
changeable a substance as Clarke repre-
sents it. Nor is it at all improbable,
but that every man hath certain stamina,

or

or original particles appertaining exclusively to him as an individual, which remain the same during life, and which, after death, enter not as an essentially component part of any other being. That this is not improbable, and that, notwithstanding the number of human beings that will have had existence, from the beginning of the world to the resurrection, there will be matter sufficient in the system to supply the non-essential parts, such as the skin, limbs, &c. appears from the small part of the body, demonstrably essential to perception, viz. the *crura*, the *pons varolii*, and *part of the spinal marrow*. For it is evident, from the known facts of the regeneration of animal substances, that it is of little consequence to identity, of what particles some parts of the human body are composed. So that the fluxity of the *whole* brain, or nervous system is gratuitous in Clarke, although it may possibly be true.

U 2. The

2. The question concerning identity is, upon every system, so difficult and intricate, and the advocates of immaterialism have so little agreed about it, that any argument from thence in the present state of knowledge, can be but of little avail.

3. Upon the system of immaterialism the difficulty urged by Clarke, is as strong as upon the opposite opinion, for if the particles of the brain be so loose, and so flux as here represented, then is the soul united not to *one*, as every immaterialist hath hitherto supposed, but to a perpetual and almost infinite number of bodies in succession, and we are clearly deceived in all those our notions of identity which our senses communicate to us: and if we are not to trust them, upon a point so apparently plain, I tremble for the foundation of all our knowledge.

4. In answer to Dr. Price, it is quite sufficient to say, that according to his process

process, he may prove *quidlibet ex quolibet*. He is kind enough to make ridiculous suppositions for the materialist which no materialist ever made for himself, and then they become the objects of his exclamations. On the principles of materialism, man, is neither the particles that compose his body alone, nor his organization alone, but both: indeed, organization is a word only, which implies particles to be organized.

5. The question of identity is so little understood, that I do not think it would be difficult to prove it a non-entity: and as far as such proof would go, the objection in question would be invalid: but when the numerous hypotheses of the immaterialists on the subject are reconciled, and the question settled by them, it will be time enough for the materialist to examine how far the supposed truth is, or is not consistent with his hypothesis.

6. I reserve the objection from consciousness, for a separate article.

VIII. The body is mortal: if then the body be the whole man, one great proof of a state of future retribution is taken away; whereas, if the soul be supposed immaterial, indiscerptible, and of course immortal, we have even for deists a very strong evidence of such a state.

Ans. 1. Granting the immateriality of the soul, its immortality can never be demonstrated from the mere light of nature. Sherlock in particular is of this opinion.

2. An intermediate state, is now generally given up even by the divines of the establishment, and after the unfuted tract of the bishop of Carlisle, and Blackburne's Historical View of the Controversy on an Intermediate State; the

The opinion I fancy is fallen, never to rise predominant any more.

3. So far as the immortality of the soul is consequent upon its immateriality, exactly in that proportion does this argument render unnecessary a divine revelation, which by the unanimous consent of all theologians, was intended principally to establish upon firm grounds, the important doctrine of a future state, which, previous to the Christian æra was so problematical as never to have been indubitably received by any sect of ancient philosophers. A christian materialist knows it can be fully proved from the scriptures, and perhaps from them only, and rests his hope on them alone.

4. I apprehend that whether the soul exist or not, it cannot be either indiscerptible or immortal.

IX. "That which peruses the impressions and traces of things in the fantasy and memory, must be something distinct from the brain upon which those impressions are made. Otherwise it would contemplate itself, and be both reader and book." Wollaston, 358.

Ans. To one assertion I reply another: it need not be distinct: it may contemplate itself: so that as the conclusion is admissible on the principles of immaterialism, the objection proves nothing.

2. Has the soul ideas independant of the body? If it have, then is it both reader and book.

X. I know upon the best of all the possible grounds of knowledge, that I have a soul, a something within me, which is not my body, which gives origin to thought and volition, which
directs

directs my corporeal motions, and which perceives the impressions of external objects on my corporeal system. *I feel, I am conscious* of the existence of this substance, as clearly as of my own existence, as of the existence of the beings around me. Stronger evidence my nature will not admit, and farther evidence is unnecessary. No *reasoning* therefore, whatever, can so clearly prove that I have no soul, as this inward intuitive certainty, that I have one. *How* it is connected with my body I know not, what are its other properties than that of causing thought and volition, I infer from reasoning, but its existence I am convinced of from superior evidence.

Ans. This is a very convenient argument to an immaterialist, and I have endeavoured to put it strongly. I reply, 1. I deny that there is any consciousness distinct from what is usually termed perception. I have indeed heard it

said, that *perception* is applicable only to the notice the soul takes of the *immediate* impressions made on our senses by external objects; while *consciousness* is that power which the soul has of arriving at such truths, as are not the objects of our senses, and which result not from impressions made thereon: such as our own existence, identity, &c. But I cannot find within myself, nor have I seen in the writings of others, nor have I heard any clear distinction made between perception and consciousness *themselves* independent of the objects on which they are exerted. The perception *may* be, and as far as I know, is, the same whether the objects of it be internal or external, immediate impressions, or revived ideas of former ones: nor does the *accidental* difference of appellation, make an *essential* difference: hence the argument is founded on an arbitrary, verbal, distinction. As all the objects of our knowledge agree in the common circumstance of *being perceived,*

perceived, and as I know of no difference between consciousness and perception, but what relates solely to the *object*, and not either to the thing itself, or the subject, I admit none.

2. I deny that we get the notions of identity and existence any otherwise, than by means of our senses, and if by these the ideas can be accounted for, it is unphilosophical to admit more causes. *Frustra fit per plura, quod fieri potest per pauciora.* My hands, feet, face, voice, person, dress, &c. make an impression on my organs of sense: so do those of other human beings; but these latter, of course, make different impressions; by the terms, therefore, I observe by means of my senses a difference between me and other people, and so of other beings. Hence I get an idea of self. This complex idea, perpetually occurs from perpetual repetitions of the impressions, which first gave rise to it.

Hence

Hence the idea of perpetual, or continuous selfness, sameness or identity. As to existence, it is included in every perceived impression, in those which occasion the idea of myself, as well as those which occasion the idea of my neighbour. I refer to Locke and Hartley for farther proof, that *all* our ideas are formed from impressions made on our senses.

3. If this consciousness of the existence of a soul, be not possessed by mankind universally, then is it a proof to those only who possess it. Others, therefore, who have it not, may have no soul, since they lack this proof of it. But it is evident no materialist hath it, otherwise he would not have been a materialist. Neither have any of the vulgar this consciousness of a soul, for it is notorious, that whatever word they may use, they are conscious of nothing, but what is *corporeal*. Nay, till the time of *Des*
Cartes

Cartes, from the first origin of the controversy, no one ever believed that he was conscious of such a soul as was strictly immaterial, and even now, nine tenths of the philosophical immaterialists, will not allow, but what this immaterial soul, hath one property in common with matter, *extension*. This consciousness therefore of the existence of an *incorporeal* soul, is confined to the hundred millionth part perhaps, on the largest computation of the human race. Doubtless a sufficient number to establish its reality.

4. This soul, of which these gentlemen are conscious, is immaterial essentially. Now, I deny, that we can have any idea at all of a substance purely immaterial. Even themselves only describe it, just as they describe a non-entity, by a negation of properties: so that unless this consciousness can be of that, of which we can have *no idea*, we cannot be conscious of a soul such as is worth

worth contending for. For my own part, as I possess not this consciousness, I must leave it to the immaterialists to explain this mystery.

5. So far from being conscious that I have a soul, as far as my consciousness or perception extends, I have none. Yet is there just the same reason for asserting that I have one, from the phenomena, as that an immaterialist hath.

6. Of this soul, whose existence is pretended to be proved from consciousness, no man whatever knows ought, or thinks ought, till he has acquired a considerable share of reading and reflection, and even of metaphysical reading. A presumption that this consciousness is an *ens rationis*. Besides, at what period of life do children possess it?

7. People are apt to be intuitively conscious of what they have been taught
to

to take for granted: some people are conscious of the truth of the doctrine of transubstantiation, and other mysteries; and when the steps of the process of reasoning, from whence was inferred some truth of long standing are forgotten, people are apt to be conscious of it intuitively.

8. But the most conclusive argument against this consciousness, is, that any thing whatever can be proved by it; that you have no ground whereon to convince a man of a received absurdity; and that all inference, from what is clearly truth to you, to what is *absolute* truth, is totally fallacious. An immaterialist, is conscious of the existence of an immaterial soul; I beg to know, of what mystery a man *cannot be*, of what mystery men *have not* been conscious: and how can any one confute another of an absurdity of which that other is conscious? Dr. Beattie, for instance, may be conscious among an immense number of other apparent absurdities, that

that within a month after the reception of Berkeley's Theory, the whole human race will be utterly exterminated. Is it necessary, after mentioning the *Scotch doctors*, who adopt this consciousness, sometimes under that name, and sometimes under the denomination of common sense, to urge this argument any farther? *Qui Bavium, &c.*

This argument from consciousness, has been better and differently considered at large by Dr. Priestley: in the present, as in the case of most of the other arguments, I have given my own words, and my own manner of statement, and not his, because being compelled to write, I could not be allowed to copy. But I mean not this essay to supersede, but to incite to, the perusal of his treatment of this subject. Some other arguments also, which I have deemed too trivial to notice, but which may have their weight with others, may be found distinctly refuted

in

in his Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit, and his Controversy with Dr. Price; to which, if Clarke's Answer to Dodwell, and his Controversy on that occasion with Collins be added, other publications will give little of additional knowledge on this subject.

in the Propositions of the first and second parts of the Commentary with the Propositions which are contained in the second part of the Commentary on that occasion with Collins be added other publications will give little or additional knowledge on this subject.

The following are the titles of the works which are now in the possession of the Library of the University of Cambridge.

1. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

2. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

3. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

4. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

5. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

6. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

7. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

8. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

9. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

10. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

11. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

12. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

13. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

14. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

15. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

16. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

17. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

18. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

19. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

20. *Algebra* by Simon Stevin.

O N

I D E N T I T Y.

IT is a remarkable fact in the history of philosophy, that human wisdom has succeeded the least in resolving questions upon those subjects, which, to a common observer, admit not the possibility of a question. Many writers of no small note in the literary world, observing this ill success attending the disquisitions of men, whom they cannot but perceive have a much larger portion of industry and abilities than themselves, aim at reputation by ridiculing investigations in which they cannot keep pace with their predecessors, and affect to think with the vulgar, because they feel their inability to rank with the wise. So far however as my observations have extended, those are likely to know most of a question,

X

who

who possessing the most of leisure and of talents, give it the most attention. In ethics and theology, in natural philosophy and the arts, this is incontestibly the case; and why the analogy should fail in metaphysics, which requires at least as much mental exertion as either, is a question which such writers as those above alluded to, have not hitherto perfectly resolved.

The subject of *personal identity*, which never occurs to the generality of mankind, may fairly be ranked among those topics, which the labours of the learned have not yet rescued from the field of metaphysical contention.

But though the subject be yet undecided, the attempts of preceding writers have not been in vain: much labour has been saved to subsequent inquirers, and fallacies have been noted that were not obvious. In speculative, as well as in active life, it may be regarded as a maxim,

maxim, that no exertion is ever lost: and paradoxical as the assertion may seem, truth is generally the offspring of error.

I am not therefore very solicitous, whether the opinions I adopt on subjects of much difficulty, be true or false; convinced that seeking for the truth, my researches will in all probability, either point out by example a path to be avoided, or assist in clearing the right road for future investigation.

The questions to which the consideration of identity has given rise, are of late date. They appear to me to have been gradually introduced by the doubts entertained concerning the resurrection of the *same* body; a point rarely disputed till a little above a century ago. The *principium individuationis* of the schoolmen, related not so much to the subject of identity, as to that of diversity, including the characteristic property by which any being was distinguished

guished from every other; this they generally defined to consist in the *genus* and *differentia*, an account which whether right or wrong, does not add much to our stock of knowledge. *Locke* therefore, so far as I know, is the first writer of eminence by whom the subject of identity has been accurately handled.

Identity may be defined “the continued existence of any being unaltered in substance or in properties.” While any thing continues to exist, it must be the same with itself: and as it is a contradiction in terms to assert that any thing can be the same, and not the same (*i. e.* different) at the same instant; the thing thus continuing to exist, must continue to exist without alteration.

The subject, therefore, may be divided into the identity of those things, which do not admit of perceptible alteration, as stones, metals, &c. and of those, which do admit of perceptible alteration, as rivers, plants, animals, &c.

It

It is evident, that the identity of this second class of substances, cannot consist in the identity of that which admits of alteration, for this is a contradiction in terms : and as all the parts of plants and animals for instance, which *are* the objects of our senses, are known and acknowledged to admit of perpetual alteration, the identity of these (if it can be predicated at all) must consist, in the identity of some constituent part, which is *not* the object of our senses. Hence, in fact, arises all the difficulty which the subject involves.

Locke's notions, which have occasioned almost all the subsequent discussion of the subject, are nearly as follows.

After observing (in language not very clear) that we get our idea of identity, by contemplating the continued existence of any thing at any one time or place, and knowing that during such

existence, it must be the same with itself; and finding that at different times it answers to the same idea, he proceeds to distinguish the various kinds of identity, according to the ideas to which that term is applied.

We have ideas, he says, but of three sorts of substances. 1. God. 2. Finite intelligencies. 3. Bodies. His notions respecting the two first I purposely omit, as little to the purpose.

When we apply the term identity to the existence of an atom for instance, we have a different meaning annexed to it, from what the word has, when applied to a mass of atoms; this again is different from the identity of a vegetable, and this last from the sameness of an animal.

In like manner in the case of human beings, it is one thing to be the same *substance*; another to be the same *man*;
another

another the same *person*. An *atom*, i. e. a continued body under one immutable superficies, existing in a determined time and place, must, in any instant of its existence, be the same with itself, and so must continue as long as its existence is continued.

If two or more atoms be joined together in a *mass*, each of these atoms will continue identically the same during their existence, and the identity of the mass will remain, while the atoms thus continue to exist united. But if one of these atoms be taken away, or a new one added, it is no longer the same mass.

The identity of *vegetables* is still different. These are not mere masses of matter, consisting of particles any how united, and which will bear neither addition, diminution or alteration, without the sameness being destroyed; for an oak, growing from a plant to a great tree, is still the same oak. The identity of an oak (for in-

stance) therefore, must consist in something which continues the same, though the component particles be perpetually and gradually changing. This identity then, can consist in nothing but such a disposition, or organization of the component particles, as is fitted to produce all the phenomena of *vegetable life* in an oak : which life, communicated to new particles of matter successively in the same organization, and continuing uninterrupted from the commencement, to the death of the vegetable, constitutes its identity.

Much the same is the case with *animals*. Their component particles are in perpetual change, but this perpetual change of the particles, of which an animal body is composed, is consistent with a peculiar organization, according to which the successive particles are disposed, and which gives rise to, and continues *animal life* ; which existing continually, uninterruptedly

ruptedly from its commencement in the animal, to the decease thereof, constitutes *animal identity*.

The identity of a human being, when considered as a *substance*, or mass of matter, consists in the identity of the particles, and the sameness of their number. When considered as a *man*, or a human animal, his identity, like that of all other animals, consists in the uninterrupted continuance of one and the same animal life, existing under one organization, but a succession of particles. When considered as a *person*, a rational intelligent agent, it consists in that *consciousness* inseparable from thinking, and essential to it; by which such a being is capable of referring all present sensations to self, and by which under the name of memory or recollection, it refers also all past sensations to the same self. For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one be what he

he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking beings; in this alone consists *personal identity*, or the sameness of a rational being. And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of the person; it is the same self now, it was then, and it is by the same self with this present one which now reflects upon it, that that action was done.

Neither is it of any consequence to the question, whether the *subjectum inherens*, the substance which is thus conscious, be one numerically, or continue to exist identically or not; for however that be, as it is this consciousness alone, by which a person remembering a past action, cannot help referring it to himself who now remembers it, that which compels this reference, viz. consciousness, must constitute the identity of the person.

Which

Which consciousness, whether like animal or vegetable life, it may consist with a perpetual change of substance; or whether it be appropriate to one and the same substance, or of what kind that substance may be, is a question not to be resolved till it be ascertained what kind of substance is endued with the capacity of thinking.

That personal identity thus consists in consciousness, is clear because 1. no one can help ascribing his personal identity to himself, while this consciousness remains; 2. because no man can possibly ascribe it to himself, if this consciousness be absent; 3. because all the other possible suppositions to the exclusion of consciousness, will fail in constituting personal identity.

1. "Had I the same consciousness
 "that I saw the ark and *Noah's* flood,
 "as that I saw an overflowing of the
 "Thames last winter, or as that I write
 "now;

“ now ; I could no more doubt that I
“ who wrote this now, that saw the
“ *Thames* overflowed last winter, and
“ that viewed the *flood* at the general
“ deluge, was the same *self* (place that
“ self in what substance you please)
“ than that I who wrote this, am the
“ same *myself* now while I write (whether
“ I consist of all the same substances,
“ material or immaterial or no)
“ that I was yesterday.” And if I am
as perfectly conscious that I was the
person who performed certain actions
one thousand years ago, as that I am
now writing on the subject, I am
justly accountable for such actions, and
must of course attribute personal identity
to myself so far as that consciousness
extends backward.

Thus also by the same consciousness,
the fingers now united to my body I
refer to myself as a part of myself : but
should my hand be severed, and the
consciousness formerly attending the
whole,

whole, attend the part thus separated, that part would be *myself*, and of this only could personal identity in such case be predicated. And this, for the same reason, that if my hand were cut off, and this consciousness should attend (as it probably would) the remaining part of my body and not my hand, I should regard the remainder as myself, and the separated hand as no part of me.

2. Neither if this consciousness be absent can I possibly ascribe this personal identity to myself. Let any man be ever so well satisfied (if so he could be) that the soul which formerly inhabited the body of *Socrates* now informs his body; or that his soul now occupies the body which *Socrates* formerly possessed, yet in either case, if he be utterly unconscious of any of *Socrates'* actions or thoughts, if he be utterly incapable of referring to himself, any thing universally referred to

Socrates

Socrates, he must also be utterly incapable of considering himself as the *same person* with *Socrates*; he cannot deem himself accountable for any of the actions of *Socrates*, and in short they are as much to him or as little to him as the actions of any other indubitably different person.

In like manner “should the soul of
 “a prince carrying with it the con-
 “sciousness of the prince’s past life,
 “enter and inform the body of a cob-
 “ler, as soon as deserted by its own
 “soul, every one sees that he would
 “be the same person with the prince,
 “accountable only for the *prince’s*
 “actions: but who would say it was
 “the same *man*?

3. No other hypothesis to the exclusion of consciousness, will account for personal identity. For if it do not consist in consciousness, it must consist either

a In

a In the same individual numerical soul, without any regard to sameness of body: or

b In the same man or animal, without any regard to sameness of soul: or

c In the same soul united to the same animal.

In the first case the absurdity follows, that two men, born of different women, by different fathers, at different periods, may be one and the same person; for the hypothesis excludes all regard to the body to which the soul may happen to be united; and in fact, there is no ground to warrant that souls are not in their nature indifferent to any parcels of matter. Hence *Sardanapalus*, and *St. Paul* may be the same persons, though *St. Paul* is not acquainted with, or conscious of, any action whatever, which *Sardanapalus* performed, and although all external and

and internal evidence should be directly contrary. Nay, according to this most absurd supposition, the soul of St. Paul might inhabit Prince Maurice's *parrot*, and then would St. Paul and the parrot be the same person.

Again; All the probabilities that personal identity cannot consist with consciousness, are probabilities also, that this hypothesis is false.

Again; All propriety of rewards and punishments, is utterly destroyed on any supposition that makes identity consist in any thing without consciousness. *De non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio.*

Again; It cannot be shewn that personal identity *cannot* consist with a succession of immaterial substances; more especially considering that animal identity *can* consist with a succession of material substances.^a

^a I add, to complete the series of arguments against this supposition, that there is no sufficient evidence

As to the second supposition, if personal identity be synonymous with animal identity, then as this consists in a continuity of animal life subsisting with and communicated to successive particles arranged in a peculiar organization, personal identity must end with life, and future existence is impossible.

This argument holds also against the third supposition; and they are all obnoxious to the very strong objections drawn from the necessity of consciousness.

It is therefore a consciousness of present impressions, and a recollection of

evidence of the existence of a soul at all; and its existence involves contradictions, and insuperable difficulties: that, there is no more difficulty in ascribing either personal identity, or consciousness to a succession of material substances, than of ascribing the identity of *animal life* to such.

That if personal identity consist in the identity of the soul, then is both a man himself, and all the world deceived; for both apply the idea to identity of body.

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past

past ones, together with a reference of them to the recollector himself, that makes the latter at present, the same being with himself aforesaid; and which, in a word, constitutes personal identity.

Such is the substance of *Locke's* elaborate essay on this obscure subject, which so far as the question was concerned, respecting the resurrection of the same body, was attacked by bishop *Stillingfleet*, and the notions respecting vegetable and animal life and personal identity, by Dr. *Watts*.

The doctrine of the resurrection of the same body, I shall have occasion to notice presently. *Watts's* objections are these. (Essays 294).

1. We know not wherein vegetable life consists, and therefore there is an impropriety in making vegetable identity, consist in the sameness of vegetable life. It does not consist in the same nutritive particles, for these are different

different according to the soils; nor in the same tubes or organs, for these may be stopt, and new ones formed; nor in the same motion of the sap, for the head of a vine or a bramble bent down and planted, will take root. The same difficulties attend the explanation of what is *animal* life; and even still greater, for the experiments of Dr. *Lower* concerning the transfusion of blood, evince that animal life may consist, the juices being changed.

2. If a tree or an animal be struck suddenly dead, and again revived, this is a new life, but not a new tree or animal, which *Locke's* hypothesis would make it.

Yet *Watts* owns that notwithstanding these difficulties, he thinks *Locke* is near the truth. Nor indeed do his objections appear to me to be valid; for although we know not exactly in what life consists, we know sufficiently its

Y 2

effects,

effects, and till its proximate cause or causes be known, it is like attraction, a really existing property, whose existence phenomena evince. *Watts's* second objection is a *petitio principii*.

His attack upon *Locke's* notion of personal identity is more formidable.

Certain consequences follow from *Locke's* hypothesis, which the latter makes no scruple of admitting.

Thus: personal identity consisting in a continuity of consciousness, if the Mayor of Queenborough could be conscious of all the actions that Socrates performed, he would become Socrates, as well as the Mayor of Queenborough. Again; if Socrates performs actions during sleep, of which he is utterly unconscious when awake, then, although he would be the same man, he would be two different persons, as possessing two separate, distinct consciousnesses;
and

and neither would Socrates sleeping be accountable for the actions of Socrates waking, or *vice versa*.

If a man, through any disorder, or by any other means whatever, utterly lose all remembrance of the past transactions of his life, without a possibility of recovery, he would then become a different *person*, although he would remain the same *man*. And this, *Locke* says, is perfectly conformable to the common opinions of mankind, who never punish the *sober* man for the actions of the *mad* man, because there is *prima facie* evidence that the consciousness of the man in his senses, does not extend to his actions while lunatic. He says moreover, that punishment is inflicted in the cases of ill actions performed in sleep and in drunkenness, because a real discontinuity of consciousness cannot in these cases be distinguished from a counterfeit one; to which he might have added, that the latter case is itself

an ill action, and in both cases the evidence is *primâ facie* from what we know of the common facts, in favour of continued consciousness or recollection. To these cases however *Watts* objects in substance, thus :

1. The evidence of personality is *external* as well as *internal*: other persons are judges of it as well as the man himself. Thus if I slay a man in the sight of two of my neighbours, and afterward utterly forget the circumstance, ought I to be allowed in contradiction to them, to say that *I* did not commit the murder? are they not competent evidences of the fact!

The force of this argument depends upon the quantity of the absurdity of denying the affirmative. But *Locke* had he lived (for he died before *Watts* published) might on his own principles have distinguished, thus :

In

In all cases until the contrary is proved, the identity of the *man*, is evidence of the identity of the *person*, i. e. of the continuity of consciousness. So that in the case put, the *onus probandi* lying upon the murderer, he would be justly punished if he or his friends did not evince the discontinuity, by competent evidence. But if this total absence of recollection really took place, the person was really changed, and all the reasons for punishing would fail as to him, and hold good (if at all) on the score of public example only: for the actual evidence only went to the identity of the *man*, and the identity of the *person* was matter of inference.

2. But suppose (says *Watts*) that the consciousness of the actions of Socrates attended the Mayor of Queenborough, this would be only a delusive impression on the mind or fancy, imitating real memory. Can such a phrenzy be sufficient to turn two men into one person? Would *Domitian* become *Romulus*,

lus, if *Domitian* could persuade himself that he built *Rome*, and performed all the actions ascribed to *Romulus*?

To this, *Locke* might answer, that if *Domitian* had only a consciousness of the actions usually ascribed to *Romulus*, or a consciousness of actions similar to those which *Romulus* performed, it would be a disorder, a delusive impression on the imagination, to be accounted for, from the impressions in common cases of sleep and deliria; but if *Domitian* actually had conjoined with him the individual consciousness that *Romulus* possessed, he would not be a similar but the same person. *Watts* therefore states a case which *Locke's* principles would not permit him to allow to be in point.

The objections *Watts* makes against the cases of forgetfulness and sleep, go exactly upon the ground of the common opinion of mankind, being
against

against the opinions of *Locke*; but I think the distinction made between the *man* and the *person*, and the evidence being competent to the *positive* proof of the former only, and to the *hypothetical* proof of the latter, will enable the reader to frame a sufficient reply to the objections of *Watts*, in favour of *Locke's* hypothesis.

Dr. *Watts* however does not quit the subject of identity, with the objections he makes against the opinions of *Locke*. He advances an hypothesis, which, whether it be his own, or whether it belong to *Leibnitz*, is an opinion extremely plausible, and likely to be adopted. He supposes that notwithstanding the body, to all appearance, is after death, utterly decomposed, yet there may be certain essential particles, *stamina*, which are incapable of decomposition, which form the *principium individuationis materiale*, and to which other particles of matter are merely
accessory:

accessory : these remaining, will be sufficient for the subsequent union of the immaterial soul, at the resurrection, and together with it, will form the same person. The observations of Mr. *Bonnet* on the pre-existence of the germ, in his *Contemplations de la Nature*, and his *Palingenese* tend to confirm this hypothesis, which has not yet been expressly controverted.

The next publication on the subject of identity, that occurs to me as worthy of notice, is the incidental mention of the question in the dispute between *Clarke* and *Collins* on the subject of the soul; the fullest, the fairest, the most accurate (though not complete) discussion of any subject of importance that I am acquainted with. *Clarke* in his argument with *Collins* in favour of the existence of a distinct, immaterial soul, as the *subjectum inbæresionis* of consciousness, urges what I confess, I think, a decisive reply to the whole
of

of *Locke's* doctrine concerning the *continuity* of consciousness, and to the particular cases put to, and admitted by *Locke*, respecting the possibility of consciousness being transferred, from one conscious immaterial being to another.

(Clarke and Collins, p. 288, 289, 307, 354, and 366, &c.) “It is
 “absurd to annex consciousness to so
 “flux a substance as the brain and
 “spirits, because, if such a substance
 “could be the seat of that consciousness,
 “by which a man, not only remem-
 “bers things done many years since,
 “but also is conscious that he him-
 “self, the same individual being, was
 “the doer of them; it would follow,
 “that consciousness could be trans-
 “ferred from one subject to another;
 “*that is, that a quality could subsist*
 “*without inhering in any subject at*
 “*all.* That (according to Collins’s
 “notions) the doctrine of a resurrec-
 “tion

“tion will be inconceivable and in-
“credible, and the justice of rewards
“and punishments impossible to be
“made out. For,

“If thinking be in reality nothing
“but a mode, which in inhering in
“a loose and fleeting system of matter,
“perishes utterly at the dissolution of
“the body, then the restoring the
“power of thinking to the same body
“at the resurrection, will not be a
“raising again of the same individual
“person, but it will be as truly the
“creation of a new person, as the
“addition of the like power of think-
“ing to a new body, would be the
“creation of a new man.”

Locke in the beginning (§ 2.) of his chapter on Identity, speaking of the identity of modes and relations, observes, that as they terminate in substances, their identity will be determined by the identity of the corresponding

ponding substances. “ Only as to
 “ things, whose existence is in succes-
 “ sion, such as are the actions of finite
 “ beings, v. g. *motion* and *thought*, both
 “ which consist in a continued train of
 “ succession, concerning their diversity,
 “ there can be no question, because
 “ each perishing the moment it begins,
 “ they cannot exist in different times,
 “ or in different places ; as permanent
 “ beings, can at different times exist
 “ in distant places ; and therefore, no
 “ *motion* or *thought* considered as at
 “ different times can be the same ; each
 “ part thereof having a different begin-
 “ ning of existence.”

Now had *Locke* considered that *consciousness* also was like *motion* and *thought*, a mode of a finite being ; that he elsewhere has acknowledged that *consciousness* is essential to, and always accompanies *thought* ; that *consciousness* also is frequently interrupted, and not strictly continuous ; that there are times
 when

when we are not conscious, as well as times when we do not think, which he has proved at large ; that if we are conscious, we must be conscious of something, but that many hours happen, during life, in which we have neither immediate impressions, nor ideas to be conscious of ; he must have acknowledged, that *consciousness*, like *motion* and *thought*, exists in succession, and that no consciousness, considered at different times, can be the same, each part having a different beginning of existence.

His friend *Collins* however, whose hypothesis did not labour under the dead weight of a distinct, immaterial principle (having, as I conjecture, considered the preceding quotation from *Locke*) after advancing in answer to the passages quoted from *Clarke*, certain propositions on the subject of identity, exactly conformable to *Locke's* ideas, so far as they extend, proceeds
to

to state nearly the same reasons that *Locke* does, to evince that personal identity cannot exist^c without consciousness, or consist in any thing else; but that consciousness, like the rest of the phenomena of thinking, is a mere mode of fleeting matter, man being wholly material; and therefore as it exists only in successive acts of consciousness, will no more be destroyed at the dissolution of the body, than it actually is during life, at any of those moments when we cease to think, or to be conscious. Hence, at the resurrection, when the body is reanimated, if a consciousness, a recollection of its past actions be added to it, the personal identity will be as perfectly preserved as the case can require, or as it actually is at any given moment of its existence. For, as there is (ac-

^c In stating Collins's, as in other hypotheses, I use for abbreviation my own method, but that they are actually the opinions of the authors quoted, I engage.

according to Collins) *no identical individual, numerical consciousness, perpetually inhering in one and the same numerical being* (which is Clarke's hypothesis on personal identity, and which he insists on, not from direct consideration of the actual phenomena, but because it coincides with his notion of the soul) nor any consciousness at all independent of the particular instances, which begin and end momentarily, there will no more be a new creation of the person at the resurrection, than there is at any moment of his existence during life.

He urges moreover that, "as human thinking, or consciousness, consists of a number of particular acts of thinking or consciousness, which, whether they reside in a fleeting or an indivisible substance, can each of them have but one existence; and cannot possibly exist at different times

“ times as substances do, but perish
 “ the moment they begin.

“ And since it is not possible for
 “ those individual, numerical acts of
 “ thinking, or consciousness, that are
 “ past to exist again, the same numerical
 “ being with the same numerical, in-
 “ dividual consciousness, cannot exist
 “ at two different times, and therefore
 “ as this is *Clarke's* notion of personal
 “ identity, there cannot possibly, ac-
 “ cording to this, be a resurrection of
 “ the *same person*, nor indeed can there
 “ be any such thing as the *same person*
 “ at any two different times.”

Clarke's opinion certainly appears to me to involve all the absurdities of the separate archetypal existence of abstract ideas an objection to it, which I rather wonder Collins did not notice: indeed, to assert that there can be consciousness independent of the particular acts of consciousness from whence

the idea is selected, is just like asserting that there can be figure independent of any thing figured, whiteness without any thing white, hardness without any thing hard, &c. Consciousness like these, is not a thing, but a name, made use of to signify a general circumstance, in which a number of particular cases agree.

To this opinion of *Collins*, *Clarke* objects " That the particles of dust
 " which, in the course of twenty years,
 " have successively been part of the
 " substance of my body, are enough
 " in quantity to form several bodies.
 " And if the addition of a like consciousness with that which I now
 " find in myself, to one of those bodies at the resurrection, will make *it*
 " to be the same individual person with
 " *me*; the addition of the like consciousness to twenty of them, would
 " consequently make every one of them
 " to be, not persons *like me*, but the
 " *same*

“*same individual person with me, and*
 “*with each other likewise: which is*
 “the greatest absurdity in the world.”

According to the known laws of reasoning, when I mean to assign a case for the purpose of bringing a *reductio ad absurdum*, against my adversary's hypothesis, the case assigned ought to be such as the hypothesis will admit. But here, *Clarke* puts a case, with *Collins's* opinion would not admit the possibility of; for the same numerical act of consciousness on *Collins's* hypothesis could not be communicated, or caused to arise in more than one being. Therefore the supposition did not militate against *Collins's* opinion, and therefore he need not have replied to it. But he did reply to it, thus:

1. The case put, proves the truth of the doctrine objected to; for as each of these conscious beings could not help thinking in this case, that he was the

same person with Mr. *Clarke*, it is evident that sameness of person consists in a consciousness, or recollection of past actions, and a reference of them to the person himself recollecting. And therefore, each of these persons so referring to himself the actions of Mr. *Clarke*, would be Mr. *Clarke*.

2. Admitting that each of them was Mr. *Clarke*, no ill consequence could arise from thence, because there is no evidence that such a renovation of personality will ever take place; and in many cases (as if Mr. *Clarke* had been a great sinner) an unnecessary quantity, both of physical and moral evil would be made to exist: so that there is a high degree of evidence against the possible existence of the case assigned.

Nothing material on this subject, occurred farther, in *this* controversy. But the opinions of *Locke*, as well as
of

of *Collins*, were soon after attacked in
 “a Discourse on personal Identity,”
 annexed to *Bishop Butler's Analogy*.

This discourse contains in a very
 short compass, the strongest objections
 both to *Locke's* and *Collins's* opinions
 that I have met with; and therefore,
 I shall extract the arguments, and keep
 them separate; arranging them however
 in my own manner.

Our *idea* of identity, he says, we
 obtain thus: “As upon two triangles
 “being compared together, there arises
 “in the mind, the idea of similitude,
 “or upon twice two and four, the
 “idea of equality; so likewise upon
 “comparing the consciousness of one's
 “self, or one's own existence in any
 “two moments, there, as immediately
 “arises to the mind, the idea of per-
 “sonal identity.”

As to the identity of vegetables:

The bishop observes, that “ when
“ a man swears to the same tree as
“ having stood fifty years in the same
“ place, he means only the same as to
“ all the purposes of property, and uses
“ of common life, and not that the
“ tree has been all the time the same
“ in the strict philosophical sense
“ of the word ; for he does not know
“ whether any one particle of the pre-
“ sent tree be the same with any one
“ particle of the tree which stood in the
“ same place fifty years ago. And if
“ they have not one common particle
“ of matter, they cannot be the
“ same tree in the proper philosophic
“ sense of the word *same* : it being
“ evidently a contradiction in terms to
“ say they are, when no part of their
“ substance, and no one of their pro-
“ perties is the same. No part of their
“ substance by the supposition, and
“ no one of their properties, because
“ it is allowed, that the same pro-
“ perty

“ perty cannot be transferred from one
“ substance to another.”

Hence he infers (as I think on due consideration of the paragraph) that vegetable identity can only be asserted in a loose and popular, and not in a strict and philosophical sense.

In like manner, he deduces from analogy (as I conceive) in the same paragraph, that if personal identity be predicated at all in a strict and philosophical sense, it cannot, in such sense, be said to subsist with diversity of substance.

Locke's opinions on personal identity, he thinks, were hasty. But these hasty opinions have been carried (he says) to a strange length by others (meaning *Collins*) whose notion, when traced and examined to the bottom amounts to this :

“ That personality is not a permanent, but a transient thing ; that it

“ lives and dies, begins and ends con-
 “ tinually. That no one can any more
 “ remain one and the same person for
 “ two moments together, than two
 “ successive moments can be one and
 “ the same moment: that our substance,
 “ is indeed, continually changing;
 “ but, whether this be so or not, is
 “ nothing to the purpose, since it is
 “ not *substance*, but *consciousness* alone
 “ which constitutes personality; which
 “ consciousness being successive, can-
 “ not be the same in any two moments,
 “ nor consequently can the personality
 “ constituted by it.”

To Locke's opinion then, *that per-
 sonal identity consists in that property of
 us termed consciousness, whether that pro-
 perty appertain to a material or imma-
 terial, to a fleeting or permanent sub-
 stance*; Butler makes the following
 acute objections.^b

1. Consciousness

^b I again repeat that I make use of my own words
 in stating arguments here as else where: that I draw
 up

1. Consciousness cannot constitute, but must from the nature of it, presuppose identity. If you are conscious that you are the very same person, who performed any transaction a twelve month ago, your identity is in this case presupposed; it is the thing, the truth of which you are conscious, and therefore must be prior to the consciousness of it: for had not this previously existed, how could you be conscious of its existence? Consciousness therefore, is the evidence of identity, and not the thing itself.

2. If consciousness constitute identity, then you are not the same person, who performed an action usually ascribed to you, if you happen to forget it. But who remembers (or is conscious of) every thing he has done?

up in form, an argument hinted at; that I dwell upon some, and abbreviate others; not because I can improve the words of the authors, but because two ways of stating the same thing, are usually better than one.

3. A person

3. A person may have a capacity of knowing some object to be the same at different times, although his perceptions (or consciousness) be numerically different. For, let it be granted, that any one object doth actually continue the same, for any definite length of time, a person perceiving this object at the commencement, and again at the end of the assigned period, will have two similar but numerically different perceptions, although the object by the supposition continue the same.

4. It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or quality, but a being only, which is capable of life and action, of happiness and misery; if therefore we are to remain the same, at any future period of existence, our sameness must consist in the sameness of some being, some substance fitted to the designs of such future existence; but consciousness is a mere quality of a being, or substance,

substance, and is not itself either the one or the other.

5. As personal identity must consist in the identity of some being or substance, and as all beings confessedly continue the same during the whole time of their existence, the existence, or non-existence of any being must be totally independent of all recollection or forgetfulness; *i. e.* consciousness or unconsciousness; which also from the terms must be subsequent to such existence. Therefore personal identity, *i. e.* the continued existence of that substance which we are, must be totally independent of consciousness.

6. " Every person is conscious that
 " he is now the same person or self he
 " was, as far back as his remembrance
 " reaches. Since when any one re-
 " flects upon a past action of his own,
 " he is just as certain of the person
 " who did that action, namely, him-
 " self,

“ self, the person who now reflects
 “ upon it, as he is certain that the
 “ action was at all done. This he,
 “ person, or self, must either be a sub-
 “ stance, or the property of some sub-
 “ stance. If he, if person be a sub-
 “ stance, then consciousness that he
 “ is the same person, is consciousness
 “ that he is the same substance. If
 “ the person, or he, be the property of
 “ a substance, still consciousness that
 “ he is the same property is as certain
 “ a proof that his substance remains
 “ the same, as consciousness that he
 “ remained the same substance would
 “ be; *since the same property cannot be*
 “ *transferred from one substance to*
 “ *another.*”

One or two of these arguments
 against *Locke's* opinion,^d have been
 noticed before, but they are of suffi-
 cient importance to bear the repetition.

^d The second for instance by Watts, and the sixth
 by Clarke.

To *Collins's* opinion that personal identity consists not in any substance, nor in a continued numerically identical consciousness, but in the successive and distinct consciousnesses of past transactions; *Butler* replies:

I. "That from hence it must follow
 "that it is a fallacy upon ourselves,
 "to charge our present selves, with
 "any thing we did, or to imagine our
 "present selves interested in any thing
 "which befell us yesterday: or that
 "our present self will be interested in
 "any thing that will befall us to-
 "morrow. Since our present self is
 "not in reality the same with the self
 "of yesterday, but another like self or
 "person coming in its room, and mis-
 "taken for it, to which another self
 "will succeed to-morrow. For it is
 "self-evident that the personality can-
 "not be really the same if (as the
 "maintainers of this opinion expressly
 "assert)

“ assert) that in which it consists is
 “ not the same.

2. “ This notion is absolutely con-
 “ tradictory to that certain conviction
 “ which necessarily and every moment
 “ arises within us, when we turn our
 “ thoughts upon ourselves, when we
 “ reflect upon what is past, and look
 “ forward upon what is to come. All
 “ imagination of a daily change of that
 “ living agent which each man calls
 “ himself, for another, or of any such
 “ change throughout our whole present
 “ life is entirely borne down by our na-
 “ tural sense of things.”

The rest of the arguments which the
 bishop adduces against *Collins's* opi-
 nions (and which I have accordingly
 stated as replies to *Locke*) are rather of
 force against the *general* notion that
 personal identity consists in consciouf-
 ness, than against *Collins's* modification
 of that notion, nor does he attempt to
 state

state or establish any precise notion of his own on the subject, or to confute the objections which lie against the hypothesis he appears to adopt. This last argument (the weakest among those which the bishop advances) I shall have occasion to notice again. But I cannot help remarking, with reprehension, the unfounded and illiberal insinuated adscription of *inward unfairness, and secret conception of heart* to such a man as *Collins*, at the end of the paragraph in which the preceding argument is contained. An insinuation, no otherwise to be accounted for, than from the fashionable sacerdotal insolence, so commonly used in those days toward every person who disdained to adopt upon trust each absurdity which the clergy thought fit to impose, as an article of the christian faith. But besides the truths which *Collins* frequently advanced in opposition to the dicta of the establishment, he was never to be forgiven for exposing irrefragably the clerical forgery in the twentieth of the articles.

Since

Since these writers, I am not acquainted with any other^e discussion of the subject, excepting a chapter on identity in Priestley's "Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit," and the subsequent remarks in the controversy between him and Dr. Price. In this chapter *Priestley* advances the distinction between the identity of the *man*, and that of the *person*; this last being, as he thinks, the only one which it is important to attend to. He does not allow that the *whole* of the particles of which the man is composed are successively changed, but adopts the opinion of certain *stamina* which are never carried off; although even if they were changed, it would not be a matter of any practical consequence, because no one who adopted such an hypothesis would ever think of altering his conduct in any degree in consequence of it,

^e I believe there has been a pamphlet published under some such title as "Letters on Locke's chap. on Identity," but I have never met with it.

nor would the operation of motives be less efficacious. For the identity of the *person* would still remain, and the reference of past actions to a man's present self would still take place, because of the existing *sameness and continuity of consciousness* in which (as he supposes) personal identity consists. Hence, since whatever is decomposed may be recomposed by the same power that originally formed it, those stamina which are essential to the existence of every *man*, will (either from the operation of natural causes, or præternaturally) be again united, and with the consciousness thence resulting of past transactions, form strictly and philosophically the same man.

It is evident from this account, that *Priestley's* hypothesis is a combination of *Locke's* as to the identity of the person, with *Dr. Watts's* as to the identity of the man. And I confess I think it cannot be freed from the objections

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which

which lie against *Locke's* opinion. As to the doctrine of certain corporeal stamina, which continue unchanged; I shall have occasion to notice it hereafter.

Dr. *Price* in his observations on these opinions, advances no argument that I can find (unless perpetual assertion be such) but what is founded on a total misconception of Dr. *Priestley's* opinions. It is very remarkable, Dr. *Price*, like Dr. *Clarke* and Bishop *Butler* (from whose sentiments he seldom varies) is content with objecting to the opinions of others, without stating at large his own, or answering the very prominent objections that lie against the hypothesis of identity, consisting either in sameness of body, or sameness of soul. The like caution also is used both by Dr. *Clarke* and Dr. *Price* with respect to the *extension of spirit*; but from persons of their abilities, it is reasonable to expect a defence of their

own

own opinions, as well as objections to the doctrines of others, especially when their own stand so much in need of support.

Having thus given a brief history of the controversy, so far as I am acquainted with it, my own opinions on this difficult subject remain to be stated.

Where there is no obvious difference between any two substances (two *ex hypothesi*) and wherever they are the same with respect to all the common uses of language and purposes of life, it is allowable to say (as in reality it is always said) they are the *same*.

There is therefore a sufficient ground for the common and popular use of the terms *sameness* and *identity*, in all cases where difference is not perceptible.

But common and popular language is not always accurate. Nor does it follow, because there may be sufficient

ground for such language, that such language is therefore strictly and philosophically accurate. In general, I think it is not so, and though we may talk with the vulgar, it is often necessary to think with the wise.

While any thing exists, it is doubtless the same with itself during its existence; but strictly and philosophically speaking, I think the existence of such a quality as *identity* may be denied in every case, wherein it is applied to any object for any ascertainable length of time.

Each of the preceding writers however, having taken for granted, that there is such a quality of substances as permanent identity, have attempted, as we have seen, to ascertain wherein it consists.

On the contrary, I shall endeavour to prove its non-existence:

. I. From

I. From the nature and known properties of sensations and ideas.

II. From the nature and known properties of the substance wherein they are perceived.

III. From the nature and known properties of the media through which the impressions are conveyed.

IV. From the nature and known properties of the objects which occasion them.

V. From the analogy of cases wherein identity universally predicated can be proved not to exist.

VI. From the insufficiency of every hypothesis hitherto advanced, to ascertain wherein it consists.

VII. From the impossibility of accounting on the hypothesis of identity for known phenomena, which are sufficiently explicable without it.

VIII. From the difficulties arising from the scripture account of the re-

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urrection on the supposition of personal identity, and the greater conformity of the opposite opinion to the account.

IX. From the non-necessity of identity toward future existence.

X. Objections answered.

1. From the nature and known properties of sensations^f and ideas.

When any external object impresses our senses, every one knows it to be anatomically demonstrated, that this impression is not perceived by us, until the motion originally communicated to the extremity of the appropriate nerve be propagated up to the brain. For if this motion be intercepted in the nerve by division, ligature, or other compression, the impression is not perceived: it doth not become a sensation.

^f By *sensations*, I mean immediate actual impressions perceived. By *ideas*, I mean, with Hartley, all our other internal feelings.

From

From repeated experiments of this kind, and from analogous accidental phenomena, observed in pathological affections of the body, this point may be considered as fully ascertained. Neither is it of any consequence to this fact, what theory be adopted respecting the manner in which this motion be propagated. For whether the nerves be considered as elastic strings, which are caused by external impressions to vibrate like the tense chords of a violin, or an harpsicord (which by the way neither Sir *Isaac Newton*, nor *Hartley*, nor any metaphysician, nor even anatomist of note, so far as I know, ever did suppose, notwithstanding the misconceptions of some modern anatomists;) or whether they be considered as substances, which do not like tense chords vibrate at once through their whole length, but permit the primary motion to be propagated up to the brain, by the successive vibration or agitation of the particles

whereof they are composed; or whether they be considered as tubes containing an equably flowing secreted fluid, of which the brain is the secreting organ; whichever I say of these theories be adopted, or whatever other theory be proposed, these two facts must remain certain, 1st. That no perception takes place unless the nerves be affected at the brain, as well as at the extremity originally impressed: and 2dly, That this impression must be communicated to the other end of the nerve by means of some species of motion, along or within the nerve itself, or its contents.

All sensations therefore, are as I have before defined them, "motions in the brain perceived." And ideas, resembling sensations in every thing but their vividness, must from this consideration alone if there were no other, as there are many, in all probability resemble sensations in their proximate cause, and
of

of course be as they are, motions (but less defined, and less forcible) in the brain perceived.

Moreover every one must acknowledge, as *Locke* himself does in a passage before quoted, that motion and thought exist in succession. Every motion of whatever species it be, must be the same with itself during its momentaneous existence; but no two motions of whatever species they be, can strictly and philosophically be identical, *i. e.* one and the same motion.

Therefore as sensations and ideas are perceived motions, no two sensations or ideas can be one and the same sensation or idea.

But what we immediately and actually perceive, are our sensations and ideas only. External objects are never in any possible instance immediately and actually perceived. We refer indeed

deed our sensations to some external object as the cause of them in the first instance, but the existence of the external object is after all, a mere hypothesis to account for that which we perceive. An hypothesis, I confess, notwithstanding the difficulties attending it, the most probable hitherto assigned.

From the nature therefore of sensations and ideas (the only existences whose existence we certainly know) it appears, that so far as we know of them, there is no such thing as permanent identity.

2. Independently however of this proof of the momentaneous successive existence of sensations and ideas, from the nature of them as perceived motions, I apprehend it is at once sufficiently obvious that no two sensations or ideas, can be one and the same sensation or
idea,

idea, unless direct contradictions can be both true.

3. Taking for granted the hypothetical existence of external archetypes, it is evident that when we assert the sameness of any one of these, yet the evidence, that which alone is *certain*, does not even go so far as perfect similarity, for when I say this table is the same with that on which I wrote yesterday, it is clear that I compare not a sensation with a sensation, but a sensation *i. e.* a perceived immediate impression, with an idea, *i. e.* a recollected former impression. How can these two then be identical which are not even similar?

4. In the preceding instance it is evident that the identity of the archetype was inferred from the similarity of the present sensation with the idea of the sensation of yesterday. All that is actually certain here, is the existence
of

of the sensation and the idea, whatever may be the substance exciting or the substance perceiving them. These however (the idea and sensation) we as certainly know to be different, as we certainly know them to exist: similarity therefore and not identity in this case we are certain of. In direct contradiction however to what we are certain of, we assert (beside the existence of the object which we suppose to be the archetype) the permanent identity of this object: although this permanent identity is not necessary to occasion even this similarity of our ideas and sensations. Shall we abide by fact or by a two-fold hypothesis? But it is not in this instance only that in direct contradiction to evidence we infer absolute identity from partial similarity, *i. e.* diversity; but such is the case in every instance wherever identity is predicated. We had a sensation of any supposed object a certain time past; the former existence of this sensation

we

we infer from the present idea of it. This idea is excited by a present sensation to which the idea of the former one is similar; under certain (but variable) circumstances of similarity we infer the identity of the archetype of our present sensation with that of the former one, whose idea now occurs. This will be found, I think, on examination the case universally. Universally therefore we infer identity from that degree of similarity which we know on examination to exist with circumstances of dissimilarity, ascertainable. Such for instance as the dissimilarity in kind between an immediate and a recollected sensation; to which may be added their dissimilarity in time, for each is successive; in degree or force; in associated circumstances, &c.

I think it may be shewn that our idea of personal identity for instance, is always inferred from circumstances of similarity, which on examination we discover

discover to be attended also by circumstances of diversity.

If we can explain any fact, by means of other known facts, it is unphilosophical to recur for its explanation to any fact which is hypothetical. Every thing is the same with itself during its existence. Even though it should subsequently change, and no longer remain identical, yet if this change be gradual and not obvious, or if it be a change merely of comparatively unimportant parts, there will be no reason obvious for asserting its diversity. People in general seldom change an opinion but from obvious causes; and when their opinion serves their stead very well, they do not seek for causes not obvious to induce them to change either the opinion itself, or the words expressive of it.

When I look at my hand, a certain set of sensations arise: when I look at
the

the hand of another person, a set of sensations arise different from the former. The same is the case on looking at, feeling, &c. the body, limbs or features of myself, and those of any other person. The sensations excited are different, and my senses are competent to ascertain that they are different as well as that they exist at all.

I find by perpetually repeated impressions which I perceive, that my hands, body, limbs, &c. are connected, are parts of one whole. I find by perpetually repeated perceptions also, that the sensations excited by them are constantly similar, and constantly different from the sensations excited by others. To the first I give the name of myself; and finding a perpetual connection between my perceptions and the whole, which I term myself, I refer the former to the latter, as the subject wherein these perceptions exist.

Farther

Farther than this, the ideas of the generality of mankind never extend ; and although they perceive gradual changes in that whole, termed *self*, yet in general, the changes are so gradual, and the perceptions still continue to be referred to that which for the present exists so regularly, that no reason occurs to them to doubt upon the subject, to entertain other notions, or adopt other language. And I think this matter may be rested on an appeal to the fact, whether the common people when talking of themselves, have any other idea of self, than the body with its properties. I deny that in any case they ever refer self to the soul, or to consciousness, or to indecomposable stamina, or to pre-existent germs, or any other of the amusing hypotheses with which the learned have favoured the world.

But when some person of better education, of more reading, and of more
leisure,

leisure, hears during his youth from those whose opinions he is taught to reverence, and whose knowledge he finds by experience is superior to his own; that the body, that which he with the vulgar has been accustomed to term his self, is the least important part of him; that this body is changeable, corruptible and mortal; that it is merely a habitation for an unchangeable, incorruptible, immortal, invisible, immaterial soul, which is the real origin of all his perceptions, ideas, thoughts, passions, &c; when the same doctrine is advanced as perfectly incontestible in all companies wherever it happens to be a subject of conversation in his presence; when he finds every one speak of the soul as commonly as of the hands or eyes; when in all the books which are pointed out for his perusal, or which accidentally occur, the same ideas are perpetually found; or if perchance it be mentioned, that some impious and detestable persons

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have

have presumed to doubt on the subject, it is added, that they are unworthy the notice of mankind in general, and that their principles are held in utter abhorrence; when in addition to all this (if his reading should so far extend) he finds, on examination, that many obvious phænomena which apparently take place in the body cannot be accounted for, from the common properties of matter that he is made acquainted with; he rests content with the general opinion, and from long habit believes it as indisputable as the existence of the body itself; he shudders to hear it has ever been oppugned, and consigns to one common pandæmonium, the horrible assemblage of deists, atheists, and materialists. If our Tyro however, should enter still farther within the labyrinth of metaphysical disquisition, and think upon the subject of identity, and the constituent of *self*, it will be natural for him to refer this self, not to the changeable, the corruptible body, but to the unchangeable,

changeable, the immortal inhabitant, whose acquaintance he has now so long enjoyed. And here in general will readers, even of a superior class, rest their opinion : an opinion sufficiently plausible for the common purposes of their literary situation, on a subject too speculative and unimportant to exact much of their attention.

How this opinion became at length considered as dubious ; and how this *Proteus* self was sought in vain by subsequent metaphysicians ; and how it eluded their intellectual pursuit, becoming the phantoms with learned appellations before enumerated, those who have attended to the progress of the controversy will sufficiently know. It is enough for me, from circumstances of universal notoriety and perpetual occurrence, to have accounted for the rise and progress of the idea *self*, or personal identity, among those who have not run the hazard of adopting the hypotheses of

B b 2

their

their teachers, instead of the plain opinion which plain facts had forced upon them. I conclude then from the facts stated, and their obvious and necessary influence, that the idea *self* always arises at first from circumstances referred to the body, and is always applied originally to the body, and its supposed properties.

But it is evident that the sensations occasioned both by our own bodies and those of others, are different at each repetition; it may safely be averred that we never receive two sensations exactly similar of our own arm or face for instance. It is from the *general* similarity, the similarity in the more obvious and prominent circumstances, together with their evident comparative dissimilarity to those of others, that induces us to conclude they are the same. And the same they are, to all the intents and purposes of common life; but this asserted sameness is clearly no other than
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an extended and popular use of a term not strictly applicable, either to the sensations and ideas themselves which are excited in us, or to the body which is supposed to excite them.

In all possible cases therefore the evidence for permanent identity, goes no farther than partial similarity.

4. There are other circumstances also in the very nature of sensations and ideas, which prevent the possibility of their identity. And if these be not identical, it is utterly impossible to know what is; for (as I have frequent occasion to observe) every thing else whose existence is asserted, is conjecture and hypothesis only to account for these. And as it is a known rule in philosophizing, not to extend the cause farther than the effect will warrant, and as similarity is sufficient *cæteris paribus* to account for similarity; the hypothetical assignment of identity, for the purpose, is unphilosophical.

When I look at the paper upon which I am writing, I cannot help seeing at the same time the letters I form, the hand I write with, the pen I use, &c. In like manner whatever sensation is occasioned within me by the action of external objects, is attended, at the same time with other associated sensations, occasioned by the concomitant circumstances. It is a known fact, that every idea (*i. e.* recollected sensation) is excited by the occurrence of some sensation or idea, similar to that which the object itself or some of its associated circumstances primarily occasioned. Also that the idea, thus excited, occurs attended with and modified by the associated ideas; but as it is hardly possible, nay utterly impossible, that all the associated circumstances should occur at one time, exactly similar in kind, number, degree, order, &c. as at a former time, the present sensation, with its associated circumstances, can never be exactly

exactly similar to the excited idea with *its* associated ideas, although identity be inferred from the actual degree of similarity between them. When it is more accurately considered also that an attention to the doctrine of association has made it highly probable, that an idea or sensation is altered or modified in *itself*, by means of its associations, and that it would be somewhat different, without these, from what it is with them; and somewhat different when combined with the associations it has, from what it would be with others that it hath not, the conclusion here drawn will become more forcible.

II. The same consequence is deducible from the nature and known properties of the substance wherein impressions are perceived.

I regard it as a point absolutely demonstrated, that impressions are never perceived until the motion primarily

excited at the extremity of the nerve, be somehow propagated up to the brain. I have more than once taken the trouble of retailing the facts upon which this opinion is founded, although I hope this trouble is unnecessary to the persons by whom this book will be read. It is in the brain therefore that impressions occasioned by the action of external objects are perceived, or become sensations.

It is notorious however that the brain consists, in a great measure, of a system of blood vessels, destined as far as we know, to contribute to the growth and nourishment of the rest of this organ: that the state of the brain depends, in a very considerable degree, upon 1. the quantity of animal heat produced by the decomposition of dephlogisticated air in the lungs, and the nutriment in the stomach and intestines. 2. Upon the quantity of blood in the blood vessels. 3. Upon the
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the proportions of its constituent parts, *i. e.* its fluidity, or otherwise. 4. Upon the quantity of salts taken up by the serous part, which act as stimuli to the living fibre. 5. Upon the nervous state of the stomach in particular, and of the body in general. 6. Upon the quantity of action in the arterial system, general or topical. 7. Upon the velocity of the circulation, either from the preceding cause, or the increased action of the heart, or other circumstances. 8. Upon the quantity of corporeal exercise. 9. Upon the quantity of mental exercise; for in this latter there must be perpetual agitations of the fibres or particles of the brain, with perpetual modifications of prior tendencies, and a superinduction of new tendencies.

From these and other causes which I could easily suggest, I think it may safely be asserted that the brain is never in the same state exactly at any two given

given moments. Therefore no present affection of it can be exactly similar to any past one. Therefore no present perception can be exactly similar to any past one. A *fortiori* they cannot be identical. But our perceptions, *i. e.* our sensations and ideas, constitute indisputably the whole of our knowledge. Even the hypothetical existences which we assume to account for them, rank themselves among our sensations or ideas. Therefore, we do certainly know that there is no such quality as permanent identity appertaining to any thing whatever of which we have any certain knowledge.

III. I argue from the nature and known properties of the media, through which impressions are conveyed.

These media are universally the nerves; upon whose sentient extremities the impressions are originally made by external objects, and by means of which the motion is propagated up to the brain,
where

where it is perceived. All the observations that have been with respect to the brain, in the preceding argument, will hold true, when applied to the nerves, which perhaps are mere processes of the brain. The propagated motion must necessarily be, such as the substance in which it takes place will admit, *quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis*; if the substance differs in kind, or number, or size of the component particles: or if these differ, with respect to their mechanical, their chemical, or organical^{*} affinities, the motion must vary with these, although these differences may be induced so gradually, that the degree of alteration may be inappreciable.

From the known properties therefore of the nerves, they can never convey to the brain two motions exactly similar,

^{*} The doctrine of stimulus, animal or vegetable, cannot be accounted for on chemical or mechanical principles.

impressed

impressed at different times. Amid ten thousand motions indeed there may be an accidental coincidence of exact similarity, between the motion D impressed a twelvemonth ago, and the present motion X: but such accidental coincidences verge so near to the impossible, that my expressions need not be altered on their account.

The affections of the nerves therefore, will afford the same conclusion as those of the brain.

IV. Such conclusions may also be deduced, from the nature and known properties of external objects, which excite in us sensations and ideas, by means of the impressions they make on the sentient extremities of the nerves, appropriate to our respective senses.

I would observe here, once for all, that, although I mention the existence of an external world as a matter of mere hypothesis,

hypothesis, yet, I take it for granted in theory, as every one does in practice, because, I think upon the whole, it is the most probable hypothesis hitherto assigned, to account for our perceptions.

I am induced to adopt this hypothesis principally on account of the conclusions deducible from the nature and properties of those organs, which anatomy has demonstrated to be necessary to sensation. For although it be indubitably certain that we give the names supposed to designate external objects, to mere motions of the brain and nerves, utterly devoid of shape, figure, colour, weight, &c. yet, unless the existence of some such substance as brain, nerves, &c. be supposed, I do not see how we can come at the preceding conclusion. And if the existence of these be allowed, why not of other external objects? The subject has certainly great difficulties, but

but I cannot assign a more probable hypothesis than the common one. My conclusions however, will rather gain than lose, by an adoption of *Berkeley's* most acute opinion, but I think facts do not sufficiently warrant it.

I proceed therefore to *prove* from the analogy of obvious phenomena, and from the known properties of matter, that strictly and philosophically speaking, there is no body that we are acquainted with, of which identity may be predicated for any ascertainable length of time.

Natural bodies are commonly divided into those of the animal, the vegetable, and the mineral kingdoms, to which, if we add the aqueous and aerial, the division will be sufficiently accurate for the present purpose.

That permanent identity, cannot be asserted concerning animal and vegetable

table substances, is so notorious, that every writer on the subject hath totally rejected the identity of the component particles of animals and vegetables as unmaintainable;^h and have resorted to identity of organization, and identity of life. But as Bishop *Butler*, after *Clarke*, observes, how can the identity of that quality be asserted, whose subject is perpetually changing; for, no individual identical quality can be transferred from one subject to another?

Organization implies particles to be organized; life implies something to live. But every one confesses, that this organized living something, does not remain identically the same, for any given time whatever. Therefore the qualities of organization and life, must of course perish with the sub-

^h Except in the cases of pre-existent germs, and indecomposable stamina, hypotheses hitherto unproved.

stances of which they are asserted ; and be renewed by the addition of similar new ones. Moreover, as to organization, animal or vegetable, it is notorious that it never can remain the same, although we granted the metaphysical absurdity of its existence, while its *subjec-tum inherens* is perpetually perishing. For new organs are either perpetually forming, or old ones decaying, both in animals and vegetables: additions, diminutions, obstructions or alterations are perpetually going forward. But the organization of an animal or vegetable is compounded of its several organs ; and these being perpetually altering, the aggregate cannot remain unaltered.

Again ; as to animal and vegetable life. These must either consist in the sum of the lives of each living particle ; or it must in either case be a new property resulting from the combination of the properties of the component particles ;

cles; but this aggregate is perpetually increasing or diminishing, in consequence of the increase or diminution of the living particles, if such there be, or of the intensity of those properties belonging to them, of which life is the result. If no more be meant by life in these cases, than a certain general idea, applicable to all animals and vegetables, during the exercise of their animal and vegetable functions, and therefore permanent and identical, it is no more than a word, an abstract idea (as it has been the fashion to call such) expressive of a general similarity in a number of particular cases, but no real individual quality or substantial existence. Moreover I think it highly probable, that both in animals and vegetables the life of the living particles, or resulting from the combined properties of the particles, is not communicated to the recently added ones, but results proportionably from them; is a property appertaining to

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them

them in certain situations, and which of course perishes when the particle itself is reabsorbed and excreted. But alterations in the properties and positions of the component particles of an animal or vegetable body, and reabsorptions and excretions of these, are perpetually taking places; life therefore undergoes perpetual renewal until its final termination.

Again; The blood in an animal body is perpetually changing. But physiological facts tend to shew that life is the peculiar result of those particles with their properties, which are conveyed by the blood. That the two great exponents of animal life, sensibility and irritability depend upon the blood, is notorious.

The vascular system of the brain, as well as of each particular nerve, and the changes produced in the nervous system by changes in the properties

perties of the blood¹ evince this, in the former case; and the inability of a muscle to perform its functions when it has not a supply of blood in consequence of the ligature of an artery, or when the red globules are prevented from being carried off by the tying of a vein, is sufficient proof of the latter. Nor is there any necessity for referring to the particular hypothesis of the *life* of the blood. Animal life therefore depending upon that which is continually changing, must itself also undergo continual change. The same kind of reasoning may be applied to the nutritious juices of vegetables.

The preceding observations peculiarly affect animal and vegetable substances; but I apprehend the point they are meant to establish, might be ascertained with sufficient probability by the

¹ This will be true without introducing the humoral pathology, which however, need not perhaps be rejected to the modern fashionable extent.

subsequent considerations to which these substances are likewise obnoxious.

That the mineral kingdom is also subject to perpetual mutation is rendered extremely probable.

1. From the known decomposition of every the most refractory substance during a sufficient course of time, if exposed to the action of the atmosphere under its perpetual variations.

2. From the *evident* formation and decomposition of a variety of earths, stones, salts, lavas, inflammable and mineralized metallic substances, both in the moist and the dry way; none of which being absolutely pure, or the combination of their component parts perfectly complete, have a perpetual tendency to an alteration of their present state: a tendency in all probability perpetually aided, or resisted by the collateral actions and reactions of the surrounding substances.

3. From

3. From the known and evident decompositions of all those mineral substances which enter as component parts of animals and vegetables.

4. From the perpetual action of subterraneous volcanoes which are traced either now existing, or lately extinct; beside those, whose external evidences are of more remote date. Where is the country which does not contain hot springs, mineral and gaseous waters, &c? The briskness also, universally found in fresh spring water, which it loses on exposure to air, is in general not owing to cold, but to the absorption of aerial acid and other gases, during its passage through the earth, and is therefore evidence of the decompositions from whence these were produced.

5. But principally from the perpetual operation of chemical affinities, which must necessarily and *universally* take place, as well as in the preceding

obvious cases, wherever there is heat or moisture. No possible variation of these can ever happen without some corresponding variation of the substances to which they were or are applied, whether upon or within the earth's surface; although the variation may be such as not to admit of an effect immediately perceptible to, or appreciable by our senses. This perpetual and universal, though gradual and frequently imperceptible alteration, which bodies undergo in consequence of the action of chemical agents, may be illustrated from the known facts attending one of them only, viz. the matter of heat.

When two bodies combine by means of chemical affinity, the compound is in many cases so different in almost every particular from its component parts, that the result of such a combination between any two bodies, chemists have termed a *tertium quid*. This difference of properties, more or less evident,

evident, is so universally the result of all chemical combination obvious to the senses, that wherever a chemical combination can be proved to take place, there is as strong a reason as induction can furnish for asserting that the compound is another substance, notwithstanding from the want of perfect saturation, the change may not be obvious to a common observer.—Moreover, if in any given case there is an obvious change of some of the properties, although *every one* shall not have become altered to the degree which is sometimes observed in similar instances, there will yet be sufficient reason for asserting, both a chemical combination and a difference of substance; for nothing can remain the same if any property whatever be changed; nor perhaps can any such change be induced in any case unless in consequence of chemical combination. These two positions may possibly require some illustration.

1. Wherever there is chemical combination there is a corresponding change of properties, whether the full effect of mutual saturation be evident or not.

2. Wherever there is any change of properties, there is foundation for asserting chemical combination. An enumeration of some instances of the known facts of imperfect saturation, saturation, and excess of saturation in chemical combinations will serve to prove the truth of the first proposition: Thus,

a When a solution of pure or caustic alkali, vegetable, mineral, or volatile, by exposure to the atmosphere, to the vapours of charcoal, or the action of the aerial acid disengaged in any other way, imbibes a certain portion of this latter; to a common observer the colour of the solution is not altered, its transparency is not altered, its bulk, its weight, nor even its taste. Yet
every

every chemist knows that the substances are no longer the same; the perfectly pure alkali, and the aerial acid are no more; the solution contains a neutral salt, which will effervesce on adding any other acid, will crystallize on exposure to heat, will effect decompositions which neither of its component parts were capable of producing, and the utmost mechanical division will never more be able to separate the substances thus chemically united; the smallest possible drop of the liquor, or particle of the salt, having properties precisely similar to the rest of the mass, and different from the alkali or the air.

b When into a solution of saline compounds, with a *mineral* alkaline basis, a solution of vegetable alkali is poured, no turbidity is perceptible, and to all outward appearance the liquor is not altered; it remains to a common eye a mixture of the first solution with the latter. But every chemist
is

is indubitably certain from a previous knowledge of the affinities of the component parts of the liquor, that the vegetable alkali has taken the place of the mineral, and that the liquor now contains a solution of a *vegetable* alkaline neutral, and a disengaged mineral alkali, as certainly as if the salts themselves were separated for his inspection.

A similar, but hidden change takes place when into nitrated or muriated earthy neutrals, vitriolic acid is poured, from a sudden redissolution of the substances which would otherwise precipitate. Chemical changes also take place unsuspected by those who are ignorant of chemical facts in all cases of redissolved metallic precipitates, such as those of zinc, copper, nickel, and cobalt by the volatile alkali, of iron by the vegetable alkali; and in the cases where from the quantity of the aqueous fluid, decomposed solutions of siliceous and calcareous earths, still retain these latter suspended.

c In

c In like manner no chemist doubts that a true chemical combination has taken place in tartar, or cream of tartar, notwithstanding the excess of acid which this neutral retains. Its properties and affinities are very different from those of the pure acid. The same may be said of the combinations of an alkali with the acid of sorrel in its common form. In like manner it is certain that a perfect change of properties, and of course of substance, has taken place in the union of vegetable alkali with the arsenical acid, long before such a quantity of the latter is taken up as will allow of perfect crystallization.

d The same observation may be made concerning vitriolated tartar, Glauber's salt, vitriolated ammoniac, nitre, digestive salt, &c. whose properties as compounds do not take place perfectly and fully, unless they be crystallized with a greater degree of acid than they are usually found to contain ;

tain; for otherwise a part of their exposed quantity is always decomposed on the application of certain acids of weaker affinities; and yet no one doubts of an entire change having taken place in the substances employed to form them, even in the usual state of these compounds.

e When mercury and the marine acid are perfectly united and become sublimate, the properties of this substance are very different from those of mercurius dulcis, which consists of the same component parts in kind, but different in quantity. Yet no one doubts but mercurius dulcis is a substance entirely different from the marine acid and the mercury of which it is composed.

Thus too, when a quantity of mercury is exposed to the action of hot nitrous acid, a part of it is at first dissolved with the dephlogistication evinced by the extricated nitrous air :
the

the remainder however is dissolved without the evolution of its phlogiston, for in the latter part of the process the nitrous fumes cease. Hence, when a solution of salt is poured in, the precipitate is not *sublimate* but *calomel*, owing to the supersaturation of the acid with the phlogisticated mercury. Yet to whom but to a chemist would this difference be obvious? And who moreover can deny the difference of the substance contained in the nitrous solution from the component parts of that solution?

f The various phenomena that iron exhibits according to its degree of phlogistication or otherwise, are proofs also, that it is not necessary to a *real* alteration in a given substance, either that the new properties shall be extremely obvious to every common observer, or that these properties shall always be the same in number or intensity. A real chemical combination,
a real

a real mutation of substance, a *tertium quid*, may take place without these.

Iron, according to the quantity of phlogiston with which it is combined, is of different colours, of different specific gravities, and hath different affinities. When a vitriolated solution of iron is dephlogisticated by frequent boiling and cooling, and the ochry precipitate is again taken up by an additional quantity of acid, copper will occasion a precipitate; while this effect is not seen on the addition of copper to a fresh solution of metallic iron made in the common temperature of the atmosphere. According to the degree of dephlogistication of this metal, the colour it gives to glass is different. According to the degree of its phlogistication it is magnetic, metallic, soluble, &c.

In all these instances although no mutual saturation of the component parts of the compound takes place, a
specific

specific difference of properties is observable; the substances (for they are not the same) are evidently different, and yet iron saturated or supersaturated, whether with inflammable or with fixt air ^k for instance, is in common language to a common person, iron; and the calx of iron whatever may be the kinds or proportions of its component parts, or however different its properties in different states, is known even to chemists as yet, by one common appellation of the calx of iron.

g One common denomination also till within these few years was given to the phlogisticated and dephlogisticated acids of vitriol, nitre, and sea salt. Yet later and more accurate experiments evince that they are different substances with different properties and affinities: that phlogisticated vitriolic acid, for

^k *i. e.* Phlogiston or Plumbago: to these might have been added the aqueated calx of this metal.

instance,

instance, is some intermedium between the common white acid and sulphur; and ought no more to be confounded with the former, than with the latter.

b The metallic acids of arsenic, Molybdæna, and Tungsten or Wolfram, afford the same conclusion with greater force than even the instances already cited. But I need not dwell upon these nor upon the Prussian acid, when compared with the Prussian lixiviums, nor upon the metalline charcoals, or case of Borax, or (what has been called) the *acidum perlatum*. Each of these is a prominent instance that a true, a perfect chemical combination; a clear, distinguishable alteration of properties, an indubitably new substance does take place in a compound without mutual saturation, and beyond mutual saturation; although common observation and common diction doth not in all cases notice the phenomena. Conclusions therefore deduced in such cases

cases from common opinions or common language, or even common observations of the facts, will be very far from accuracy.

The second position, that a change of properties, is perhaps in all cases an exponent of chemical combination, the preceding facts with ten thousand others tend to confirm. It is therefore as strongly proved as proof from induction can make it. I say however, "perhaps," because how far a change of properties may be induced by the attractions of magnetism and electricity, may possibly be regarded as a point as yet uncertain. Even if they do so combine with the bodies affected by them as to induce a change of properties, I think I should have no scruple to rank such a combination, such a species of *elective attraction* among the chemical phenomena. This question however I am not inclined to discuss, because my conclusions will not be injured in any degree by either of the alternatives which the question admits.

D

Instances

Instances similar to the preceding might be multiplied exceedingly. To persons much conversant with chemical phenomena, even these are utterly needless. But to those who have not attended to such phenomena, however unintelligible the preceding instances may at first appear, it was necessary to offer them, that the facts upon which a conclusion is grounded, so different from that which people in general deduce, might be fairly stated for farther examination or inquiry.

For the same reason also I shall proceed to state the circumstances which compel the conclusion that heat (*i. e.* the matter of heat) is a chemical agent: premising for this purpose, the prominent characteristics of chemical combination. Whether the attraction of *cohesion* be ultimately the same with *chemical* attraction or affinity, is a question which the present state of our knowledge will not permit us to answer. From reasonings concerning the mutual actions of small particles of matter

matter as such, little probability will be gained, and the well-aimed experiments of *Morveau*, fail in supporting the conclusions they were meant to afford. The present collection of philosophical facts however, appear to furnish some decided proofs of diversity between the attractions of *cohesion* and *composition*.

When bodies are united by virtue of the former attraction, whether they be homogeneous or heterogeneous, the properties of the mass, is the aggregate of the *similar* properties of the parts of it, prior to their aggregation. A lump of gold added to another lump of gold by fusion, when cool will possess properties exactly similar in kind to those which the separate lumps possessed at the same temperature.

In like manner a lump of Bismuth fused with another of Cobalt, which do not unite chemically, but cohere at their contiguous surfaces, will when reduced

to their former temperature, possess the aggregated properties of the Cobalt and the Bismuth.

But when a lump of Copper is united with another of Tin by the attraction of composition (*i. e.* by chemical affinity) the properties of the compound when reduced to the prior temperature of the component parts, are extremely different from those of the parts. If the proportions be three parts of copper to one of tin for instance, the mass is harder, more brittle, more sonorous than either of the constituent metals; the colour is whiter than their intermediate colour, and the specific gravity is greater than the intermediate specific gravity.

Another distinction between bodies mechanically and chemically combined, is that in the former case they can again be separated by mechanical means, or a portion may be separated so exactly similar in size, shape, absolute and specific

cific gravity, colour, &c. to either of the parts previous to their junction, that they shall not be distinguishable. Thus a blow of the hammer will destroy the adhesion of bismuth and cobalt, or zinc and iron; and from the mass of gold a portion may be separated so exactly similar to either of the aggregated lumps that no difference whatever shall be observable to the most curious eye.

But the utmost application of mechanical force, the most extreme division, will never be able to separate the combined portions of copper and tin in such a manner, that any separated part shall not remain like the mass itself, extremely different from either of its component parts.

Another difference yet remains to be noticed between bodies united by the attraction of cohesion, and by chemical affinity. The intensity of the property

in the former case, so far as we know, will depend upon the number of the mutually attracting particles, upon the quantity of surface mutually exposed, and the degree of their contiguity. But these principles will not in the present state of knowledge at least afford any thing like a satisfactory solution of the phenomena of elective attractions; notwithstanding it will be admitted that they have their effect in chemical cases, as well as in those of simple adhesion.

But the *affinities*, the preference of some substances, and the rejection of others, which take place in chemical combinations, to the utter destruction of the attraction of cohesion, constitutes a decided difference between the two.

If then it can be shewn, that the *matter of heat* has these characteristic and other marks of acting upon bodies as a chemical agent; if its action cannot be reconciled with the attraction of cohesion,

cohesion, or the phenomena of the other attractions; if an alteration of properties can in all cases be shewn wherever it combines with other bodies, proportioned to the degree, and analogous to the other chemical phenomena of imperfect saturation, it will be no objection that the degree, or the change in any given case, may be intended or remitted, or that the asserted alteration is not evident at first view, to that gross and inaccurate degree of observation, which is nevertheless sufficient for the common purposes of human life.

The following considerations will shew, that such effects are to be ascribed to the agency of the *matter of heat*.

1. Heat enters as a component part into every body in nature with which we are acquainted, and upon which experiments have been made. It is almost unnecessary to say, I do not

mean that every body in nature may be heated, but that the matter of heat itself is a component part of substances at a time when they do not exhibit a degree of heat to our bodies, or a thermometer beyond the temperature of the atmosphere. The late discoveries on the subject of *latent*, *absolute*, or *specific* heat, set this point beyond the reach of controversy to those who are acquainted with the important labours of *Black*, *Wilcke*, *Crawford*, *Kirwan*, *Lavoisier*, &c. Nor indeed can any one entertain a doubt of this general fact, whether conversant with chemical phenomena or not, who considers that the sole difference between the three very different substances, ice, water, and vapour, is solely owing to the quantity of heat that enters into their composition as a constituent part, without being sensible to the thermometer. Thus when the mercury in Fahrenheit's thermometer stands at 32, applied to ice; when
water

water just going to freeze exhibits the same temperature; and when the water contained in the state of vapour in the atmosphere, raises the mercury to the same degree, there is the same sensible or apparent heat, although it is well known that the water has a degree of heat greater than the ice, equal to that of which 130 degrees of the thermometer is the exponent, and that the vapour of the atmosphere¹ possesses prodigiously more.

The substance termed *fixed air*, in its concrete state, when combined with lime, &c. is of considerable specific gravity, perhaps heavier than any metal but pure Platina, yet when combined with the matter of heat in the form of *aerial acid*, it is a substance utterly different in almost every property, from that which entered as a component

¹ To say nothing of that other species of comparatively incondensable vapour, noticed by Dr. Priestley, and M. de Saussure.

part of lime stone. What can be more different than the airs termed fixed and inflammable air, from such bodies as the following; black lead, charcoal, the diamond, the vegetable acids, nitrated ammoniac, Prussian acid, &c? And yet in some the sole, in all, the principal difference ascertainable is the quantity of heat which enters into, and is permanently retained as a part of their composition never to be separated in the one, or combined with the other, unless by means of chemical elective attractions.

Whoever considers these facts, and the experiments with their results of the authors before mentioned, or the experiments of Dr. *Priestley*, on the seeming conversion of water into air, or those of that excellent philosopher Mr. *Kirwan*, on the relative specific heat of the mineral acids, and his observations on the necessity of considering the elective attractions of the matter

matter of heat in all chemical combinations, will be fully satisfied from these and the other phenomena of this section, not only that there is such a substance as the *matter of heat*, but that this substance is a chemical component of the bodies which it enters, whether in the states of saturation or supersaturation.^m

2. But this point will be still farther removed from the reach of doubt, when it is considered that the matter of heat does not enter bodies in any quantity relative either to the ratios of their bulk, or their density, as *Boerhaave* supposed, but that, like all other chemical agents, it has *affinities*, not guided by any law deducible from these ratios, or any other hitherto ascertained. To be convinced of this, the reader has only to look at the tables of *Wilcke* which *Bergman* gives, or at his column

^m I fancy it is not ascertained whether any body can contain *less than its natural quantity* of specific heat.

of the affinities of the matter of heat among his tables ; or the experiments of Dr. *Crawford*, or those of Mr. *Kirwan*, which Mr. *Magellon* has inserted in his perspicuous exposition of *Crawford's* theory, not to mention the as yet uncertain experiments of *Lavoisier* and his coadjutors. To the same purpose are all the instances, where on the mixing of heterogenous bodies of different temperatures, the mean temperature by calculation is different from that which the experiment affords ; and all the cases of the alteration of temperature in chemical analyses.

3. Decompositions and combinations take place with the application of heat which would not take place without. Precisely similar to every other instance of double elective attractions which effect what the application of a single substance is not able to accomplish. The decompositions and combinations
also

also which take place in the dry way, are something different from those which the same substances exhibit in the moist way. An evident proof like the rest, of an alteration produced in the quiescent and divellent affinities by the internal combination or external application of the matter of heat. To this head may be referred, the formation of fixed air by dephlogisticated and inflammable airs, the composition of water from the same substances, the formation of nitrous acid in Mr. *Cavendish's* most important experiment, &c. none of which are effected (artificially at least) without the application of heat. To this head also may be referred the difference between mercurial *Æthiops* and *Cinnabar*, metals and their calces, Lime and Lime Stone, &c.

4. The matter of heat, like all other chemical solvents, destroys or diminishes the other attractions, that of cohesion
in

in particular ; to which also may be added, that of gravitation. This is so evident with respect to cohesion, and the universal fluidity induced by a sufficient degree of heat that it requires no illustration. That it diminishes the electrical and magnetic attractions, and when sufficiently accumulated, destroys them, is also well known. And notwithstanding the apparent novelty of the fact, and its diversity from the previous theory, I think the experiments made by Dr. *Fordyce* and Dr. *Crawford* (especially considering the well known accuracy of the latter) on the *absolute* weights of ice, water, and heated gold, perfectly evince that the attraction of gravitation is lessened by the accumulation of heat in the bodies tried. Neither does it appear to me, considering the universally known fact, that all the other attractions are affected by the matter of heat, that the result of this experiment was any other than what might very reasonably be expected
à priori.

à priori. The innumerable cases of agreement in the mode of action between all the other chemical agents and the matter of heat, which this section comprehends, still farther corroborate (if such farther corroboration be necessary) the propriety of ranking the latter among the former.

5. The matter of heat moreover, when combined with any body, is like all other chemical agents, incapable of being separated by mechanical means, although always separable by the application of proper chemical precipitants. It is true, the matter of heat may be *accumulated* in any body by percussion or friction, which are mechanical methods; but these methods are only among the mechanical means of promoting chemical union. Exactly analogous to the necessity of triture for instance to promote a chemical combination, which would otherwise not take place without it; thus when mercury

cury and corrosive sublimate are ground together to form calomel, or when the most accurate mechanical mixture is found necessary to make gun-powder, the chemical combinations of the substances take place only in conformity to the general laws of chemical affinity, although the mechanical means are necessary to bring the particles sufficiently near for the chemical affinities to take place, or to make the properties of the compound produce their full effect. The analogy therefore between the matter of heat and other chemical agents, is in this particular also sufficiently striking.

6. But another and still stronger proof of this mode of agency in the matter of heat, and which comprises the substance of all that is necessary upon this subject, to my conclusion, is, that it alters the properties of all bodies to which it is applied, and forms with them a new compound.

Not

Not to dwell upon the particular instances which might be adduced, enough of which have been enumerated in the first of these sections, I shall mention the properties of bodies which seem more particularly to constitute their identity.

a The *absolute weight* of all bodies is altered in proportion to the quantity of the matter of heat which they possess. I appeal to the experiments of Dr. *Fordyce* and Dr. *Crawford* above-mentioned, which prove that this diminution of absolute gravity is appreciable at a certain degree of heat applied. Neither is it of any moment that in some cases heat is sensible, and in others latent, for we know not of any essential difference between this substance in these two states, and they are conformable to the other analogies of chemical saturation and supersaturation, and it will be seen that my deductions apply to sensible heat in particular.

particular. The facts however lead one to conclude that the alteration is proportionate to the quantity of heat combined with the body, whether that body be saturated or supersaturated therewith. Hence also, the lowest quantity of heat will occasion an alteration in the properties of the bodies which contain it or (an expression equally proper) which it contains. Hence also it is of no consequence whether the degree be appreciable or not. This reasoning will apply to the other cases now to be adduced.

b The matter of heat alters the *specific* gravity of bodies. I appeal to all the more gross and obvious facts of volatilization, and to all the more accurate late experiments on the specific gravities of bodies; to Mr. *Kirwan's* paper on this subject in particular. Here is another decisive instance of the totally inaccuracy of vulgar observation and common language. How lately

lately has it been suspected that the thermometer and barometer were necessary to determine the specific weights of substances; and who but a philosopher would have conjectured that a cubic foot of water would weigh more by 485,3 grains in one part of a room than another; for there is frequently the difference of twenty degrees in the same room?

c The matter of heat alters the *extension* of bodies. This fact is notorious from all the experiments with the pyrometer. And the variations in clay, gold, bismuth, iron, &c. (at certain degrees) from other substances in this particular, only serves to shew, that heat does not act uniformly, according to any mechanical ratio.

d It increases or diminishes the *solidity* of bodies rendering fixt substances fluid. This fact also is too obvious for the necessity of induction.

e It alters the *colour* of bodies; if not universally, in so many notorious instances, that this effect cannot be denied, and the variations (*i. e.* the elective attractions) in its operation again furnish an instance of its chemical analogy.

f The *form or shape* of bodies is altered by heat; this is obvious in high degrees from the alteration of their solidity, and in low ones, from that of their extension, and therefore needs no particular proof.

Hence then it appears, that the matter of heat is potent over every property which bodies possess; that whether the degree of change be appreciable by common observers, or whether it affect common language or not, such change in some way or other does actually take place in every degree of heat, wherever we have the means of trying whether it doth so or not, and therefore

therefore we have reason to conclude, that in every case whatever, such change does take place whenever a similar cause operates, whether appreciable by us or not.

Hence therefore it may be concluded universally that the matter of heat does not intercede the pores of a body, or adhere to the particles of it atmospherically, but acts as a *chemical* agent: that like all other chemical agents it alters the properties of the substances with which it combines, forming new ones; and this whatever may be the degree of its presence. But as every thing must be defined by an enumeration of its properties; as we know nothing of any substance in nature, but the properties of that substance; as no collection of properties can remain the same if any one of them be altered, whatever may be the degree; no substance can remain the same, if it be perpetually exposed to the action of the

matter of heat ; every substance in nature with which we are acquainted, is perpetually exposed to the action of the matter of heat ; for the temperature of the air, the earth, the water, and all that is within and upon these substances is perpetually and momentarily varying. The quantity of the matter of heat let loose or fixed is perpetually changing ; increasing or diminishing in quantity in every place ; an increase and diminution which the common law by which all bodies have a tendency to equal temperature, makes them common partakers of.

Without therefore considering any of the other chemical agents, or the obvious facts respecting the aqueous and aerial kingdoms : without dwelling upon the perpetual active powers of attraction and repulsion generally considered ; upon the *nifus* to change, the incessant reaction of every particle in nature ; or upon the particular attractions

tions of electricity and magnetism, their extensive influence and constant variation, I conclude, that whatever may become of common opinions or common language, no substance in nature can strictly and philosophically be asserted to remain for one moment identical.

The only objection that occurs to me upon this disquisition, is a doubt that some may perhaps entertain whether sensible heat, and latent heat be agents of the same species, whether they both act chemically. The facts and reasonings however before alleged, together with the farther arguments that the theory of *causticity* will suggest to every chemist, appear to me to leave very little doubt respecting the chemical agency of sensible heat. To reply at large to this, or to other trivial objections that might possibly be invented against the opinion I have thus advanced, will, I think, be unnecessary

necessary to those who can enter into the spirit of the preceding reasoning; and will at any rate be an extension of this subject incongruous with the rest of this tractate. Neither indeed am I very solicitous about adding the physical to the metaphysical proof of my general proposition, because I apprehend the latter is of itself sufficient to establish the opinion I adopt.

The corollaries evidently deducible however from the preceding disquisition, are,

That in all cases of external objects, as well as of sensation and ideas, identity is constantly inferred from similarity.

That the degree of similarity so far from approaching to perfect, is in very many cases extremely gross, and incomplete.

Also, that from the perpetual variations of the atmosphere, with respect
to

to its density, component parts, temperature, &c. as well as of other external objects, no two sensations occasioned at different times by two objects, supposed to be one and the same, can be exactly similar.

V. The non-existence of identity may also be inferred from the analogy of those cases, wherein identity, universally predicated may be proved not to exist.

The identity of animals and vegetables is universally predicated, and some few metaphysicians excepted, universally predicated of the *substance* of them. That this is so I again repeat, notwithstanding the opinion is so evidently a mistaken one. But the mutation of the substance is so gradual, and so much of similarity still remains in both cases, that the common people never have occasion to observe the impropriety of their language. Nor indeed

deed can any one seriously believe that the bulk of mankind, who notoriously never search deeply into any point but where their own immediate interest is concerned, should think of calling any thing the same, but the visible, tangible object. Metaphysical difficulties never occur to them, and if such do occur, the person has more important objects to attend to, and too little of abstruse knowledge, to induce or enable him to investigate the subject.

Here then notoriously, identity is almost universally asserted concerning substances, of which there is every reason that the case will admit, for concluding a perpetual mutation.

But in these cases, are they right, who assert identity not upon superficial and vulgar grounds, but upon accurate observation and deliberate inquiry? Can it not be asserted of pre-existent

pre-existent germs, or immutable stamina, in either animals or vegetables? No: for neither the one nor the other have ever been seen; their existence is supposed for the purposes of hypothesis, to avoid metaphysical difficulties occasioned by the stubbornness of fact.

Can it be predicated of animal or vegetable organization? No: for the organization is perpetually varying. Of animal or vegetable life? No: for these also suffer perpetual alteration, and perpetual renewal.

It appears therefore that the vulgar and the wise, though disagreeing in particulars, agree in a general imposition upon themselves and others, in the fancied identity of animals and vegetables. If they deceive each other, and their neighbours, in cases so apparently obvious, is it impossible they should fail
to

to bring forth truth from the more hidden recesses of *personal* identity?

But if the preceding chemical disquisition be (almost in any part) true, there is the same deception, in mineral, in aqueous and aerial substances as in animals and vegetables. Where can error be so perfectly concealed that human ingenuity shall not discover and adopt her?

I forbear to enumerate with tedious repetition the very many instances already adduced to this effect, or to swell unnecessarily the long catalogue with a fresh addition. Until some stronger objection be urged to my chemical sentiments than their novelty, I may fairly consider them as reasonably substantiated. In the plain facts therefore of external objects devoid of animal or vegetable animation, the same unsuspected mistake is perpetually made,

made, and therefore *may* be *universally* made.

But it actually is universally made; so far as our knowledge has the quality of certainty annexed to it. Are not two perceptions (whether sensations or ideas) in every case of asserted identity universally termed one and the same? And are we not therefore under a mental mistake exactly similar in kind to our corporeal one? That we are so, is in my opinion a proposition nearly as indubitable as the most evident of axioms; and if we mistake so grossly in ascertained, why may we not in hypothetical existences?

VI. I deduce the probable non-existence of identity from the insufficiency of every hypothesis hitherto advanced to prove wherein it consists.

The notions respecting animal and vegetable identity have already been sufficiently

sufficiently discussed. It has been (as I conceive) sufficiently proved, that it doth not, and cannot consist in sameness of particles, of organization, or of life. Until therefore some metaphysician, of more ingenuity than his predecessors, shall bring up to their assistance some hitherto unadvanced opinion, the identity of these substances must, if I be right, accompany the shades of defunct hypotheses. Nor shall I be less warranted in forming the same conclusion respecting the identity of other external objects, appertaining to the mineral, the aqueous, and the aerial regions. For the reasons I have advanced appear to me sufficient to establish the position they were meant to support, in direct opposition to the asserted identity of these existences.

But will not *Locke's* acute distinction between the identity of the *man* and of the *person* hold good? and may not the

the latter at least be adopted, whatever may become of the former? I think not: neither do I conceive that any other of the opinions on the subject of *personal identity*, will maintain its ground with those who will just recollect the hypotheses advanced, and the prominent objections to them.

1. *Consciousness*. But no identical quality can be transferred from one subject to another. This objection of *Clarke* and *Butler* I regard as irrefragable.

2. *Permanent Stamina*. We have no proof of their existence; it is possible; it is perhaps more than possible, because it is a tolerable solution of many difficulties. But it still remains a mere conjecture, without fact to support it. *A posse ad esse non valet consequentia*.

Pre-existent Germs. These obscure beings which have been introduced into
the

the world of conjecture of late, chiefly by the obstetric pen of *M. Bonnet*, whether they be considered as in the human species, inclosed within the narrow sphere of each other's periphery, like (with reverence be it spoke) an unopened nest of boxes " in a turner's shop ; or distributed in various parts of the animal, as in the polypus or the earth worm, in the present state of our knowledge concerning them, have a very dubious claim to real existence. But granting this, they will become no prop to the falling system of identity under any aspect of it ; for the new properties at first induced by the stimulus of the male secretion on the irritable embryo, and the subsequent perpetual increase and change of properties, will render its future identity still more hypothetical than its present existence. Neither is it possible to avoid the conclusions deducible

^a L'Emboitement.

from

from actual phenomena, respecting the perpetual alteration these germs (the outer one especially) must undergo while cooped up within the mutable mansion which *Bonnet* has allotted them. I leave this hypothesis then to its fate, till the labours of some future *Lewenboeck*, *Bonnet*, or *Spallanzani* shall give it a more hostile appearance.

4. *The Soul*. When the reality of this prestigious being shall be ascertained, it will then be time enough to urge again the objections which *Locke* had adduced against this hypothesis, and the other arguments to the same purpose, which, in a preceding part of this tract, I have subjoined to the difficulties *Locke* has charged upon it. The list will be presently increased.

5. The identity of the *Body*, I trust, is so thoroughly untenable, that we need not insult the vanquished.

F f

6. *Collins's*

6. *Collins's successive Consciousness.*

I object to this, that it is a contradiction in terms ; if identity consist in a quality, or a substance (chuse ye whether) which is perpetually and momentarily changing ; then does identity consist in that which undergoes perpetual diversity. I rather wonder that *Collins* did not, as I have done, reject identity altogether.

Where then shall we seek for this fleeting quality ? Not within " the visible diurnal sphere," nor even in the ideas of those who perpetually cheat themselves with the expression. In the present state, therefore, of our knowledge, I deem myself justified in concluding its non-entity.

VII. The same conclusion is rendered probable from the difficulty of accounting for known phenomena, which are sufficiently explicable without it.

The

The hypotheses on the subject of identity, admit of two general divisions; they appertain either to the identity of the soul, or to the identity of some essential part of the body: but I think neither of these will serve to explain several acknowledged facts.

I shall take for granted, that nothing can remain the same while any part of its properties are altered; and if so, I think it will follow, that in no period of its known existence can the *soul* remain the same: for it is notorious that there is a gradual formation, and a gradual change of all those habits, dispositions and passions, which are usually referred to the soul, as properties or qualities thereof. All those properties also, usually termed faculties of the soul, judgment, memory, volition, &c. are perpetually altering in the degree of their intensity, improving or deteriorating; each of them are

liable, not only to perpetual mutation, but to gradual decay, and perfect abolition, even during the life of the possessor. Let any one consider the mental properties (if any there be saving perception) in a new-born infant, and trace their increase to their perfection in middle life, and their gradual decay during old age. Let any one consider the difference of these, produced perpetually by more or less food, by more or less sleep, by more or less of heat or cold, by use or non-use, &c. Let any one consider the changes induced in these properties of the soul, by the occurrence of external circumstances, which in very many cases totally alter the dispositions and passions of a man, and his whole character: let all these things be considered, and then let the moment be ascertained wherein the soul (if it exist) retains precisely the same properties as it did the moment before.

Neither

Neither can these phenomena consist with identity of body. For not to dwell upon the *conjectural existence* of any unchanged particle of the body, as all the facts just stated, are facts (*ex hypothesi*) respecting the properties of the body, they shew a perpetual mutation of these corporeal properties ; *i. e.* a perpetual corporeal mutation. If it be said that there is a granted mutation of non-essential parts, I reply, that the properties of the body of which we are speaking, are essential properties : they do not appertain so much to the finger or the toe, to the hair or the nails, as to the man : and therefore exhibit a change of the essential parts of the man.

Now, upon the hypothesis of the existence of the body solely, and the gradual, but successive change of the component particles of the body, all these facts are easily explicable ; and

when it is farther considered that, such change doth actually take place in every part of the body, which admits of our ascertaining, either by experiment or reasoning, whether it doth so or not, why should an opinion thus founded upon known facts, and thus furnishing an easy solution of apparent difficulties, be refused admittance?

VIII. Several difficulties arise from the scripture account of the resurrection, on the supposition of the existence of personal identity, which are sufficiently explicable on the hypothesis of its non-existence.

If the resurrection spoken of in the scripture, be *a resurrection from the dead*, it cannot be a resurrection of that which cannot die, viz. of an incorruptible, immortal soul. Moreover, if the scripture expressions relate only to the resurrection of the body, and not of the soul, then the resurrection

tion of the latter is out of the question, so far as scripture is concerned, whatever may become of its existence.

But the resurrection of the same body involves difficulties utterly insuperable ;

And it is also positively contradicted by scripture.

The resurrection spoken of in scripture is a resurrection *from the dead*, as the following passages sufficiently prove.

Job xix. 26. And though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh shall I see God.

Matt. xxii. 31. But, as touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God, saying, I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? God is not the God of the dead, but of the living.

Hereby giving the Saducees, who denied the resurrection to know, in the common language of prophecy, that the event was as actually certain, as if it had already taken place. The parallel passages are hereafter quoted.

Matt. xxvii. 52. And the graves were opened, and many bodies of saints which *slept*, arose, and came out of the graves after his resurrection, and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many.

That death and sleep, are in scripture language very frequently synonymous, as in this case, every one knows.

Mark xii. 25. For when they shall rise from the dead, they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels which are in heaven. And as touching the dead that they rise, have ye not heard, &c.

Mark

Mark ix. 9. And as they came down from the mountain he charged them that they should tell no man what things they had seen, until the Son of man were risen from the dead, and they kept that saying to themselves, questioning one with another what the rising from the dead should mean.

Luke xx. 35. But they which shall be accounted worthy to receive that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage. Neither can they die any more, for they are equal unto the angels, and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection. Now, that the dead are raised, even Moses shewed at the bush, when he calleth the Lord, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living, for all live unto him.

This

This last expression confirms the interpretation before given of the parallel passage in Matthew.

John v. 28. Marvel not at this, for the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth, &c.

The raising of Lazarus in John xi. is a type of the general resurrection, but the raising of Lazarus was a raising of him from the dead. "Then said Jesus plainly unto them, Lazarus is dead." Ver. 14.

Such also was the resurrection of Christ, which is every where spoken of as a resurrection from the dead. Nor in any of these places is any hint given that something immaterial, some part of a man which does not suffer death, and has therefore no occasion to be raised from the dead, still lives. Neither can I see how any one can seriously think

think that the doctrine of an immaterial, immortal soul is any where clearly inculcated in the scriptures, who has remarked the very loose and various significations annexed to the terms soul and spirit in the bible, and who recollects that our Lord and his disciples had they entertained such a notion, could not have failed to apply it in their discourses to the Jews, so large a party of whom were Sadduces, denying any resurrection. But it is manifest, that no argument against the Sadducees is drawn throughout the whole of the scripture, from any doctrine similar to the modern one concerning the soul, notwithstanding the perpetual use made of this doctrine to prove a future existence by the modern maintainers of it, so much wiser than Christ and his apostles. I appeal to any supporter of this opinion, whether in a controversy with a Sadducee, he would not think it of extreme importance to urge the conclusions, which
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are deducible from this hypothesis of an immaterial, immortal spirit? How happens it, that previous to his resurrection, Christ did not urge these topics, and subsequent thereto, his disciples neglected them?^a

The doctrine of personal identity however, so far as it leans on the rotten prop of the immaterial hypothesis, is not only unfounded in scripture for the reasons just given, but for those also, which are deducible from the passages, wherein the resurrection is asserted, not only to be a resurrection from the dead, but a resurrection of the *body*.

Rom. viii. 23. Even we ourselves groan within ourselves waiting for the

° The passage. "Fear not them that can kill the body," &c. the strongest which the scripture affords to the Psychists, means *fear not them who can destroy life here only, but him who can destroy it both here and hereafter*; the non-resurrection of the wicked is certainly alluded to in scripture.

adoption

adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body.

2 Cor. iv. 10. Always bearing about in the body the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in our body. For we which live are always delivered unto death for Jesus' sake, that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in our mortal flesh.

***** Knowing that he which raised up the Lord Jesus shall raise up us also by Jesus, and shall present us with you.

1 John iv. 2. Hereby know ye the spirit of God. Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God; and this is that spirit of Antichrist, whereof you have heard that it should come, and even now already is it in the world.

2 John 7. For many deceivers are entered into the world, who confess
not

not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh. This is a deceiver and an Antichrist.

This resurrection however of the dead body, will not be a resurrection of the same, the identical body which died.

1 Cor. xv. pass. For I delivered unto you first of all that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures: that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day according to the scriptures. **** Now if Christ be preached that he rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen. And if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain. Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God, because we have testified of God that he

he raised up Christ, whom he raised not up, if so be the dead rise not. For if the dead rise not, then is Christ not raised. And if Christ be not raised, then is your faith vain; ye are yet in your sins. Then they also which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished. If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable. But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first fruits of them that slept. For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive. **** Else what shall they do which are baptized for the dead, if the dead rise not at all? Why are they then baptized for the dead? And why stand we in jeopardy every hour? I protest by your rejoicing, which I have in Christ Jesus our Lord, I die daily. If after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantage it me, if the dead rise not? Let us

us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.

**** But some man will say, how are the dead raised up? And with what body do they come? Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die. And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body which shall be, but bear grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain. But God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body. All flesh is not the same flesh, but there is one kind of flesh of men, another of beasts, another of fishes, and another of birds. There are also celestial bodies, and bodies terrestrial; but the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial is another. There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars, for one star differeth from another star in glory. So also is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption: it
is

is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory: it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power, it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body.

**** And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall bear the image of the heavenly. Now this I say brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither can corruption inherit incorruption. Behold I shew you a mystery, we shall not all sleep; (*i. e.* die) but we shall all be changed: in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump (for the trumpet shall sound) and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed. For this corruptible shall put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality. So when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, death is swallowed up in victory.

As this chapter is an express dissertation upon the subject, apparently written in answer to objections which had been personally urged to St. Paul against the doctrine of a resurrection as he preached it, I have thought it worth while to quote thus fully.

Phil. iii. 21. Who shall change our vile body that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby he is able to subdue all things unto himself.

Neither indeed is it all likely that we can be raised with the identical body, of which we were constituted at the time of our death :

For 1. As has been before observed, how can a diseased carcase, unable to support the properties of life, thought, action, &c. be fit for the purposes of another state? a state, where in all probability so much more of exertion and activity,

activity, will be required, and be necessary?

2. Neither can we properly be raised with any of those bodies which we possessed at any of the periods of our existence prior to our decease: for it is a known fact, that our tempers, dispositions, habits, depend upon our good or ill state of health, our corporeal qualities in general, &c. and I think little doubt will remain to any person who will pay attention to the subject, that the illnesses of a death-bed, as well as those and other supposed misfortunes of former parts of our life, are the necessary results of the properties of ourselves, ordained so to be, for the express purpose of eradicating the evil propensities, bodily or mental, which occasioned them; so that a person at the moment of his death, is (morally speaking as well as corporeally) very different from what he was at any former period of his terrestrial existence. 3. We do not cer-

tainly know of any part of the body which is not corruptible; as to the conjectures concerning the existence of certain incorruptible, corporeal atoms we have sufficiently discussed them already; neither would they serve the purpose granting they were so; for the corporeal particles celestial or terrestrial, which must at the resurrection be joined with them, cannot unite with any combination, similar to a chemical one, or they will become new substances; and I confess I am not acquainted with any part of the human frame which hath not chemical affinities; all the parts which I have seen or heard of, certainly have. 4. In like manner all the parts of the human frame, of which we can with certainty predicate any thing, are capable of corruption. 5. Of the many bodies we possess during life, which can, even with the slightest degree of plausibility, be adopted for the resurrection? 6. As changes will in
all

all probability be induced in the state of the earth at the resurrection, if we are to remain, upon earth, or, as the other place of our future existence, wherever it be, will in all probability be different from the earth in its known present state, and as our bodies and their properties are adapted to a residence upon the earth in its present state, in all probability likewise such changes will be induced, as are befitting the future place and state of our existence. But whatever is changed, however it be changed, or in whatever degree, cannot be said to remain the same, and therefore at the resurrection, in all probability, we shall not (accurately speaking) rise the same persons, that at any former time we were.

These difficulties however, insuperable as they appear to me, on the supposition of identity, are very conformable to the opinion of its non-existence,

and in fact lead directly to this conclusion. This is so obvious, that I shall not extend this argument farther, in its explanation.

The doctrine of personal identity then, not only receives no countenance from scripture, but it is directly contrary thereto; and so far as that doctrine is of importance in the general question, so far is my hypothesis on this question countenanced by the sacred writings.

IX. From the non-necessity of identity toward future existence.

If all the phenomena which the supporters of the hypothesis of actual identity, shall deem necessary at the resurrection, can be proved possible without the aid of that hypothesis, then is the opinion of actual and permanent identity unnecessary toward the supposition of future existence. But such phenomena

phenomena can easily be accounted for, and may well arise, without introducing the doctrine in question as a *finè qua non* to their existence.

Let any particles of matter be taken, exactly similar in number, in kind, in situation, in properties, with those which composed the man at the instant of his decease; let the same tendencies to motion, simple or compounded, and of course, (with respect to the brain,) the same tendencies to association belong to the particles thus newly put together; let the same ideas be excited with which the man departed from the present life, then will the same degree, the same kind of knowledge, the same habits, passions and dispositions, the same reminiscence appertain to the being thus formed, as the pre-existent being enjoyed before. The same motives to do well or ill will be applicable; their effect will be the same,

the propriety of inflicting^p them will be precisely the same, and the degree of good to the system exactly in the one case, as it would be in the other.

If it be objected, that the man at the resurrection will, upon this system, be not the same with, but merely similar to the former; I reply, that similarity is all that a reasonable being, deciding according to evidence, can actually predicate in any case of the existence of a living human creature, at any two moments of that existence. Nay, that upon this hypothesis a provision is left for a far greater degree of similarity, than any evidence can be produced to establish, during any portion whatever, of the living existence of such a being.

In fact, all the dissimilarity that will exist upon this hypothesis, is the diversity of the component particles. But

^p The truth of the doctrine of universal restitution I take for granted.

we never conceive this to be of the least consequence during our life, nor do we ever suppose that where the particles of which our bodies are to be composed are similar, that identity is of the least consequence.

The particles of which my body is composed, so far as the phenomena extend, are those which were obtained from the nutriment I have used. Of the two fowls upon the dish, is it of any consequence which of them I apply to this purpose? And yet the phenomena will be the same whichever of them I feed on, though the particles that produce these phenomena will be similar indeed, but substantially different. Nor will the greatest philosopher that the human race has produced, be able to distinguish which of the animals, in this case, has been applied to the nutriment of my body. A difference may indeed arise from some inobvious circumstances of dissimilarity in the
two

two fowls, but a difference to us, utterly inappreciable.

Identity then, is not necessary to the phenomena of future existence, even though no change is to be produced in us by divine appointment; and that change renders it impossible.

X. Objections answered.

The objections drawn from the proofs of the existence of a *soul*, of indestructible *stamina*, and of pre-existent *germs* have already been sufficiently discussed.

In the present state of our knowledge I regard them all as *non-entities*, from considerations which I have advanced in this tract, and in that on *Materialism*.

The objection from the consciousness also which we are supposed to have of our identity, being precisely of the
same

same nature with that which we are supposed to have of a soul, need not be particularly discussed. Bishop *Butler's* mode of stating this argument I have already given, but as the passage is short, it may not be amiss to state it again. "This notion is absolutely
 "contradictory to that certain con-
 "viction, which necessarily and every
 "moment rises within us when we
 "turn our thoughts upon ourselves,
 "when we reflect on what is past,
 "and look forward to what is to come.
 "All imagination of a daily change of
 "that living agent, which each man
 "calls himself, for another, or of any
 "such change throughout our whole
 "present life, is entirely borne down
 "by our natural sense of things."

I refer for a general answer to this, to my observations on consciousness, at the latter end of my tract on *Materialism*. I have only to add in reply to this passage in particular,

1. That

1. That if all imagination of a daily change in us be borne down by our natural sense of things, then does our natural sense of things positively contradict known fact; for a daily, a momentaneous change in us (*i. e.* our bodies, for the existence of a soul I regard as unfounded) does actually take place.

2. Other known and ascertained facts, are frequently borne down by our natural sense of things. For how many thousand years before the days of *Copernicus*, was the motion of the earth round the sun entirely borne down by our natural sense of things, which made us give full credit to the motion of the sun round the earth? Do not the generality of mankind believe upon the evidence of their natural sense of things, that every part of their body remains exactly the same to day, as it was yesterday? It is only from experiment and much reflection, that the
contrary

contrary truth is established in the minds of those who have attended to physiological inquiries.

“ When I view this book,” says Dr. Reid,¹ “ at the distance of one foot, “ or of ten feet, it seems to be about “ seven inches long, five broad, and one “ thick. I can judge of these dimensions very nearly by the eye, and I “ judge them to be the same at both “ distances. But yet it is certain, that “ at the distance of one foot, its visible “ length and breadth is about ten times “ as great as at the distance of ten feet, “ and consequently, its surface is about “ a hundred times as great. This great “ change of apparent magnitude is altogether overlooked, and every man “ is apt to imagine that it appears to “ the eye, of the same size at both “ distances.”

I forbear to quote the rest of the doctor's examples, or his paradoxes on

¹ Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense. Dub. edit. p. 109.

the *Geometry of Vifibles*, it appears fufficiently from thefe instances, that bifhop *Butler*'s natural fenfe of things, Dr. *Reid*'s common fenfe, and Dr. *Price*'s confcioufnefs, require to be corrected by fuperior evidence.

Bifhop *Butler*'s other objection to *Collins* (viz. that on the fuppoftion of perfonal identity confifting in confcioufnefs, which confcioufnefs confift in feparate and fucceffive acts of confcioufnefs, the man of to-day need take no care about the man of to-morrow) will hold againft my opinion alfo.

I reply to it, 1. That as the man of to-morrow, though not in all points the fame with, yet depends for his exiftence upon the man of to-day, there is fufficient reafon to care about him.

2. That the man of to-morrow poffeffing a reminifcence of the actions of the man of to-day, and knowing that thofe actions will be referred to him, both by himfelf and others, they cannot

not be indifferent to the man of to-day, who looks forward to the properties of the man of to-morrow.

3. The approximation to identity, *i.e.* the high degree of similitude between the two men, is sufficient to make the one care about the other: and in fact they do so.

4. That a good man knowing that a future being, whose existence depends upon his, will therefore be punished or rewarded as the actions of the present man (whose habits and associations will be propagated) deserve, will have a sufficient motive to do right and abstain from wrong.

5. That the man of a twelvemonth hence, or some more indefinitely long period, depending for his existence and properties on the man of to-day, is nearer to the latter considerably, with respect to the interest the latter has in him, than

H h the

the children of this man of to-day, and yet the children of a person, though at the utmost only half his, furnish very strong motives to care and anxiety concerning them, and a guard upon a man's present conduct, in consideration of the effect it will have upon their future happiness.

Such are the objections that occur to me upon this subject; objections which having considered more attentively, since I finished the tract on *Materialism*, I do not think are able to overturn the evidence for the opinion which I there hinted at, and have here advanced. An opinion, which however abhorrent from common belief, is not on that account to be rejected; for otherwise the standard of intellect among the vulgar, must be the standard of truth to the philosopher. Until therefore some arguments be advanced in support of permanent Identity, more valid than those I have met with, I must be content to retain my own hypothesis.

A SUMMARY

S U M M A R Y
O F
UNITARIAN ARGUMENTS.

MANY of the apparent contradictions involved in the Trinitarian hypothesis, have been alluded to at various times in theological writings, but I do not remember to have met with a regular deduction of all, or even of the greatest part of them. Some years ago, when this controversy engaged my attention, I was induced to attempt something of this kind for my own satisfaction: what follows is the result. While the tenets them-

selves continue the established doctrine of the national church, every attempt to demonstrate their absurdity, cannot but be seasonable.

For the purpose of proving the Trinitarian explanations of the scripture erroneous; the Unitarians insist, that the scripture cannot possibly hold forth, as true, and as the object of faith, any doctrine whatever which can be proved to imply contradictions and absurdities. They say also, that for reasons hereafter to be given, the Trinitarian hypothesis is full of contradictions and absurdities: therefore notwithstanding they allow that we are under an obligation to believe every thing that is really and truly revealed in scripture, they conclude that the Trinitarian exposition must necessarily be erroneous, however numerous the texts adduced in its behalf.

There

There are in scripture *three* denominations which have given rise to the Trinitarian controversy. 1. The Father. 2. The Son. 3. The Holy Ghost, or Holy Spirit.

1. It cannot be denied, but the terms Father and Son, are either expressive of two distinct, intelligent agents, or they are merely two names, terms, or denominations for one and the same intelligent agent. The former part of the dilemma is admitted, and the latter is denied, both by Trinitarians and Unitarians. Sabellians indeed have called themselves Trinitarians, but by the latter term I mean such are strictly so, according to the plain and obvious meaning of the words of the articles, and the Athanasian Creed,

2. The terms Father, and Holy Spirit, are either expressive of two distinct, intelligent agents, or they are merely two names, terms, or denomi-

nations for one and the same intelligent agent. The former is asserted by the Trinitarians, who deny the latter, and the former is denied by the Unitarians, who insist that the Holy Spirit is not a distinct, intelligent agent.

3. The terms Son and Holy Spirit, are either expressive of two distinct, intelligent agents, or are merely two names, terms or denominations, for one and the same intelligent agent; (*i. e.* upon the Trinitarian supposition, that the Holy Spirit is an intelligent agent.) The Trinitarians maintain the former, and deny the latter part of the dilemma.

It is evident, that even on the Trinitarian hypothesis, one or the other side of each of the foregoing dilemmas must be true.

The sum of the Trinitarian Doctrine, as delivered in the thirty-nine articles, and the Athanasian Creed, is as follows.

a There

a There is but one living and true God.

b The Father is the living and true God.

c The Son is the living and true God.

d The Holy Ghost is the living and true God.

e The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are equally possessed of all the properties and attributes of the Deity. They are co-eternal, co-equal, con-substantial, and con-potential.

f The Son is begotten, from everlasting of the Father.

g The Son took man's nature upon him "in the womb of the blessed Virgin, of her substance, so that two whole and perfect natures, the godhead and the manhood, were joined together in one person never to be divided."

b The Holy Ghost proceeded from the Father and the Son.

I. Whatever God be, it evidently follows from the preceding Trinitarian positions, that he cannot be an intelligent agent; for if it be possible to express in language a contradiction, a contradiction is expressed in saying that, "Three intelligent agents are one intelligent agent."

II. Whatever God be, he must, on that hypothesis, be something in some respects different from the Father. For either the Son is in some respects different from the Father, or he is in every respect the same as the Father; that is, he is the Father; but this is contrary to the first dilemma. The Son therefore is in some respects different from the Father. But by *c* and *g* the Son is in no respect different from God, for he is the very and eternal God (Article second); therefore the
very

very and eternal God is something in some respect different from the Father. But difference and identity are opposites: therefore the Father is not the very and eternal God.

I see no method of avoiding this consequence, but by insisting that the Father, is a term of larger comprehension than God, so that the Father may be God, and yet be something that God is not. But this will still make the Father, something different from, something else than, something beside the true, very and eternal God.

III. & IV. By the same mode of argument it may be proved, that the Son and the Holy Spirit, are beings in some respects different from God. But how three beings, each in some respects different from the very and eternal God, can yet be jointly and separately that same, very and eternal God, let the Trinitarians explain.

V. If

V. If the Father be in all respects the same as God, that is, if the terms Father and God be coincident, which they must be, unless God be allowed to be something different from the Father: moreover, if (for the same reason) the terms Son and God, and Holy Ghost and God be also coincident, then the terms Father and Son, Father and Holy Ghost, Son and Holy Ghost will be also coincident, that is to say, it will follow that the Father is the Son, and also that he is the Holy Ghost, also that the Son is the Holy Ghost, and that they are all three, one identical intelligent agent, contrary to the dilemmas and the language of the Trinitarians.

VI. As the Father is God; the Son God; and the Holy Ghost God; the terms Father and God; Son and God; Holy Ghost and God must be coincident, and include the same meaning. But according to the Trinitarian hypothesis,

thesis, God consists of three persons ; “ three persons in one God ” (Litany) viz. the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Hence the Father consists of three persons, viz. himself, the Son, and the Holy Ghost : the Son of three persons ; himself, the Father, and the Holy Ghost ; and the Holy Ghost of three persons, himself, the Father and the Son. Whatever meaning the Trinitarians may chuse to affix to the term person, yet surely it may very properly be asked, “ how can these things be ? ”

VII. The essence of a thing, is defined to be, that by which a thing is what it is : that which distinguishes a thing from every other thing. (Chambers : Bailey :) Hence a thing can have but one essence ; for every characteristic by which it is distinguished from every thing else, and by which it is what it is, belongs to its essence. This term is much used by the Trinitarians, and is adopted (I should presume) of course
as

as most expressive in its signification, of the meaning they intend to convey.

The Trinitarians allow, that the three persons in the Trinity, are three distinct, intelligent agents. Yet each of these persons, according to them, actually partake of, possess, and enjoy the essence of God ; which essence is by the term, single, and appropriate to one existence alone. The Trinitarians assert, that the case is thus, but acknowledge that they do not understand how it is so.

The Father being God, either possesses the *whole* essence of God, or he does not. Now, whether the essence of God, be something unique uncompounded and indivisible or not, if the Father do not possess that whole essence, he cannot, in the first case (*i. e.* of its being uncompounded, indivisible) possess it at all, and therefore is not God at all ; and in the latter case, he possesses it
only

only partially, and therefore is only partially God, neither of which a Trinitarian will allow. Hence he must allow, that the Father being God entirely, completely and totally possesses the essence of God, in order to his being God. But if the entire essence of the Deity be possessed by the Father, how can it be also entirely possessed by the Son, and also entirely possessed by the Holy Ghost, which is necessary to their being what the Trinitarians say they are, the very and true God? Yet in the words of the Trinitarians, are these three persons "co-essential!"

It follows as a corollary from this article, 1. That it is not incumbent in the opinion of the Trinitarians, upon the subscribers to a proposition, previously to understand the proposition to be subscribed. 2. An Unitarian would deduce as a corollary, that one only of the persons in the Trinity can be God; and no more.

VIII. Let

VIII. Let the Trinitarian supposition be adopted, that each of the three persons is with the others co-essentially God. Then it will follow, that each of the beings termed God, viz. God the Father; God the Son; and God the Holy Ghost; consists of two separate essences; one by which he is God; and another by which he is the Father, Son, or Holy Ghost: but the definition of an essence seems to exclude this.

IX. *Substance*; is regarded by authors as *nomen generalissimum*, the most comprehensive term in nature. This every logical compendium lays down. The Trinitarians therefore, not having, according to the thirty-nine articles and the Athanasian Creed, disputed, or changed the usual meaning of the term, it is to be presumed they use it according to its common acceptation. God then is a substance. But each of the three persons in the Trinity, (since
according

according to the Trinitarians, they are not identical, or coincident, but actually distinct;) is also a substance. Hence from Trinitarian premises, it follows that God consists of three (if not of four) substances; that is, one substance is three substances!

X. If the Father be that substance which we call God; then he is so, either entirely or partially. But he is not so partially, because in that case he would be only partially God; which a Trinitarian would be unwilling to allow. The Father therefore is entirely or totally that substance which we term God. Therefore he is so exclusively of the Son and Holy Ghost, who therefore are not in any respect, God. But the Trinitarians maintain notwithstanding, that they are each of them in every respect God!

XI. & XII. It will follow in like manner, according to all the acknowledged

ledged rules of reasoning, that if the Son be wholly and entirely that substance, which is termed God; the Father and the Holy Ghost must be wholly and entirely excluded from the title. Also if the Holy Ghost be totally and entirely that substance termed God; the Father and the Son can have no claim to that denomination.

XIII. Let it be supposed (for argument's sake only) that the terms essence and substance may have a meaning affixed to them at some future time, by some defender of the Trinitarian Doctrine more acute than his fellow-labourers or predecessors, by which the conclusions drawn above, may be apparently obviated: what are we to think of a doctrine which condemns to eternal torments (Athanaf. Creed) those who pay not implicit faith to, and thoroughly adopt opinions that cannot be cleared of contradictions, unless by means of a perversion of all the

the rules of language, of all the known meanings of the terms used, and all the acknowledged rules of reasoning? And which on the improbable supposition (to the Unitarians at least) that by these means the contradictions can be in some measure concealed or eluded, yet it is impossible that the doctrine can be made intelligible to the millionth part of those, who in words are taught by rote to adopt it? And which, in fact, whenever its advocates have attempted to explain it, has been explained in a different manner by every one; and their explanations have served no other purpose than to make an obscure subject obscurer, and furnish ground even to themselves for mutual and disgraceful reproaches and public accusations of ignorance and heterodoxy? These remarks however, would be more seasonable perhaps a few pages hence; for we have not yet waded through half the contradictions

I i and

and absurdities charged upon the doctrine in question.

XIV. It is generally allowed, that the first and principal characteristic of the Deity is, that he is self-existent. But according to the Trinitarian hypothesis, all the three persons of the Trinity are God; and as such are all self-existent; but the same arguments that prove God to be self-existent, prove also that there can be only one self-existent being.

XV. Whatever being is God, is in consequence self-existent; but the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are each God; hence each of them is self-existent; but the Trinitarians say, the Father only is self-existent, the Son being begotten, and the Holy Ghost having proceeded!

XVI. The Trinitarians say, that
 "The Son was begotten of the Father
 from

from everlasting." The Unitarians say, that if the term begotten have any meaning at all, it must be that the person begotten was subsequent in order of time to the person begetting, consequently, according to the common acceptation of the terms, the sentence above quoted contains a contradiction. Any sense of the word everlasting different from the common one, or that which implies a negation of commencement, will destroy the eternity of the Son.

XVII. The terms Son and Father, according to every known acceptation of them, imply a priority of time, as well as a priority of rank in the Father, and a subordination of time and of rank in the Son. If the universal signification of these terms is not to be followed, why adopt them? Nothing can be clearer than that in an argument the words used should either be taken in their common ac-

ception, or the new sense in which they are used, should be clearly expressed and strictly adhered to. But the Trinitarians, without affixing any new sense to the terms Father and Son, employ them; and with their usual consistency assert of the persons in the Trinity, "none is afore or after another; none is greater or less than another!"

XVIII. "The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, and yet there are not three Gods, but one God." The Unitarians have always objected to this, and their objection has never yet been done away, that as the Trinitarians allow that the term God here used, has the same meaning each time, and as they allow moreover, that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not one, but three distinct beings, it is impossible to express in language a stronger

stronger contradiction than this sentence contains.

XIX. When the Son was begotten of the Father, either the Father was God, or he was not. The latter supposition will of course be rejected; but if he was God, then did God beget either himself or another God. Chuse ye whether.

XX. In like manner, as to the procession of the Holy Ghost; it may reasonably be asked, how can one thing, or being, in *any possible manner* proceed from another without that other previously existed?

XXI. Also, how can the consequence be avoided, if the Holy Ghost be God, and also proceeded from the Father and the Son, that God did not proceed from himself? that is, begin to exist in consequence of having previously existed? This begetting of

the Son, and procession of the Holy Ghost, ill accords with the co-eternity and co-equality of the three persons !

XXII. No person of any kind of authority as a writer, whose writings I have met with or heard of, ever considered the subject of the existence of God, but conceived that he was necessarily self-existent, unoriginated, independant. Even Trinitarian divines acknowledge this as a truth incontestable ; and yet they scruple not to assert at the same time, that the Son, and the Holy Ghost, both of whom are God, depend for their existence on the Father ; who begat the one, and from whom, with the second, proceeded the third !

XXIII. " God of God, light of light, very God of very God," says Nicene Creed ; and Trinitarians repeat the sentence. But if there be any meaning annexed to the words, it can be
no

no other than that the thing begotten, is identically the same with that which begetteth it. For the terms used are perfectly identical. If this be not a contradiction, what amounts to a contradiction?

XXIV. If God could multiply himself, and beget another God, in any one instance, nothing hinders, as far as we know, but he could make the same exertion of omnipotence in innumerable other instances. So that Gods, or participators of the godhead, *may*, for aught we know, be infinite in number.

XXV. The two last arguments will hold true concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit. The thing proceeding, and the thing from which it proceedeth, upon the Trinitarian hypothesis, are identically the same: and there may, for aught that appears, be Holy Spirits innumerable.

XXVI. If each of the three persons in the Trinity be by himself God and Lord, then, whatever is said to be done by God, by the Lord, by the Father, by the Son, or by the Holy Spirit, may with equal propriety be said to be done by any one, or by all of them together. So that the language of the Scripture, on the Trinitarian hypothesis, is nothing but confusion and tautology.

XXVII. It is allowed by the Trinitarians, that in the Trinity there are three separate persons, or distinct, intelligent agents. These persons, possess the attributes of the godhead, either,

1. In their distinct personal capacity : or,
2. In their conjoint capacity : or,
3. In both.

1. Suppose they possess these attributes in their distinct personal capacities ; as
indeed

indeed the Trinitarians expressly assert that they do : then the consequence is unavoidable, that there are three distinct Gods. The Trinitarians may deny this ; and in like manner may I deny that two and two make four ; but if their readers have common sense, a mere denial, such as hath hitherto been given, will weigh nothing.

Again ; if they possess these attributes in their distinct personal capacities, then as all these attributes are infinite in quality and extent, there will be three separate beings possessed of infinite properties or attributes, which is absurd. There will be, for instance, three omnipotencies, three omnipresencies, &c. The Athanasian Creed says, we must not assert this, and Trinitarians deny that it can follow from their principles ; but what signifies (as I have observed before) a mere denial ? Any man, with sufficient effrontery, may positively and repeatedly

peatedly deny the truth of every axiom in Euclid.

2. Suppose the three persons in the Trinity possess the attributes of the godhead not in their separate, but their conjoint capacity: then as distinct persons, of intelligent agents, they are none of them God. And God may be something different, or distinct from the persons of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Which conclusion, were I a Trinitarian, I should be loath to admit.

3. Suppose these attributes are possessed, neither in their distinct capacities solely as persons, nor solely in their joint capacity: then follow the absurdities of both the last paragraphs together, which, as a Trinitarian, I should be still more loath to admit. Nor do I see whither a Trinitarian can fly for shelter from the absurdities of his opinions, without subjecting himself

himself to be haunted by absurdities of equal magnitude in return, while he continues a Trinitarian.

XXVIII. The doctrine of the separate existence of abstract ideas, seems now thoroughly exploded. It has declined, from the days of Occam and Duns Scotus. *Virtus sine substantia subsistere non potest*. That is, there can be no attribute or property, but what must be the attribute or property of some individual; and which though similar to, is not the same, or identical with the attribute or property of the same name, inherent in any other individual. “How
“can the assertion be cleared of contradiction, (as Chillingworth observes, Rel. Prot. ch. v. sec. 46) that
“there should be length, and nothing
“long; breadth, and nothing broad;
“thickness and nothing thick, &c.
“that is, that there should be a long,
“broad, thick, white, round, heavy,
“sweet, moist, flowing, active, passive,
“nothing?”

“ nothing ?” Hence the attributes of the godhead, either belong separately to each of the persons of the Trinity, or to some other being beside the persons of the Trinity, or they do not exist at all: and either of the alternatives is pregnant with such consequences as none but a Trinitarian can digest. The first involves Tritheism; the second Polytheism; the third Atheism.

Such are part of the conclusions evidently deducible from the doctrine of the Trinity, as expressed in the thirty-nine articles, and the Creed called the Athanasian Creed.*

* Setting aside the absurdity of ascribing this Creed to St. Athanasius, when it is notoriously a much later composition, containing neither his expressions, nor his opinions, there is a contradiction in terms (as Taylor observes) in the expressions of the Creed itself: “ There is one person (*υποστασις*) of the Father, another of the Son, &c.” In another part it asserts that “ God and man are one altogether not by confusion of substance, but by *unity of person* (*υποστασεως*).”

Those

Those which might easily be drawn from that strange absurdity of the two natures in Jesus Christ, which includes the very grossest anthropomorphitism, and supposes that the very and eternal God became an infant in the womb, and suffered death upon the cross, I omit; because any one may conceive in what manner they flow from this opinion, after perusing what hath been already urged; and also because I think that after what has been advanced concerning the miraculous conception, in the Theological Repository, and in Priestley's History of Opinions concerning Christ, very little doubt will remain in the mind of any candid person who will take the trouble of considering the subject, but that the account of this miraculous conception in the new Testament is undoubtedly spurious.^b

^b See also the satisfactory observations on the doctrine of the divine and human natures of Christ, in Taylor's Lett. of Ben Mordecai, 4to. Lett. I. p. 56, 57, 58, and 59.

I proceed

I proceed to state some obvious considerations that appear to me strong presumptive arguments in favour of the Unitarian hypothesis.

1. I think the origin and progress of the doctrine of the Trinity, a very strong argument against its truth. The following points of ecclesiastical history seem sufficiently established.

a That the Jews universally were Unitarians :

b That the first christians for a long time, whether Jewish or Gentile, Ebionites, Nazarenes, or Alogi, were Unitarians.

c That the Unitarians, especially among the common people, continued the majority in the days of Tertullian, and even of Athanasius, the middle of the fourth century.

d Athanasius

d Athanasius himself and Chrysostom confess, that the apostles were silent with respect to the divinity and miraculous conception of Christ, and account for it, from their fear of offending the first converts, till these were well established in the belief of the Messiahship of Christ. Athanasius moreover ascribes the prevalency of Unitarianism among the Gentile converts, to their connection with the Jewish christians, who were Unitarians.

e Hegesippus, the first christian historian, Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, and Irenæus, who treat of the heresies of their times, do not reckon among them, the opinions of the Unitarians, which most certainly were extremely prevalent in their day.

f The divinity of Christ, and the personality and divinity of the Holy Ghost were not introduced at once, but by degrees. No clear traces of these

these doctrines can be found in the more ancient fathers, Clemens Romanus, the Pastor of Hermas, Polycarp, &c. This is so much the case, that the silence of an ancient father concerning the abstruse controversies of the Trinity is deemed a criterion^e to establish his antiquity. The word Trinity itself, was unknown till used by Theophilus and Tatian, in the beginning of the third century after Christ, and then it consisted only of *God*, the *Word*, and *Wisdom*.

g The Trinitarian hypothesis was gradually and cautiously introduced by the Gentile converts among the philosophers of the Alexandrian school, where the Platonic and Oriental Philosophy was in great vogue, insomuch as to be termed by way of eminence *knowledge*; (γνωσις.) As these Gnostic chris-

^e *Vid.* Letters of Ben Mordecai, 4to. Lett. I. p. 28. See also Mosheim, Ecc. Hist. 8vo. edit. vol. I. p. 149, 296, and 372.

tians among the Gentile converts, were by far the most learned among the professors of christianity, the defence of it of course devolved upon them, and their authority in consequence, was of great weight in the christian church in their day.

The characteristic of this sect of philosophers was pride, and it is a remarkable circumstance, which Mosheim^d notices from Eusebius, that even when they were elected Presbyters, they could not be prevailed on to lay aside their philosopher's cloaks; preserving even in their outward appearance an admixture of their profession while heathens, with their newly adopted character of christians: hence their anxiety to exalt Christ above the rank in which the Scriptures had placed him. The characteristic of their philosophy consisted chiefly in their opinion of the emanation of superior intelligencies

^d Vol. I. p. 137.

termed *Æons*, from the substance of the Supreme Being; the pre-existence of all souls, and the depravity of matter. Plato had mentioned the Logos; John had mentioned the Logos also. The Platonic, or Gnostic christians, with the Eclectics, having propagated their motley opinions, the Logos by degrees became personified; then deified, and at length exalted (on the supposition of his being Christ) to an equality with the Supreme Being. The same was the case, very gradually with the Holy Ghost. First, but cautiously he became personified, and was considered probably by some as a superior emanent intelligence, by others as a creature made by Christ; next, the third person of the Trinity. The author of the recognitions held that he was a creature created by the Son. *Origen**

* Mosheim (vol. I. p. 334.) says, that *Origen* held the Holy Ghost was nothing more than the divine energy or active force. But *Origen* does not appear to have been settled in his opinion on this subject.

appears

appears to have been of the same opinion: *Eusebius* was certainly so, for he expresses it. *Tertullian* confounds him with the Logos; *Lactantius* denied his personality: *Novatian* and *Dionysius* of Alexandria, assert his inferiority to the Father and the Son. Nor does the modern opinion concerning him appear in the other antenicene fathers. The council of Nice, though the procession of the Holy Ghost, from the Father and the Son, has crept into the Nicene Creed, determined nothing either as to his divinity, or even his personality. It was in consequence of the opinions of *Macedonius*, that the personification and deification of the Holy Ghost, became established at the second of the councils holden at Constantinople in 381. But even there, thirty-six bishops dissented, and the *Pneumatomachi* were long numerous.

b Justin Martyr, who appears first to have introduced the notion of Christ's

pre-existence, so far from mentioning it as a point settled and indisputable, apologises for it, as an opinion rather of his own, than generally adopted. He had a strong motive moreover for exalting Christ beyond the rank of mere humanity; namely, his writing to an heathen emperor in recommendation of christianity; and the Apotheosis of great personages was then becoming fashionable. But neither he, nor any of the Fathers before the Nicene council, conceived the idea of Christ's equality with the Father.

Such is a brief account of the origin of the Trinitarian hypothesis. It may be still more briefly traced in the words of Priestley: "The first general council gave the Son the same nature with the Father; the second admitted the Holy Spirit into the Trinity; the third assigned Christ a human soul in conjunction with the eternal Logos; the fourth settled the hypostatic union of the divine
"and

“and human natures of Christ; and
 “the fifth affirmed, that in conse-
 “quence of this union, the two na-
 “tures constituted only one person.”^f

From this account it is evident, that as you approach to the times of Christ and his apostles, when the doctrines of christianity may fairly be presumed the most free from corruption, as nearest their source, *Unitarianism* was generally and even universally prevalent: on the contrary, as you recede from the times of Christ and his apostles, and in proportion as a vain philosophy became gradually intermingled with christianity, Unitarianism declined, and the absurdities of the Trinitarian hypothesis, and the infamous and bloody disputes conse-

^f My authorities for this account will be found in Mosheim, vol. I. Taylor's Letters of Ben Mordecai, Lett. I. Priestley's Corruptions of Christianity, vol. I. His History of Opinions concerning Christ, vol. I. and his controversy with Horsely and Badcock.

quent thereon prevailed in the world.
 "In the year 317 (says Mosheim) a
 "new contention arose. The subject
 "of this fatal controversy, which
 "kindled such deplorable divisions
 "throughout the christian world, was
 "the doctrine of *the three persons in*
 "*the Godhead*; a doctrine, which in
 "the three preceding centuries had
 "happily escaped the vain curiosity
 "of human researches, and been left
 "undefined, and undetermined by any
 "particular set of ideas."* Such a
 deduction as this, stands in need of a
 short comment.

2. It is a presumption in favour of
 the Unitarian opinion, that it is strictly
 conformable in its idea of God, with
 what may be demonstrated by the light
 of nature, and expressed in intelligible
 and consistent language, and level with
 the capacities of men in general.

The Trinitarian hypothesis on the
 contrary, is such as not only, can

never be demonstrated by the light of nature, but is quite discordant therewith; and so far from being conveyable in consistent and intelligible language, is expressed in terms contradictory to themselves, according to their general and notorious acceptation, and has never yet been understood by any of its most learned advocates.

3. The Unitarian opinion contains every thing necessary to influence the dispositions and the practice of men on the side of morality.

The Trinitarian hypothesis, consists of points merely speculative; such as cannot be explained, confessedly; for they are *mysteries*; and therefore can have no practical influence: and if they could be explained, no practical inference that I can conceive, has been, or can be drawn from them.

4. Among those christians, who have adopted the Unitarian opinion,

there have been, and could have been none of those cruel persecutions and bloody disputes, which are so justly deemed the opprobrium of the christian world. This opinion is too plain and simple to engender among its advocates such controversies,

Neither have the Unitarians been charged, as far as I recollect, throughout the whole of Ecclesiastical History, with that unchristian animosity against the maintainers of other opinions, which has given occasion to such severe reflections as,

Ye who in different sects were sham'd,
And come to see each other damned.

But is not christian ecclesiastical history composed principally of two parts; the quarrels of the Trinitarians among themselves; and the quarrels of the Trinitarians with those who were not of that denomination? Inasmuch as to make the very name of christianity, such as they profess, and such as they practice,

practice, "to stink in the nostrils" of men of common sense, and common decency, who have not been paid for supporting it, and have had the spirit to think for themselves? The case is notoriously thus.

If therefore we take the criterion to guide us which Christ has recommended, "by their fruits shall ye know them," how can we even for a moment hesitate, where to side!

5. It is a presumption highly favourable to the Unitarian opinion, that it is of all others conceiveable, the most opposite to the pagan notions concerning the Supreme Being, prevalent at the time of our Saviour.

The Trinitarian hypothesis, on the contrary, so far from being opposite to the general characteristic of the pagan opinions, is hardly to be distinguished by common and unlettered under-

understandings, at least, from Polytheism; and indeed some of its most learned advocates have been publicly and repeatedly accused by others of its learned advocates, of explaining the Trinity into Polytheism. Nor can any unprejudiced person doubt in the least, but that the *real* idea actually annexed to the doctrine of the Trinity by those who profess to be Trinitarians, whether learned or unlearned, is that of three separate Gods; viz. God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. It is easy for a learned man to assert in words what is not true in fact, and to impose upon others, and perhaps himself, by heaping together a number of verbal distinctions, to which he has no clear ideas annexed; but I make no scruple of appealing to my reader, whether his actual and common notion of the Trinity be not that of three distinct Gods, as I have represented it.

6. Is it not a presumption also highly favourable to the Unitarian opinion, that it is such an one as the APOSTLES may very easily be conceived perfectly to comprehend, and easily to convey. Whereas from the very nature of the Trinitarian doctrine it cannot be intelligibly taught, not merely by the learned of this and former centuries, but by any human creature whatever? Would not the doctrine of three divine persons, in one divine nature (or essence, or substance) be distinguished with great difficulty, from Tritheism, by persons who had all their lives been Polytheists like the gentile christians?

7. It is a presumption in favour of the Unitarian hypothesis, that it requires no metaphysics, but to controvert the opinions of its adversaries.

The Trinitarian notions on the contrary, are founded on metaphysical and mystical

mystical explanations of simple and obvious passages. It requires moreover a considerable degree of ingenuity even to comprehend the abstruse expositions of it (so far as they are in themselves comprehensible) which are given by its advocates individually, or the church (that is the establishment) of England collectively: but surely an opinion of such supposed importance was never designed (if it be just) to be confined to the learned only: and in the present state of things, the unlearned are very little the wiser for the doctrine, and most assuredly not the better.

8. If the Trinitarian hypothesis were true at all, it is reasonable to conclude that since one great end of the mission of our Saviour was to propagate just notions concerning the Deity, in lieu of the false and idolatrous opinions of the heathens on that subject, this doctrine of the Trinity *would be so plainly and repeatedly delivered*, that no mistake could

could possibly arise concerning it; and yet so far is this from having been the case, that (as we have seen) the majority of christians, for three centuries at least, were Unitarians, and from the time of Justin Martyr to the present day scarcely two divines have perfectly agreed in their notions concerning it. The disputes among the Trinitarians of the Establishment, in the time of king William, ran so high, that the farther discussion of the subject was forbidden: and yet strange to say, each of the Polemics appeal to the *Bible*!

9. It is a presumption highly favourable to the Unitarian opinion, that its advocates can have had no motive to induce them to adopt it, but its intrinsic verity: on the contrary, every motive which human means are capable of furnishing to suppress an opinion, have been exerted to *suppress* the opinion, that neither Christ nor the Holy Ghost appear from the scriptures to be entitled

to

to the name of God, or to divine honours.

The Trinitarian, or opposite opinion however, has been *supported* for these fourteen centuries with all the honours and emoluments that national establishments have had to bestow. The iron hand of the secular power has gone with it; and those who have enlisted under its banners have not been sparing in their application to that power. Yet has it been drooping for many years in this and in other countries; and that in the exact proportion of increased knowledge, whether national or individual. Would this have been the case had *truth* been its companion?

10. It is a presumption also in favour of the Unitarian opinion, that it is more than countenanced by a great number of *express and exclusive* passages of scripture, while the opposite opinion is not expressed in *any one* genuine passage through-

throughout the Bible, but gathered by implications directly opposite in their intent, to the letter and spirit of the Unitarian passages above-mentioned, as well as to the general tenor of the rest of scripture. Thus of thirteen hundred passages^a in the New Testament wherein the word God is mentioned, not *one* of them necessarily implies a plurality of persons. The inferiority of Christ to the Father is deducible from two hundred and forty passages in which Christ is noticed in the New Testament. In four hundred and one passages God the Father is so mentioned as to lead to the conclusion that he is *supreme*. Some such passages (enough I apprehend to satisfy any serious inquirer) I have collected as follows.

Passages, wherein God is mentioned in such a manner, as to exclude any other being whatever from the title, save one.

^a Hopkin's Queries on Art. 3.

In

In the Old Testament. Exod. xx. 3. Thou shalt have *no other* Gods before me. Deut. v. 7. Thou shalt have *no other* Gods before me. Ch. iv. 35. Unto thee it was shewed, that thou mightest know that the LORD, he is God, *there is none else besides him*. Ver. 39. Know therefore this day and consider in thine heart, that the Lord he is God in the heaven above, and upon the earth beneath ; *and there is none else*. Ch. xxxv. 39. See now that I, even I am he, and *there is no God with me*. 2 Sam. vii. 22. Wherefore thou art great O Lord God, for there is none like thee, *neither is there any God beside thee*, according to all that we have heard with our ears. Ch. xxii. 32. For *who* is God save the Lord, and who is a rock save our God? 1 Kings xviii. 39. And when all the people saw it, they fell on their faces, and they said, the Lord *he is the God*, the Lord *he is the God*. 2 Kings xix. 15. O Lord God of Israel which dwellest between the cherubims, thou

thou art the God, *even thou alone*.
 Ver. 19. That all the kingdoms of the
 earth may know that thou art the Lord
 God, *even thou only*. 1 Chron. xvii. 20.
 O Lord, there is none like thee, *neither
 is there any God beside thee*, according to
 all that we have heard with our ears.
 Ps. xviii. 31. For *who* is God, save the
 Lord, and *who* is a rock, save our God ?
 Ps. lxxxvi. 10. For thou art great and
 doest wondrous things : *thou art God
 alone*. Is. xxxvii. 16. O Lord of hosts,
 God of Israel that dwellest between the
 cherubims, thou art the God, *even thou
 alone*. Ch. xlv. 6. I am the first and
 I am the last, and *besides me there is no
 God*. Ver. 8. Is there a God besides
 me ? *Yea, there is no God, I know not
 any*. Ch. xlv. 5. I am the Lord, and
*there is none else ; there is no God besides
 me*. Ver. 21. *There is no God else beside
 me ; a just God and a Saviour ; there is
 none beside me*. Ver. 22. I am God, and
there is none else. Hof. xiii. 4. Yet I
 am the Lord thy God, from the land of

Egypt, and thou shalt know *no God but me, for there is no Saviour beside me.*

I have quoted these passages from the Old Testament at length, because I think they are of themselves perfectly conclusive, that neither Christ nor the Holy Ghost, are God. I think this will be evident from the following considerations,

1. The passages themselves do in express terms, purposely framed even to tautology, exclude every other being whatever, save *one* numerically, from the title of God.

2. The pronouns used respecting this one God, are all singular; *I, he.*

3. The Jews were surrounded with Polytheists; and they were perhaps the only nation in the world, who believed in the unity of the Deity, to the exclusion of all other beings from
the

the title of God. Now considering the number of passages wherein, in the the Old Testament, God is mentioned as one being only, or at least apparently so, if the doctrine of the Trinity were true, it is highly probable that great care would have been taken, that these passages should not operate to the exclusion of the idea of a Trinity among the Jews; and also that accurate and evident distinctions would have been made, between the doctrine of a Trinity, and the Polytheistical notions of the heathens; that the one might not be confounded with the other; but through the whole of the Old Testament, there is none such.

4. The Jews, on the contrary, always have been, and still continue Unitarians; nor is there the least trace of a Trinitarian doctrine extant among them in any age, or a Trinitarian exposition in any of their writings. Surely, if it was intended, as divines generally

assert that it was, that the Jews should preserve just notions concerning the Supreme Being, and were, for that purpose, forbidden to intermix with the Polytheistical nations amidst whom they lived; it is a most wonderful circumstance that this cautious exclusion, together with all the teachings of Moses and the other prophets should never in one clear instance have had the designed effect! To this day our Trinitarian notions are the first among their objections to christianity.

5. It is now universally agreed, that Christ was the Messiah. It is evident also, that the scripture passages above cited, and all other prophetic parts of the Old Testament were addressed to, and designed for the instruction of the Jews. But it is also notorious, that the Jews never had an idea that their Messiah was to be the very and eternal God himself, as the Trinitarian christians suppose Christ to be. Does not
this

this general tenor of the Old Testament, together with the interpretation put upon these passages by the very people for whose instruction they were delivered (and which moreover is undoubtedly the plainest and *most obvious* interpretation, whatever may be the true one) prove, either that the Trinitarian notion is in direct opposition to the notions inculcated in the Old Testament, and to the Jewish nation, or else that there is a most unaccountable want of precision, in the doctrine taught by persons generally presumed to be inspired?

6. Something is indeed said in the *Old Testament* concerning the Messiah, but nothing from whence it can be concluded that he is the very and eternal God; but still less room is there in the *Old Testament* for the conclusion that the Holy Ghost is God, which if true, is certainly a point full as important, and necessary to be communi-

cated, as that either of the other two persons, or all three are God.

So far is the divinity of the Holy Ghost from being evident in the Old Testament, that there is not one single passage therein from whence it can even possibly be conjectured, by any one who attends to the Hebrew idiom. The attempts that have been made by Trinitarian expositors formerly, to deduce the doctrine of the Trinity from the Old Testament, have been so inconceivably absurd, that even Trinitarians, of *modern* times, reject them entirely. The council of *Sirmium* indeed anathematized all who denied that God the Father spake to God the Son, when he said, "Let us make man," &c.ⁱ And "Meyer, who wrote a book *De "Mysterio Sacro Sanctæ Trinitatis ex "solius veteris Testamenti Libris demon- "strato*, urges as the text which is

ⁱ Jortin's Remarks, vol. II. p. 244, who quotes Socrates Hist. Eccl. 2. p. 30.

" the

“ the most clear and conclusive of all.
 “ Deut. vi. 4. Hear, O Israel, the
 “ Lord our God is one Lord : in which
 “ he is not at all singular (says Jortin)
 “ many of his cabbalistic brethren
 “ having made the same remark on
 “ the same text. The famous *Postellus*
 “ observed, that there were eleven
 “ thousand proofs of the Trinity in the
 “ Old Testament interpreted rightly,
 “ that is, ετυμολογικο - μυσικο - καββαλιστικως. ” ^k

But explanations which imply such gross ignorance, or palpable neglect of Hebrew phraseology, convince no longer.

The passages that assert the numerical unity of the Supreme Being in the *New Testament*, are equally explicit with the preceding quotations from the *Old*.

Matt. xix. 17. Mark xii. 29, 32.
John xvii. 1, 3. Rom. iii. 30. xvi.

^k Ibid. vol. III. p. 100.

27. 1 Cor. viii. 4, 6. Gal. iii. 20.
 Ephes. iv. 4 to 6. 1 Tim. i. 17.
 ii. 5. vi. 14 to 16. James ii. 19.
 Jude 4. Rev. xv. 3, 4.

The Unitarians say, that if there be any meaning in language, the above quotations prove God to be numerically one.

In the following texts the Son is declared to be, and to act in all things subordinate to the Father, and to derive all his power and authority from the Father.

Matt. vii. 21. x. 40. xi. 25 to 27.
 xii. 50. xvi. 27. xix. 17. xx. 23.
 xxvi. 39 to 53. xxvii. 46. xxviii.
 18, 19. Mark ix. 37. xiii. 32. Luke
 iv. 18, 43. x. 16. xxii. 29. John
 iii. 16, 17, 32 to 35. iv. 34. v. 19
 to 43. vi. 38 to 40. vii. 16 to 42.
 viii. 49, 54. ix. 4. x. 17 to 37. xi.
 22, 41, 42. xii. 44 to 50. xiii. 3, 31,
 32.

32. xiv. 10 to 31. xvi. 5. xvii. 1 to 25. xviii. 11. xx. 17, 21. These are the passages of the *gospels* wherein we have the words of Christ himself; who surely would not so frequently have used, such strong expressions as the preceding passages contain, of his inferiority and subordination to the Father, if the case had not been that he really was so. The other passages of the New Testament that prove the same point, may be seen collected by Dr. Clarke, in his *Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity*.

Whatever the HOLY SPIRIT be, he or it, is said to be under the power, dominion, and direction of the FATHER, in the following passages; which of course put a negative on his coequality with the latter.

Matt. xii. 18. Luke xi. 13. John
iii. 34. xiv. 16, 17, 26. xv. 26.
xvi. 13. Acts ii. 17, 18, 33. v. 32.
viii.

viii. 18 to 20. x. 38. xi. 17. xv. 8.
 Rom. v. 5. viii. 2. 1 Cor. ii. 10 to
 12. vi. 19. xii. 6 to 9. 2 Cor. i. 22.
 v. 5. Ephes. i. 17. iii. 16. 1 Theff.
 iv. 8. 2 Theff. ii. 13. 2 Tim. i. 7.
 Tit. 3 to 6. Heb. ii. 4. 1 John iii.
 24. iv. 13.

Is it not something very extraordinary upon the supposition of the co-equality of the three persons in the Trinity, that there should be such strong, and such numerous passages that lead to the conclusion of the inferiority and absolute subjection of the Son, and the Holy Ghost to the Father, and yet that there should not be one passage throughout the Bible that can any way induce us to conclude the subordination, real or apparent, of the Father, to the Son or Holy Spirit?

There is no kind of doubt, but every man must form some opinion on a subject that he has attended to. Of course

course he will adopt that opinion which he thinks right. Thus the translators of our Bible, according to the fashion of the times, were Trinitarians. And of course also, they translated the Bible, in conformity to their Trinitarian notions. And they did right. Were a Socinian to make a new translation, he would translate under the guidance of his Socinian opinions; and properly: every man has a right to promote by all fair means, that opinion which he deems conformable to truth. But let it for a moment be supposed, that the words *το πνευμα αγιον*, had been translated according to their literal import, as a person unbiassed by either opinion would most certainly have rendered them; would a noun of the *neuter* gender be personified, unless figuratively? Or would not *πνευμα* have been rendered, spirit, breath, or inspiration? And if it had been translated literally, and its neuter signification been preserved in the translation, and had

had this translation been authorized in our churches, would any one have entertained a notion, that this holy inspiration, a gift (as it is perpetually termed) was a real personage; hypostatically distinct from the Supreme Being, and yet equal to him in every attribute? I have no conception that it would. The same remark will apply to the terms *ἐκκλησία* *congregation*, which has been rendered *church*; manifestly for the purpose of subjugating our consciences and opinions, to those who call themselves our spiritual rulers: so βαπτίζω *to dip*, which we hellenistically term *baptize*, and thereby conceal the heterodoxy of our practise in baptism, &c.

In the following passages the HOLY SPIRIT is distinguished, not merely from the *Father* or the *Son*, but from *God*. Hence he cannot be the same as God; *i. e.* he cannot be God.

I Cor. ii. 10, 11. iii. 16. vi. 19.

I Pet. iv. 14. Matt. iii. 16. xii. 28.

Rom.

Rom. viii. 9, 14. xv. 19. and in several other places wherein he is termed the Spirit *of God*.

In all the passages however wherein mention is made of the Holy Spirit, the expression has one of the following significations.

1. By a common figure (not literally, as the Trinitarians expound) *God himself*; as in

Gen. vi. 3. Pf. cxxxix. 7. cxliii. 10. If. lxiii. 10. compared with Numb. xiv. 11. Acts v. 3. compared with the next verse; &c. &c.

In like manner by the same figure, the *spirit of a man*, is put for the man himself; as in

Gen. xli. 8. xlv. 27. Deut. ii. 30. Pf. lxxvii. 3. cxliii. 7. lxxvi. 12. Ecclef. iii. 21. Luke i. 47. 1 Cor. xiv.

xiv. 14. xvi. 18. ii. 11. 2 Cor. ii. 13. 2 Tim. ~~v~~ 22. and in many other places in the common translation, and more in the original, as the Bishop of Carlisle has shewn in his Appendix to his Theory of Religion. By the same figure is also frequently put for the man himself.

2. In other passages the Holy Spirit is put for the energy, operation, power, or wisdom of God; as in

Gen. i. 2. Job xxvii. 7. compared with Gen. ii. 7. Ps. xxxiii. 6. Job xxxiii. 4. Is. xxxiv. 16. Luke i. 35. Acts x. 38. &c. &c.

3. Some holy talent, quality or disposition, immediately imparted by God to man; as in

Numb. xi. 17. 2 Sam. xxiii. 2. Ps. li. 11. Is. lxiii. 11. Dan. iv. 8, 9, 18. v. 11, 14. Luke xi. 13. Ephes.

Ephes. i. 13. 1 Theff. iv. 8. and in all those passages before quoted, wherein the Holy Spirit is represented as subordinate to, and under the power, dominion, and direction of the Father. The Son also appears to have had authority and power to import such a talent, quality, gift or disposition, in the passages before quoted, where the Spirit is declared, or implied to be subordinate to the Son. This will also explain the passages, wherein the Holy Ghost is distinguished from the Father.

The other scriptural uses of the term Spirit, seem also conclusive against the Trinitarian meaning affixed to it. Thus we read of

The Spirit of Fear.

The Spirit of Burning.

The Spirit of Slumber.

The Spirit of Whoredom.

The

The Spirit of Counſel.

The Spirit of Divination.

The Spirit of Error, &c.

Such is a brief ſketch of the reaſons that may be adduced againſt the doctrine of three perſons in one God. There is no doubt, but truth will in the end prevail. At preſent, indeed, it is in theological as in political matters, not the weight of argument, but the number of voices that carry the day. Eccleſiaſtical however, as well as political tyranny ſeems on the decline, and it is the duty of every friend of mankind to exert his endeavours unceasingly to haſten their down-fall.

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